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CENTRAL EURASIA



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CONTENTS

29 May 1992

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Lack of Russian 'Concrete Political Decisions' on Kurils Noted	[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 6 May]	1
Western Siberia's Hard Currency Exports Profiled	[DELOVAYA SIBIR No 13, 28 Mar-3 Apr]	2
Chinese Help Plan Free Trade Zone in Chita	[DELOVAYA SIBIR No 16, 18-24 Apr]	5
First Quarter Trade Results Studied	[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI No 9, May]	5
Journalist Views Mujaheddin Rivalry Before Kabul Regime Downfall	[TRUD 25 Apr]	6

INTERREGIONAL AFFAIRS

COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS

Commentary on Tashkent Summit Outcome	[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 21, 20 May]	9
Commentator Pessimistic on CIS Stability	[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 16 May]	9
Union of Dniester Region With Ukraine Advocated	[VECHERNIY KIYEV 21, 23 May]	11
Kryuchkov Lawyer Discusses Accused 'Putschists,' Attacks Press	[MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA 18 Apr]	15
KGB Recruitment, Fear Tactics Said Still in Effect	[MOSCOW NEWS No 14, 5-12 Apr]	18
Attempts to Block Search for CPSU Funds Alleged	[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 21, 20 May]	20

POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Russian-Latvian Relations Assessed After Moscow Talks	[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 7 May]	21
'RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA' Editor on Significance of New Sponsors	[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 19 May]	22

ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

22 Exchange Groups Meet in Samarkand	[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 13 May]	24
Central Asian Exchanges Criticize 'Inert' Political Leadership	[PRAVDA VOSTOKA 7 May]	25
Heavy Industry Wants Direct Ukraine-Russia Ties	[PRAVDA 19 May]	26
Drug Use, Production Up in Central Asia; Burma Role Decried	[Radio Moscow 23 May]	27

RUSSIA

POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Shifting Deputies 'Blocks' at Congress Viewed	[MOSCOW NEWS No 16, 19-26 Apr]	28
Report on Political Struggle for Islamic Revival	[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 8 May]	29

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS

Shmelev Criticizes 'Harshness' of Reforms, Notes Dangers Ahead	[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI No 8, 8 May]	30
Impact of Tax Policy on Business Activity Stressed	[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI No 11, 19 May]	32
Nongovernmental Organizations on Employment Problems	[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 15 May]	33
Decree on Energy Resources Prices	[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 20 May]	34
Maritime Fleet Future Pondered	[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 15 May]	37
'Aeroport' Association Work Highlighted	[VOZDUSHNYY TRANSPORT No 20, May]	40
Decree on Aid to Housing Construction	[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI No 11, 19 May]	42
Order on Preservation of Personnel Records of Liquidated Enterprises	[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI No 11, 19 May]	42
Academy of Sciences Associate on Strike Situation	[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 16 May]	42

Telephone Service Charges to Rise [IZVESTIYA 16 May]	44
Official on Progress, Problems in Agricultural Reforms [ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 13 May]	45
Resolution on Livestock Subsidies [ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI No 11, 19 May]	46
Weekly to Cover Agricultural Exchanges [SELSKAYA ZHIZN 15 May]	47
Increased Drug Trade Expected, Antidrug Campaign Urged [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 7 May]	48
Report On Rising Crime Rate, Few Solutions Seen [KOMMUNISTSKAYA PRAVDA 13 May]	50
Previously Unpublished Documents Reveal Persecution of Church [ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 16 May]	53
Cinematography Minister on Goals, Censorship Issues [LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 20, 13 May]	54

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Former Obkom Secretaries Predominate in Positions of Power [ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 13 May]	56
Situation of 'Northern Regions' Outlined	57
Government Views New Approach, Strategies [FEDERATSIYA No 19, 28 Apr]	57
Report on Specific Aid Measures To Be Undertaken [FEDERATSIYA No 19, 28 Apr]	59
Commentary on Establishment of Khakass Republic [FEDERATSIYA 8 May 92 p 6]	60
Political Activity in Tatarstan	61
Milli-Majles Decides To Realize Its Program [SOVETSKAYA TATARIYA 16 Apr]	61
Parties Submit Petitions to Supreme Soviet, President [SOVETSKAYA TATARIYA 16 Apr]	61
Supreme Soviet Session Agenda Adopted [SOVETSKAYA TATARIYA 21 Apr]	61
Commission Tracks Agrarian Reform in Krasnodar Kray [ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 13 May]	62
Chelyabinsk Factories Unable to Meet Payroll [ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 13 May]	64
Moscow's Northeastern District Prefect Interviewed [VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA 1 Apr]	64
St Petersburg 1st Quarter Privatization Program [NEVSKOYE VREMYA 12 Mar]	67

UKRAINE

POLITICAL AFFAIRS

URP 'Confidential' Letter Deplores Khmara Leadership [VECHERNIY KIYEV 28 Apr]	71
Political Association 'Novaya Ukraina' Registered [VECHERNIY KIYEV 28 Apr]	72
Objectives of Ukrainian Peasant Party Viewed [SILSKI VISTI 30 Apr]	72
Statistical Data on Supreme Council, Deputies [VECHERNIY KIYEV 29 Apr]	73
State Investigates Firearms Violations, Thefts [GOLOS UKRAINY 6 May]	74

ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

Parliament Rejects 1992 Draft Budget [VECHERNIY KIYEV 28 Apr]	74
Finance, Economics Officials Removed from Office [DEMOKRATYCHNA UKRAYINA 21 Apr]	75
Statistics Ministry Reports Consumer Price Index for March [VECHERNIY KIYEV 28 Apr]	75
New Trade Minister Discusses Foreign Investment, Exports [VECHERNIY KIYEV 30 Apr]	75
Czecho-Slovak Businessmen Sign 'Many Agreements' in Ukraine [GOLOS UKRAINY 6 May]	76
Prospects for Gold Mining Viewed [SILSKI VISTI 30 Apr]	77
Ukrainian Metallurgical Concern Formed [DEMOKRATYCHNA UKRAYINA 16 Apr]	77
Rukh Resolution Deplores Course of Land Reform [NARODNA HAZETA No 16, Apr]	77
Head of Peasants Union on Labor Unrest in Agrarian Sector [DEMOKRATYCHNA UKRAYINA 9 Apr]	78
Ministry Lists Birth, Death Statistics [DEMOKRATYCHNA UKRAYINA 21 Apr]	80

CENTRAL ASIA

KAZAKHSTAN

Nazarbayev on Current Political Issues [TRUD 14 May]	81
Fuel Shortage, Broken Farm Equipment To Affect Food Supply [KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA 29 Apr]	82

Area Sown to Grain Reduced	<i>[SELSKAYA ZHIZN 15 May]</i>	83
----------------------------	--------------------------------	----

KYRGYZSTAN

Akayev Policies, Personality Assessed	<i>[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA 20 May]</i>	83
---------------------------------------	--------------------------------------	----

TAJIKISTAN

Russian Reaction to New Government Viewed	<i>[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 21, 20 May]</i>	84
-------------------------------------------	---------------------------------------------	----

TURKMENISTAN

Aviation Company Formed		85
Decree Issued	<i>[TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA 5 May]</i>	85
Chairman Appointed	<i>[TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA 5 May]</i>	85
Resolution Published	<i>[TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA 5 May]</i>	86

UZBEKISTAN

Karimov Press Conference on CIS Relations, National Borders, Other Issues	<i>[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 15 May]</i>	86
Trade Union Chairman on State, Nationalities Relations, Other Issues	<i>[TRUD 19 May]</i>	88
Ukase Transforming Trade Ministry Into Joint Stock Company	<i>[PRAVDA VOSTOKA 7 May]</i>	89
Bad Weather Affects Spring Sowing in Most Regions	<i>[PRAVDA VOSTOKA 7 May]</i>	90

CAUCASUS

AZERBAIJAN

Mutalibov Bid to Recover Presidency Evaluated	<i>[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 21, 20 May]</i>	92
Republic Representative to UNESCO on Efforts to Improve Economy	<i>[KHALG GEZETI 25 Apr]</i>	92
United Nations Debate on Libyan Sanctions Viewed	<i>[KHALG GEZETI 22 Apr]</i>	93
Head of State TV, Radio on Changes in Media	<i>[KHALG GEZETI 24 Apr]</i>	94

GEORGIA

Official on Fighting Economic Crime	<i>[SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA 23 Apr]</i>	98
-------------------------------------	------------------------------------	----

BALTIC STATES

ESTONIA

Prime Minister Demands Vote for Exiles	<i>[EESTI PAEVALEHT 22 Apr]</i>	101
Exile Council Defies Parliament	<i>[EESTI PAEVALEHT 24 Apr]</i>	101
People's Front Bracing for Comeback	<i>[EESTI PAEVALEHT 24 Apr]</i>	102
Estonia Prepares for Own Currency	<i>[IZVESTIYA 18 May]</i>	103
ZHIZN Ethnographic Dictionary: Estonians	<i>[ZHIZN No 14, Apr]</i>	103

LATVIA

New 'Latvian Ruble' Faces Difficulties	<i>[IZVESTIYA 18 May]</i>	104
Chairman Outlines Role Of Russian Society Of Latvia	<i>[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 18 May]</i>	105

Lack of Russian 'Concrete Political Decisions' on Kurils Noted

924C1450A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 6 May 92 pp 1-2

[Article by Yuriy Leonov: "Decision Time Approaching"]

[Text] **Russia Has Run Out of Arguments at the Negotiations on the "Northern Territories"**

The main purpose of the visits of Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa to West Europe and of his deputy, Foreign Minister Michio Watanabe, to the CIS was to make progress in the solution of the problem of the return of the northern territories. In his discussions with Mitterrand and Kohl, Miyazawa tried to persuade his "Big Seven" partners to tie the allocation of economic assistance to Russia to progress of the negotiations on the territorial problem, but encountered, instead of "support," merely "understanding". Nor did Watanabe, who visited Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Russia, have any greater grounds for optimism in connection with a possible speedy solution of the problem: In the hope of Japanese assistance the Central Asian states "warmly welcomed" the first visit by a Japanese minister, but are manifestly not about to complicate their relations with Russia over the four islands of the Kuril chain, and the result of the Moscow part of the trip may be expressed in the words of Galina Sidorova, the Russian foreign minister's policy adviser, which are notable for their paradoxical character: "Despite the fact that on the 'territorial issue,' which remains central, there was no fundamental change, both parties demonstrated an aspiration to ensure progress along the entire spectrum of Russian-Japanese bilateral relations."

Criticizing diplomats no less than the Russian press, the Japanese press observed caustically apropos the results of the visits that the "tactics of Japanese diplomacy" have essentially had no effect. There is nothing surprising in the fact that West European leaders convinced, not without the assistance of Russian journalists, that the most likely alternative to Western support for Russia's reforms will be the onset in Russia of dictatorship are reluctant to intensify the already difficult position of the Russian president by pressure in connection with the Russian-Japanese problem. As far as Germany is concerned, this country has one further reason to distance itself from the Kuril subject: It was itself as a result of the defeats in World War II deprived of territory, which it considered its own for a certain time, and has relinquished any claims to it. As far as the Russian position at the negotiations with the Japanese is concerned, an odd, almost surrealist situation is now taking shape. The Soviet side did not for a long time recognize the very existence of the territorial question, and Gorbachev's recognition of the existence of the problem was, of course, virtually seen as a breakthrough. Russia's leaders no longer had such a reserve for maneuver, and they had to tackle the already recognized problem in practical

fashion. But when the stimulation of the negotiating process had gone so far that it required a transition from the level of diplomatic consultation to the level of concrete political decisions (when, in other words, it had become clear that we had nothing to counterpose at the level of international law to the desire of the Japanese for a return of the islands seized by Stalin not even during but after the war), it transpired that Russia's leadership was not ready to make any decision. On the one hand the surmounting of Stalin's legacy, the need for the development of relations with Japan, the longing for Japanese technology and its living standard and the expectation from Japan of assistance and credit. On the other, however, criticism for "selling off the fatherland" on the part of the ultra-patriots, who would undoubtedly rise up were it necessary in the wake of "our" Baltic, "our" Eastern Europe, and "our" Ukraine for us to "give up" "our islands" also. Solution of the question of territorial demarcation with Japan is for Russia just as painful as the debt repayment procedure: You take someone else's, but have to give back your own. How to act in order not to offend the Japanese on the one hand and not give the opposition trump cards on the other?

It was here that a shrewd method was found—an appeal to public opinion, which would not, allegedly, contribute to a solution of the territorial question in the immediate future. The "people's opinion" was employed actively by the Russian side to postpone the adoption of a decision, but the Japanese did not swallow this bait for long. They understand full well that even in Russia, which is undergoing democratization, public opinion is "made" with the help of the propaganda media no less successfully than in the totalitarian Union, and for this reason its significance should not be exaggerated. In addition, this opinion does not coincide entirely with the results of opinion polls which have been published. For example, whereas until recently about 200,000 [currency not specified] would be "pressed into the palm" for a residence permit for the South Kurils, the rate has now risen to a million, and there has been no diminution in the numbers of those wishing to go to a territory on which the inhabitants could in the future acquire Japanese citizenship or no less attractive Japanese compensation—people are, after all, sure that, in the event of a transfer of the islands, the Japanese would not behave with them as Stalin behaved with the indigenous inhabitants of the South Kurils.

One way or another, the "public opinion" stratagem is ceasing to work, having been rumbled. It is clear that the question will have to be settled not by a "future generation of politicians" but by the present generation. When, however, will the Russian leadership have matured sufficiently to make a decision? This could happen in July, possible, when President Yeltsin goes to Munich, where, following a meeting of the leaders of the "Big Seven", he will meet with them at a special session. But what is more likely is the adoption of a decision in September, prior to Yeltsin's visit

to Japan. The Japanese are placing big hopes in the Russian president's September visit. In Moscow, Watanabe discussed with Russian minister Kozyrev the preliminary plan of the president's trip, and the ministers decided that they would get together once more before September (Watanabe will return to Moscow to specify the agenda and prepare the joint documents following the July meeting of the "Seven").

What if this does not happen? A high-ranking Japanese diplomat told the author that the Japanese side's possible dissatisfaction with the pace and results of the negotiations on the territorial problem would by no means signify Japan's refusal to participate in multilateral assistance to Russia, but the participation in the actual programs would, possibly, be adjusted.

Western Siberia's Hard Currency Exports Profiled

924A1151B Novosibirsk DELOVAYA SIBIR in Russian
No 13, 28 Mar-3 Apr 92

[Report prepared by the associates of Delsi, the BS Analysis Center, Novosibirsk: "Exports of Western Siberia Today and Tomorrow"]

[Text] At present, Siberia accounts for more than one-half of the hard currency proceeds from exports in Russia. Two facts are noteworthy in this instance: the high degree of concentration of exports by a few giant enterprises, and the low foreign economic activities by smaller producers. Western Siberia accounts for less than 2,000 of 30,000 participants in foreign economic relations registered in Russia as a whole. The bulk of Siberian exports is effected through the channels of centralized deliveries.

Rates of Growth of Exports in West Siberian Oblasts (percent)

	1989 over 1986	1990 over 1989	1990 over 1991
1. Tyumen Oblast*	102	- 16	-10
2. Kemerovo Oblast	45	1	33
3. Altay Kray	193	0	...
4. Tomsk Oblast	164	- 7	...
5. Novosibirsk Oblast	68	- 24	- 40
6. Omsk Oblast	110	- 20	...
Western Siberia total	90	- 7	...

* without oil and gas

In 1991, West Siberian enterprises delivered for export products worth almost 8 billion rubles [R] (in domestic prices). If these deliveries are converted into foreign trade prices, the amount will be much more impressive because the bulk of Siberian exports consists of raw materials, which in the world market are valued much higher than in our domestic market. Oil and gas from Tyumen Oblast account

for an overwhelming proportion (more than 80 percent) of exports from the region. Nonetheless, an analysis of the delivery of other goods to the world market is also quite interesting. In the last five years, their exports have increased by a factor of almost two; the process of the growth of export deliveries was particularly dynamic until 1989. In 1990, the volume of exports began to decline in most oblasts; this decline accelerated sharply in 1991.

Territorial Breakdown of West Siberian Exports (percent)

	1986	1989	1990
1. Tyumen Oblast*	6.5	6.9	6.0
2. Kemerovo Oblast	46.4	35.3	38.0
3. Altay Kray	14.1	21.8	23.0
4. Tomsk Oblast	9.0	12.5	12.0
5. Novosibirsk Oblast	13.8	12.1	10.0
6. Omsk Oblast	10.3	11.4	10.0
Western Siberia total	100	100	100

*without oil and gas

Novosibirsk Oblast

The position of Novosibirsk Oblast in Western Siberia in terms of the volume of export deliveries is modest. By 1990, its share dropped to 10 percent. At the same time, the oblast stands out for the heightened activity of participants in foreign economic operations: It accounts

for approximately one-third of the participants in foreign economic operations registered in West Siberia. A quite high share of the products of machine building and manufactured consumer goods, compared to other West Siberian oblasts, is a characteristic peculiarity of the structure of exports by the oblast. About 50 state enterprises deliver products for exports. The Siberian Textile

Equipment Plant and the Adron Production Association are the largest exporters.

A general economic crisis which has caused a disruption of horizontal relations has primarily affected the foreign economic operations of the oblast. Export deliveries began to decline in 1990 at an accelerating pace: by 26 percent in 1990 compared to 1989, and by 40 percent in 1991 compared to 1990, which may be termed a catastrophe. In absolute terms, the volume of exports declined in all commodity groups; however, the deliveries of machines and equipment "suffered" the most. As a result, the share of the latter dropped to 25 percent of the overall volume of exports from the oblast. The disintegration of CEMA and a transition to settlements with former CEMA members in freely convertible currencies and at world market prices, were a special factor in this instance.

In addition to a crisis in the domestic economy and the decay of relations within the economy, the potential for enhancing export deliveries by the oblast is restricted by the quality and age of the equipment operated at the plants: Worn-out and obsolete equipment calls for considerable repair outlays, and is incapable of yielding products which are competitive in the world market. This problem is particularly acute at enterprises manufacturing civilian products. The equipment pool at the enterprises of the defense complex on the whole meets modern requirements. As a rule, specialized equipment consists of machine tools with program control, recently manufactured automatic and semiautomatic equipment. At the same time, the degree of amortization of universal equipment is high at such enterprises; at present, there is nothing to replace such equipment with, because its production was discontinued in our country five to 10 years ago.

In 1990, Novosibirsk Oblast was one of the few in which a considerable growth of imports, by a factor of two in domestic prices compared to the previous year, occurred simultaneously with a drop in the volume of exports. The total volume of imports exceeded that of exports by the oblast by more than R100 million.

Kemerovo Oblast

More than 50 enterprises contribute to export deliveries by the oblast. The five largest exporters, which account for 60 percent of deliveries to foreign countries—the aluminum plant, the coke chemistry plant, the Kuzbassrazrezugol and Kuznetskugol concerns, and the Nitrogen Association, clearly stand out among the aforementioned exporters. Raw materials prevail in the structure of exports (98 percent): coal (almost one half of all exports), aluminum (15 percent), cast iron, rolled ferrous metal goods, ferroalloys. In addition, the oblast is the largest supplier of chemical products and fertilizer in Western Siberia; they account for eight percent in the breakdown of exports from the oblast.

The crisis of foreign economic operations in Kemerovo Oblast began somewhat later than in the other oblasts of Western Siberia—in 1991. However, a drop in exports immediately occurred in an acute form—by almost one-third, and affected virtually all main types of export products. Export deliveries of cast iron and rolled ferrous metal

goods dropped at a particularly high rate—by a factor of five. The number of exporting enterprises also declined. The growth of the volume of export deliveries by one-third in 1991 is attributable solely to an increase of domestic coal prices in which the value of exports is expressed.

The oblast is the main supplier of Siberian coal to the world market. The production facilities of the coal-mining enterprises of the Kuzbass are not on par with the state-of-the-art standards of domestic and foreign equipment and technology. A considerable portion of the equipment needs to be replaced. However, the export of coal was highly effective due to the low self-cost of Kuzbass coal and the extremely low level of domestic prices for coal compared to its world prices. Given favorable market trends, outlays of one ruble yielded \$3.60 in hard currency proceeds.

However, while external conditions favored the export of Kuzbass coal, domestic conditions were an unfavorable influence. Enterprises were not interested in exports within the framework of state requisitions, under which the bulk of export deliveries were effected. This prevented enterprises from choosing trade partners on their own or responding quickly to changing trends in particular segments of the world coal market, as a result of which, spare market "niches" were occupied by our competitors.

The first experience of independent operations in foreign markets was unsuccessful as well. Thus, as a result of their uncoordinated actions, exporters from Kemerovo drove coal prices down in 1989, and sustained losses in hard currency. Following their bitter experience, they got together and set up the specialized foreign economic company Kuzbassimpeks, which represents their interests abroad, as well as on the Kemerovo Commodity and Raw Material Exchange.

A more favorable environment for foreign economic operations in the oblast is anticipated in conjunction with the creation of the Kuzbass free economic zone in its territory. However, it should be noted that for now, the center is retaining control over the main export commodities of the free economic zone, which virtually reduces to naught all privileges granted to the Kuzbass.

Tyumen Oblast

Crude oil and natural gas are the mainstay of the exports of the oblast (as well as the entire West Siberian region). More than 60 percent of the crude oil and more than one-half of the natural gas in the CIS are produced in Tyumen Oblast. The oblast generates, respectively, about 80 percent and more than 90 percent of the exports of such goods from the CIS.

The volume of deliveries of other products to foreign countries is not significant, and comes to as little as one to two percent of the volume of exports from the oblast.

The volumes of deliveries of Tyumen oil to the world market have been declining continuously since 1989, in parallel with a drop in the volume of production. Compared to 1989, the volume of crude oil exports in 1990 declined by 12 percent both in value terms (in domestic prices) and in terms of quantity. In 1991, exports increased by almost 30 percent in terms of value, whereas quantity dropped sharply, by almost 50 percent. Therefore, the growth of the volume of deliveries in terms of value was due solely to a considerable increase in domestic prices for oil which more

than offset even the aforementioned unprecedented reduction of actual quantity. The situation which has emerged in oil exports mirrors the critical position of oil production: equipment which has been worn out, to say nothing of being obsolete; the absence of economic arrangements to stimulate the effective operation of oil producing enterprises; the need to proceed with the development of reserves found under more complex geological conditions.

Crisis phenomena have also been registered in the dynamics of the export deliveries of natural gas, though they are less pronounced than in the case of oil. In 1990, the volumes in terms of value and quantity dropped by three percent compared to 1989; in 1991, the volume in terms of value increased by more than 40 percent (also due to changes in domestic prices for natural gas), whereas the volume in terms of quantity declined by six percent. Nonetheless, the condition of the gas industry has been satisfactory so far against the background of the overall production slump.

About 30 enterprises and associations of the oblast contribute to exports (except for oil and gas): the Tyumenlesprom Production and Technical Association, the petrochemical combine, the worsted cloth combine, the oblast Union of Consumer Cooperatives, and so on. Next to oil and gas, products of the logging and lumber industries are the second largest export item. The products of machine and instrument building combined account for about three percent of the exports. However, on the whole the volumes of deliveries, excluding crude oil and gas, are not high, even if compared to other West Siberian oblasts: The contribution by Tyumen Oblast to regional exports is minimal. The poor diversification of exports is a predictable consequence of superspecialization in the economy of the oblast.

Altay Kray

Until 1990, Altay Kray stood out for the rapid pace of augmenting exports and for improvements in the structure of the latter. New processes have been much more intensive here than in other oblasts of West Siberia. Thus, in 1989 alone, the volume of exports grew by 54 percent, and further growth was registered in 1990, even given the unfavorable legislative environment at the time. In 1990, the share of consumer goods in exports increased; the share of machinery, equipment, and transportation vehicles came to 43 percent.

More than 40 enterprises contribute to export deliveries from the kray. The Altay Railway Car Plant, the Sibenergomash Production Association, the Kristall Production Association, the Coke Chemistry Plant, and the Transmash Plant are among the largest suppliers of products to the world market.

In June 1991, the Altay Free Enterprise Zone was established in the territory of the kray by an order of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet chairman. The development of the agro-industrial complex was expected to be one of the main avenues for specialization in this zone. However, the process of the formation of the zone is just beginning. The tapping of the export potential of the kray will largely depend on the degree to which concepts built into the draft of the zone are successfully implemented.

Omsk Oblast

More than 40 enterprises in Omsk Oblast deliver goods for exports to more than 50 countries of the world. Chemical and petrochemical products are the main export items of the oblast (75 percent). Machines, equipment, and transportation vehicles account for nine percent of export deliveries; fuel, mineral raw materials, and metals account for four percent. The Omsknefteorgsintez Production Association, the synthetic rubber plant, and the Omskshina Production Association are the largest exporters in the oblast.

In 1990, the volume of export deliveries dropped by 20 percent. Apart from the reasons common for all oblasts, this was also caused by a high degree of export concentration at a few enterprises.

The bulk of deliveries by enterprises was made within the framework of filling state export quotas. Besides, petrochemical products are subject to strict licensing, which considerably restricted the independent entry of enterprises to the world market. Opportunities for the expansion of exports by the exporting enterprises of Omsk were also restricted by the fact that their equipment is heavily worn out; their capacity is utilized virtually 100 percent. The aggravated ecological situation in the oblast is yet another reason for which expanding the scope of traditional export-oriented production is questionable.

Tomsk Oblast

The decline in the volume of exports from the oblast in 1990 was relatively moderate—by seven percent compared to 1989. The largest exporters such as the TNKhK [Petrochemical Combine] Production Association, the Tomlesprom Production Association, and the TEMZ [Tomsk Electric Motor Plant] reduced their foreign deliveries.

While receiving from abroad mainly machinery, equipment, and computers, the enterprises of the oblast export, for the most part, raw and other materials—crude oil, methanol, fertilizer, timber, and timber products. Oil and refinery products account for 50 percent of the total exports; together with chemical products, this group of goods accounts for 80 percent of the exports of the oblast. This structure entails a number of problems because narrow specialization condemns exporters to a heavy dependence on world trends. Price fluctuations in the world raw materials markets are more pronounced than in the markets of finished products. Besides, entering raw materials markets will be more effective if an exporter has agents at the largest oil exchanges of the world, along with the freedom to dispose of his commodity.

Rich natural resources and a considerable scientific-technical and industrial potential suggest the existence of extensive opportunities for the development of foreign economic operations in the oblast. However, this potential has been studied to a lesser degree than in other oblasts of the region. The position of the oblast leadership was an important factor in this regard. For example, it is quite instructive that a division of the office of commissioner of the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations was not open in the oblast until recently.

Chinese Help Plan Free Trade Zone in Chita

924A1151A Novosibirsk *DELOVAYA SIBIR* in Russian
No 16, 18-24 Apr 92 p 6

[SIBINFIRM (Siberian Information Agency) article: "The First Sign of Free Trade Zones"]

[Text] Chita—A meeting of the mixed Russian-Chinese group for the issues of organizing a joint free trade zone (SZST) in the vicinity of the settlement of Zabaykalsk (Chita Oblast) and the city of Manzhouli (Inner Mongolia Region, the PRC), was held in Manzhouli.

The Russian delegation to the meeting was headed by Valeriy Lomako, the first deputy head of the Chita Oblast administration, and the Chinese delegation was headed by Wang Zhenghai, the deputy mayor of the city of Manzhouli.

Issues of the continuous operation of the Zabaykalsk-Manzhouli motor vehicle crossing were discussed, as well as the development of the future free trade zone, and a number of other issues. Based on the results of the meeting, the heads of the border guard, customs, and other control services of the two sides agreed on organizing the continuous operation of the crossing on the Russian-Chinese border within two weeks.

The schedule, volume, and content of joint work at the first stage of creating the SZST were also determined. It was scheduled to begin the construction of the necessary infrastructure on 10 May. The Russian side assumed obligations to develop a plan for the compound, and to build roads and spur lines, whereas the Chinese side undertook to build commercial facilities.

The official dedication of the SZST is scheduled for 10 August. As Sergey Kotov, the second secretary of the Directorate of Far Eastern and Indochina Countries of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, who took part in the negotiations, told the Siberian Information Agency, the free trade zone in the area of Zabaykalsk and Manzhouli is likely to become the first of four whose openings are being prepared at various sections of the Russian-Chinese border. In Kotov's words, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia considers the creation of such zones to be the most promising avenue for developing cooperation with China.

First Quarter Trade Results Studied

924A1183A Moscow *ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI* in Russian
No 9, May 92 p 3

[Article by Vladimir Golyakov, first deputy chief of the Economic Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations of Russia: "Why Exports 'Lost Weight'"]

[Text]

Vladimir Golyakov, First Deputy Chief of the Economic Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations of Russia, on the Main Results of Foreign Economic Operations in the First Quarter of 1992

Our readers are already aware that the volume of exports in the first quarter of 1992 dropped by 20 percent compared to the corresponding period of last year. Why did this happen? Raw materials actually accounted for the same proportion

of the export of Russia. However, deliveries of crude oil were 16 percent off, and those of lumber, pulp, cast iron, and a number of other goods were reduced many times.

As you can see, this was a significant drop. Naturally, it caused foreign exchange proceeds to decline. At the same time, imports increased by 15 percent compared to the corresponding period of last year. This is to say that the percentage of imports acquired on credit increased. Foodstuffs and raw materials for producing them were increasingly purchased with these funds. Compared to the first quarter of last year, the purchases of butter, grain, potatoes, and drugs increased considerably in the first quarter of this year. Therefore, let us note here that the foreign debt of Russia and other countries of the Commonwealth continued to grow; by the end of 1991, it came to approximately \$80 billion.

The national economy cannot do without acquiring abroad considerable quantities of foodstuffs, drugs, and spare and subcontracted parts and assemblies. The procurement of some goods such as tea, coffee, leather footwear, furniture, and others had to be reduced, given a continuous shortage of foreign exchange funds and the desire to slow down the growth of the total debt as much as possible.

Such is the current status of the foreign trade of Russia. What are the reasons for its unfavorable development? Let us try to figure this out.

In the first quarter of this year, unfavorable trends continued to prevail in the sphere of foreign economic relations, the same trends which virtually brought about a crisis in this sector of the economy in 1991. These are primarily the decay of existing economic relations between individual enterprises and entire regions, the destruction of a uniform economic space, a major reduction in the output of energy carriers and other raw materials, as well as in the output of manufactured products, the inability of agriculture to provide even the most necessary foodstuffs for the population, the dysfunction of the credit and monetary system of the country, and continuing inflation. Other destabilizing factors continued to have an effect too. In addition, export quotas for licensed goods were announced with a delay; arrangements for the payment of export duties did not work properly.

All of the above processes unfolded against the background of trends in the world economy which, on the whole, were unfavorable for us. In addition, competitors, including those from the former Union republics, increasingly counteracted Russian exporters. We should also take into account the fact that, in many instances, unqualified entrepreneurs who are not knowledgeable about world commodity market conditions and trends were given access to foreign markets. According to preliminary data, the total number of Russian enterprises participating in foreign economic operations exceeds 13,000. Of these, only about 7,000 engage in export and import transactions on a regular basis.

Which regions were responsible for the drop in foreign trade? First of all, this was a consequence of the CEMA disintegration. It was necessary to fundamentally revise

foreign economic relations with countries which used to belong to the council. This brought about a substantial reduction of trade with them, the disruption of production-sharing ties, and so on. In the first quarter, exports to these countries were still off by the greatest margin. The turnover of trade with them fell by almost 40 percent compared to the first quarter of 1991.

At the same time, Russian exporters and importers switched to the markets of capitalist countries. Of course, this was due not only to the fact that these were lucrative markets but also to unsolved problems in mutual relations between Russia and its former CEMA partners. Trade with developed capitalist countries increased considerably, but mainly on the import side. In the first quarter, these countries accounted for 75.1 percent of Russia's trade turnover (in the first quarter of 1991, 65.5 percent).

The abandonment by Russia of political motives for developing trade and economic cooperation with foreign countries is facilitating the expansion of ties with South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, and other countries. Exports to these countries increased considerably last year, and are still growing. In the process, the spheres of cooperation with these countries are likewise expanding and becoming increasingly attractive for participants in foreign economic relations on both sides.

This is the first year in the post-October history of Russia when it has acted in the foreign market on its own rather than within the USSR. However, this is not at all to say that Russia has embarked on its foreign economic operations with a clean slate: The legacy of the former Union puts a heavy burden on it; problems which existed before have been aggravated. It is difficult to make a projection for the current quarter. However, certain signs of amelioration in foreign economic relations are becoming apparent.

Foreign Trade Turnover in January Through March 1992 (preliminary data; billion U.S. dollars)

	Turnover			Export			Import		
	Jan-Mar 91	Jan-Mar 92	92 as percentage of 91	Jan-Mar 91	Jan-Mar 92	92 as percentage of 91	Jan-Mar 91	Jan-Mar 92	92 as percentage of 91
Total	16.71	16.18	96.8	8.70	6.96	80.0	8.01	9.21	115.0
CEMA (former)	4.78	2.95	61.8	2.46	1.43	58.1	2.32	1.52	65.7
China, DPRK, Laos, Yugoslavia	0.98	1.07	108.9	0.59	0.53	90.0	0.39	0.54	137.4
Capitalist countries	10.95	12.15	111.0	5.65	5.00	88.6	5.30	7.15	134.9

Journalist Views Mujaheddin Rivalry Before Kabul Regime Downfall

924C1336A Moscow TRUD in Russian 25 Apr 92 p 3

[Article by V. Snegirev, Kabul, 24 April: "What Is the Future Preparing for Them?: Our Special Correspondent Reports From Afghanistan"]

[Text] Saturday is the deadline for the ultimatum set by Gulbuddin Nekmatyar, the leader of the fundamentalist "Islamic Party." The leader of the "intransigents" have been standing firm all these recent days: the detachments of the coalition of the north are supposed to remove the "security belt" around Kabul, and in the capital itself the governmental troops, militia, and the national guard—in a word, everyone—is supposed to lay down their weapons and surrender to the mercy of the insurrectionists. Otherwise Gulbuddin has threatened to take the city by storm, and then, he says, there will be no mercy. He did not have any intention to share with anyone the victory in the jihad. The leaders of the other Mujaheddin organizations have concluded not to act completely foolishly, to avoid bloodshed, and to sit down at the negotiations table in order to decide the country's future fate. And only one leader, as though hypnotized and ostentatiously preserving his faithfulness to previous incantations, continued to sharpen the knives.

Only one, but what a leader! All these years, the people fighting under the green banners of his army were mostly "fighting men of Allah." It was they who always demonstrated the most zealous adherence to the "holy war," mercilessly killing not only the "nonbelievers," but also their own blood brothers in other detachments. Persons who became victims of the extremists were civilians who were suspected of having ties with the regime, merchants, truck drivers, foreign journalists, and volunteer physicians.

I recall when, during a trip last year through the northern provinces of Afghanistan, which are controlled by the Mujaheddin, my traveling companions—two television cameramen from Great Britain—were in mortal fear of meetings with Hekmatyar's people. When we arrived in Telukan, they pointed to a building lying in ruins—the electric power station: two years previously Hekmatyar followers had had a squabble with Masood followers and the door had slammed, leaving after them, in the literal sense, a dark memory. Since then, the big city had been left without electricity.

We were lucky that time. A nurse from Iceland, who was working through the International Red Cross, had not succeeded in avoiding a tragic meeting. Yesterday she was shot point-blank by a semiautomatic gun when the girl was attempting to provide assistance to wounded Mujaheddin

from Vardak Province. "The mullah taught me to show no mercy in destroying all the 'impure,'" the murderer said coolly.

The news about this alarmed the inhabitants of Kabul even more. It is not a problem of covering once again women's faces with the yashmak, as is required everywhere by the Mujaheddin in the cities seized by them. But who knows where the limit of the religious fanaticism lies, where ideology—whatever it is called—ends and violence begins? Are we really to believe that the maelstrom of events will once again put the entire nation into the vicious cycle?

Everyone here talks endlessly about this—people in the shops, on the street corners, in the corridors of official institutions. The people of Kabul, possibly, are even exaggerating the danger. They talk about the existence of a Hekmatyar underground in the city which, at a definite signal, is ready from within to support an offensive from the south. Many people share their alarm about the fact that the "intransigents" are putting their reliance on inciting hostility between the Pushtus and the other nationalities inhabiting Afghanistan. They have started a rumor to the effect that the existence here of Uzbek members of the national guard from the north "insults the national pride of the Pushtus," and that no one can ever become reconciled to that.

Only one good piece of news was woven into the mosaic of events, facts, and conjectures. From Logar Province, where the main forces of the "hezbe islamie" ("Islamic Party") are located, General M. Rafi, vice president of Afghanistan, returned. The very fact of the meeting between Hekmatyar and that person, who occupied the highest military positions under the previous regime, is a sensation. The general let it be known to journalists that the position of the fundamentalists' leader at the present time is not so militant, and the dialogue with him will be continued.

Incidentally, the journalists. Probably not since the war in the Persian Gulf has any conflict gathered so much press. By truths and untruths, 300 correspondents from two dozen countries have already penetrated into Afghanistan. And only our beloved CIS, for some reason, is not hurrying to send its reporters here. Other than a team from the Russian Federation's VESTI, which broke through yesterday from the north, there is no one else. And yet Afghanistan is much nearer for us than it is for Japan, which send here about 50 of its correspondents. Can it be that the state of "brotherly friendship" and "permanent internationalism" with respect to a neighbor has been replaced in our country by complete indifference?

Journalists, remembering last year's experience in Baghdad, are laying in supplies of candles and flashlights. Because the reports of the cancellation of the ultimatum from the south did not follow, and therefore the tension is not abating. People listen in silent apprehension. Needless to say, Gulbuddin is strong and experienced. His missile units are well aimed at targets in Kabul. He has at his disposal armored equipment and a network of saboteurs and agents. But Masood has control of the air base in Bagram and a

helicopter regiment in the capital. Also, he has much more "armor," which I was able to confirm by my own eyes.

That situation presented itself the day before yesterday, when, together with my old friend, Englishman Peter Juvenal, I set off to the north from Kabul to the deployment area of the main forces of the "Jamiat islamie." We hired a taxi—a decrepit first-model Volga. We lay in a supply of food products from various Islamic organizations, and on the front seat we placed a newspaper that was folded in half. On one page was a photograph of Masood, and on another, a photograph of Hekmatyar. While en route, we kept turning the newspaper over, depending on who the next checkpoint belonged to. The Masood followers stared adoringly at their leader. The Hekmatyar followers, upon looking into the vehicle, would seem startled by the portrait of theirs. That is how we drove for two hours. It helped.

The fact of the matter is that the mountain villages that look like a layer cake along the road to Charikar belong to the Mujaheddin from Hezbe and Jamiat. Tank and gun barrels, machineguns, and missile units look from one village at another. This is not a road, but a solid military camp. While en route there, we were stopped 19 times, and on the way back, even more frequently. Praise be to Allah, we were saved by the documents identifying Peter, who had fought side by side with the Mujaheddin for ten years.

In Charikar, near the city gas station, after frightening away the taxi drivers and the owners of private vehicles, Masood's tanks refueled. The bearded faces of the Mujaheddin drivers poked out of the hatches, and soldiers wearing a gray uniform and guerrillas wearing galoshes sat haphazardly on the armor. The next city—Jabal-Ussaraj—was like a disturbed anthill: crowds of armed people with beards, military equipment, soldiers from the government troops, jeeps with radio sets, command posts—and all of this was like one big eastern bazaar.

One after another, green helicopters touched down at the landing area situated next to the Mujaheddin base (where, at one time, our regiment, which guarded the entrance to the Salang ravine, was stationed). Eight MI-8 brought in highly placed guests: B. Sevan, a special representative of the UN general secretary, generals from the capital garrison, and emissaries from the coalition council of the northern provinces. For the first time in the entire history of this long war, Masood was given this honor. He received his guests at one of the private villas in the center of Charikar. After confirming his intention not to enter Kabul, but to operate in conformity with the previously coordinated plan for settlement, he expressed the hope that, in Hekmatyar's actions, prudence would take the upper hand. He avoided making any sharp statements against his rival and showed himself to be, at negotiations for the first time in his life at this level, a true diplomat.

After lunch, the guests left, and Masood went to his modest headquarters on the same street, where we were granted the opportunity for a continuous 24-hour period to observe the actions of the field commander and his entourage.

Truly that was a day of great discoveries. It suddenly turned out that there were plenty of people around Ahmed Shah

Masood who spoke Russian. It turned out one person had attended the 10-month KGB course in Moscow, and was well versed in espionage matters. He had gone into the Panysher ravine, where he headed Mujaheddin counterintelligence. Two others had graduated from the air school in Frunze, after which they had flown a pair of MI-24 combat helicopters from Kabul to this famous ravine. Ordinary guerrillas approached and, in perfect Russian, asked how things were going, sometimes even lapsing into vulgarities that attested to their previous close contact with Soviet fighting men. It turned out that the brother of the commander's closest assistant had occupied an important position in the political administration of the governmental troops. The father of another young member of the Mujaheddin, who, we were told, serves as an intelligence officer, until recently had been a deputy commander in chief of the Afghan air force. A highly placed officer in state security, generals, and colonels strolled through the Masood headquarters as though they were in their own home.

That which everyone had guessed now came finally to light: the Afghans for a long time had been not so much fighting against one another as they had been simulating warfare. I recalled a recent conversation with a certain competent individual who told me the number of missiles, aerial bombs, and rocket shells that had been expended last summer during just one way against the Mujaheddin—the total number was in the tens of thousands. The battle of Stalingrad had never involved such a large number. But do you know what results were reported at that time? Nineteen persons killed, and 27 wounded. Of course, figures like that could be complete deception. Someone wanted very much to shoot at our expense.

In trying assiduously to execute the instructions from our advisors, the staff officers developed plans for grandiose military operations and sent up into the air armadas of assault aircraft and combat helicopters. What was created was the complete appearance of a merciless struggle against the enemy. But actually it had long since been a matter neither of an enemy nor a struggle. Beyond the limits of anyone else's view, another life continued, a life that was incomprehensible to our advisors and intelligence officers and that, in the final analysis, led to the present-day situation.

I asked Masood whether he guaranteed security to all those people who had been linked with the previous regime. "Yes, the inhabitants of Kabul can rest assured," he answered. "We are removing from our affairs only those who occupied the highest positions." Masood invited us to have dinner. He was hospitable and animated. "Everything is going according to the prearranged plan, and I am experiencing an influx of happiness," the field commander acknowledged.

Yesterday morning, when we were returning from Charikar at one of the posts they asked us to get out of the car. "Hezbe," Peter whispered nervously. "Remember that you are a Finnish correspondent and your name is Ray." Armed bearded men in shabby black attire surrounded us. "Journalists?" one of them asked. "Yes." They handed us a bouquet of crimson flowers, which now cover the mountain slopes like a beautiful carpet. "Proceed," he added generously. "Soon we will see each other in Kabul."

Perhaps in truth not everything is so bad? Tulips in the hands of the "irreconcilables"—we took that as a good sign.

COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS

Commentary on Tashkent Summit Outcome

924C1309A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 21, 20 May 92 p 1

[Article by Liliya Shevtsova: "Eleven Minus Five? CIS: Conference of Unpredictable States"]

[Text] Against the background of the continuous funeral knell the Tashkent summit meeting suddenly stands out from the overall course of events. It was the shortest and produced the greatest results. Culminating with the adoption of 13 documents. Let us especially emphasize the signing of the six-state collective security agreement, which could become the basis for a new military and political alliance.

So, was the universal prophecy about the imminent demise of the CIS wrong and has the subject which showed no signs of life suddenly started breathing?

Let us wait a while before drawing final conclusions.

Recently, however, the situation in the post-Soviet states has begun to change. Hopes for help from outside, from third countries, have not been justified. Yet the economic crisis continues to deepen and the danger of social explosion is increasing. In a word, the idea of unification is knocking ever more loudly on the door. But with whom and on what basis?

Yesterday it was thought that the age of regional alliances had come, that the formation of Slavic and Asian blocs was in the offing. But in practice it turned out that sometimes there is much more that separates the closest neighbors than brings them together. So far the idea of regional communities has never been realized anywhere. Some people thought that the recent Ashkhabad meeting of the eight Asian countries would prove the opposite. But the antagonisms among its participants not only in the differences of the interests of the former Soviet republics, but, above all, those of Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan had their effect. And something else became clear at that time as well: The post-Soviet states of the Asian region were not prepared to break away from Russia. On the contrary.

This fact may be regarded as a new phenomenon of our disintegrating reality. But what were these Central Asian leaders before they were turned into active advocates of the Commonwealth? Look at what is happening in Dushanbe, Baku, and, finally, Afghanistan—and you will understand it all. These events may be regarded as a foretaste of the inevitable escalation of the political battle and, possibly, also of a forthcoming change of regimes in other states as well. In this context one can fully understand the motivations of their leaders, which compelled them to advance the idea of regional security and to ask Russia to be its guarantor.

The Russian leadership has already begun to search for a new formula for the Commonwealth. Evidence of this is the rapprochement of Russia and Kazakhstan, which was reinforced by the agreements in Uralsk. In a word, the idea of a union of everyone with everyone else has already been

deemed to be unfeasible. At least in this stage. Russia has directed its efforts toward forming special relations with a number of republics, considering these relations to be the nucleus of the new community.

The Tashkent meeting reflected the anticipated breakthrough in development of the post-Soviet space, which could be based on the collective security agreement. At the same time we must not be too optimistic: For now we can see the beginning of a possible process, but how it will end is unclear, and its future will depend on various circumstances. Such as, for example, the personal relations between individual presidents. In brief, it would be a delusion to think that in the near future the fruitless CIS will be replaced by a new confederation. Close relations are possible among certain states while among others a certain distance is required. Certain states can preserve the independence of their economic policy while entering into a defensive alliance. In a word, the main thing for us today is the need to recognize that there can be no standard model for the coexistence of all successors of the USSR.

The Tashkent meeting will raise a number of new issues as well. Thus it will be necessary to think about the degree to which the signed agreements can be implemented, taking into account the possibility of aggravation of the power struggle in individual republics and the replacement of the ruling regimes there. There is every justification for the concern about the fact that the new image of the community is acquiring increasingly Asiatic features. In this connection, the position of Byelarus is especially important for preserving the European orientation. But the most significant question which everyone will have to think about is this: Will the defense alliance which could emerge not be turned into a means of fortifying obsolete political structures in other states?

Commentator Pessimistic on CIS Stability

PM1925130992 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 16 May 92 p 2

[Observer Aleksandr Golts article under "Topic of the Week" rubric: "Other Alliance May Appear in Place of CIS. But Stability Will Scarcely Be Strengthened as a Result"]

[Text] The past week has yielded considerable evidence of the profound crisis being experienced by our Commonwealth. The escalation of conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh and the Dniester region, the tension in Tajikistan, the continuation of Russian-Ukrainian competition over the nuclear, naval, and other inheritance of the former Union—here is the obvious evidence of this crisis. Its result is that several sovereign republics' presidents demonstratively preferred contact with the leaders of the states of "distant foreign parts" to the regular meeting with their CIS colleagues which is taking place in Tashkent.

But relations with the outside world are not giving the CIS leaders the only reason to avoid contact with each other. Other states see our sickly Commonwealth and the conflicts between its members as a suitable field for their own foreign policy activity.

Today, for example, not only bloody confrontation between Armenians and Azerbaijanis is taking place in Nagorno-Karabakh. A hidden struggle between Iran and Turkey for influence on the region's affairs is going on in parallel. When Iranian diplomacy suffered an obvious defeat (Shusha was attacked by Armenians at virtually the same time as the latest cease-fire agreement was signed in Tehran), Turkey did not fail to seize the initiative. Declaring Shusha's seizure a gross violation of international law, Ankara lodged a protest at the UN Security Council. Although the Turkish foreign policy department's leader claims that his country is doing everything to avoid involvement in the conflict, his words that "Turkey will not tolerate the seizure of Azerbaijani territory" give serious grounds for wondering precisely what methods Ankara intends to resort to.

Recent events in Dushanbe have provided a different kind of example. At the moment of crisis the opposition did not hesitate to seek support from the mujahidin who have only just come to power in Afghanistan. In response the opposition received a signal from Kabul which could be interpreted as encouraging.

Finally, the meeting of the heads of Turkmenistan, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Turkey, and Uzbekistan held in Ashkhabad gives much food for thought. Most of the participants stated that there is absolutely no question of forming a sort of community, an alternative CIS. However, the very fact that this meeting occurred provides the opportunity to talk with a considerable degree of certainty of the appearance of new geopolitical realities which are sweeping the former Union's territory.

What is taking place is natural given the situation that has developed in the CIS. The leaders of the southern and eastern republics belonging to the CIS cannot fail to feel serious concern over the Commonwealth's future. Indeed, how can it not be felt when one of the CIS' "founding fathers"—L. Kravchuk—states that the Commonwealth is not in a position to solve the problems arising between the state belonging to it.

No small amount of skepticism is evidently inspired by the inability of international institutions such as the United Nations or the CSCE to defend its new members' interests. This skepticism is reinforced by the world community's unconcealed confusion in the face of numerous crises on the former Unions' territory.

In that case let us ask ourselves what is left for the Central Asian and Transcaucasian states, with their none-too-developed economies and orientation toward the former Union's European republics? Only one thing—to seek new partners and create new alliances. The basis of such alliances will be not the old communality which has been formed over the past 70 years but, most likely, communality on an ethnic and religious basis.

In principle there is probably nothing bad in such mutual relations and in such alliances (if, of course, they do not pursue extremist aims). But we must not exclude the possibility that states wishing to play a more significant role in the international arena will be involved in these alliances. Which means states wishing to widen their sphere of influence. Their interests will inevitably come into conflict with other countries' interests. This will be yet another factor of instability and, what is more, a permanent instability lasting many years. An instability which will inevitably engulf considerable territories of the former Union.

That the Transcaucasian and Central Asian republics are moving farther and farther away from the CIS's European countries and that conflicts in other regions are not being resolved is an accusation often made against Russian foreign policy. It is accused of weakness and passivity. But let us be objective: On the one hand, in the last few months the Russian Foreign Ministry has taken a number of steps toward a settlement in the "hot spots" and in forging new relations with the Central Asian states. On the other hand, diplomats' opportunities have narrowed considerably. Because of the old inconsistent and sometimes plainly immoral policy of the "Center," Russia is not now perceived by the participants in the conflicts as an honest broker. Given any turn of events, its every step is seen primarily as an attempt to give assistance to the opposing side.

Neither is it a secret that it is precisely now that those same Central Asian republics, like the other CIS countries, are seeking those partners with whom cooperation could yield an obvious material return. It is no accident that the economic agreement, reinforced by specific projects, was the main result of the Ashkhabad meeting. But Russia can hardly offer much here either.

Yet however limited the opportunities, Russia should understand that its future is to a very great degree linked to "nearby foreign parts." And to the extent to which it proves possible to preserve existing ties and create new ones. Yes, it is now obvious that it will not be possible to form coordinating organs within the CIS framework. But maybe the time has come to think about setting up some kind of permanent bilateral structures which would not only conduct discussion of the existing contradictions and conflict situations but would also bring about a dialog between Russia and individual republics, be they Ukraine, Moldova, or the Central Asian states. This dialog would concern the whole spectrum of cooperation. In this way it would be possible to strengthen the Commonwealth itself.

The current situation shows that the inevitable result of the CIS's disintegration will be a colossal economic, political, and social instability incomparable even to the current instability. And no new alliances will be able to reduce it. This fact, should it be appreciated, should be yet another argument for those who are still trying to preserve the CIS in extremely difficult circumstances.

Union of Dniester Region With Ukraine Advocated

92UN1319A Kiev VECHERNIY KIYEV in Russian
21, 23 May 92 p 2

[Two-part article by Igor Nedyukha, candidate of technical sciences: "The Dniester Region: Road to Peace or Path of War?"]

[21 Apr p 2]

[Text] Imperceptibly somehow, by virtue of the specific features of their internal dynamics, events in the Dniester region have in terms of their urgency relegated to the background even such a regional "favorite" of the media as the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict in Nagornyy Karabakh. Now, however, the Dniester region has with no exaggeration become a permanent headache of the leadership and politicians of all the countries involved in what is happening on both banks of the old Dniester, namely, Moldova, Ukraine, Romania, and Russia. But how could it be otherwise for the thunderstorm is already rumbling not somewhere miles away but right on the doorsteps of the national apartments of our common European home.

Ukraine, as the sole CIS country bordering Moldova, has found itself in a most delicate position. On the one hand unswerving compliance with the Helsinki principles of noninterference in the internal affairs of sovereign states which are participants in the Helsinki process and respect for the permanency of their borders is being demanded of Ukraine. At the same time, however, there is a real prospect of the emergence of very serious complaints against Ukraine and their negative repercussions in the event of the Ukrainian leadership's disregard in this form or the other of the interests of the Slav nation constituting the majority of the population of the Dniester region and demanding that it be granted autonomy within the framework of the Republic of Moldova.

At least, even the recent news conferences of the leaders of the heads of states which are members of the CIS have shown that the incident from the "ostrich" policy category, when agents of the special services of Moldova (or Romania) were allowed right in the center of Kiev next to the Ukraine Hotel to arrest in broad daylight and transfer without hindrance the length of Ukraine to Chisinau I. Smirnov—now president, whatever he was previously, of the functioning Dniester Republic—by no means went unnoticed and has still not been forgotten. And, after all, as is known, I. Smirnov had come to Kiev at that time at the head of a Dniester region delegation with proposals for the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine concerning reunification of the Dniester region with Ukraine.

The problematical nature of Ukraine's position in this complex situation is increased also by the fact of not inconsiderable importance that the Dniester region is its former territory incorporated by Stalin in 1940 in the Moldavian SSR which he had formed. The latter, together with its twin sisters—the Soviet Baltic republics—emerged in the identical "legal" soil as a result of the realization in practice of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of sorry renown on

the sharing out of zones of influence between the USSR and Germany, consideration being given least to the wishes of the peoples inhabiting them.

Truly, the Dniester region, which had up to 1924 been part of Ukraine on a common basis with the other oblasti, subsequently acquired the status of Moldavian ASSR under the jurisdiction of Ukraine, given the preponderance on its territory of the Ukrainian population right up to 1940. Consequently, Ukraine cannot help but bear if only moral responsibility for the fate and national interests of its former wards.

Granted the manifestly artificial nature of its appearance in 1924, the new autonomy within Ukraine was intended, according to the designs of Stalin and his associates, merely to emphasize with a view to the future the Soviet leadership's nonconsent in principle to Romania's virtual Anschluss of Bessarabia, which had previously belonged to Russia in accordance even with the terms of the 1812 peace with Turkey. And the peace of 1812 had itself, in turn, served as the legal basis for the acquisition of the generally recognized state independence of the Wallachian Principality, which had previously been a vassal subordinate of Turkey and from which, in fact, the present Romanian state was formed.

But the above-mentioned historical aspects are by no means preventing certain Romanian circles from laying claim at the present time not only to Moldova, Northern Bukovina (Chernovtsy Oblast) and Southern Bessarabia (the Izmail region) directly but also to the Dniester region, which has never belonged to Romania, unless we count its temporary presence together with Odessa Oblast as part of the Romanian province of Transylvania following the attack on the USSR in 1941.

For this reason the question raised by a majority of the population of the Dniester region concerning its autonomization is connected primarily with the reunification in the very near future, which has actually been predetermined, of the whole of Moldova with Romania and with the formation of a single Romanian state and, consequently, with the detachment of the population of the Dniester region, inevitable under these conditions, from its Slav roots or, as a highly probable alternative, with forced repatriation.

Romania's fundamental position on the question of the right to national self-determination in respect to its own national minorities may be traced sufficiently unambiguously in the example of Romanian Transylvania, whose 1.5 million indigenous Hungarian population has for many decades been attempting unsuccessfully to secure for itself the right to real autonomy within the framework of the Romanian state. There is no doubt, therefore, that a similar fate would await also the present Slav population of the Dniester region, whose reluctance to "merge" with Romania is in fact the last obstacle in the way of the effective realization of the above-mentioned plans. In addition, one has the impression that without the tiny Dniester region with its developed industrial base and agriculture providing on the order of one-third of Moldova's gross product all told, Romania itself is not particularly consumed

with a desire to affiliate to itself, at the present time at least, only Moldova proper. There are, evidently, serious apprehensions as regards the addition here merely of extra difficulties to its economy, which is spinning its wheels as it is. After all, even the very sponsors of the formation of a united Romanian state with the incorporation therein of Moldova by no means conceal the fact that the present sovereign Moldova is necessary merely for preliminarily "digesting" in accordance with Romanian standards the Dniester region prior to its subsequent absorption by the unitary Romanian state.

Thus upon discussion of the present conflict situation in the Dniester region, in the opinion of V. Sandru, Romania's ambassador to Russia, if it is at all possible to speak of Romanianization, "this is the same as the Russification of Kostroma Oblast" (IZVESTIYA 4 April 1992), which indirectly confirms the Romania side's confidence of the alleged absolute indisputability of Romanian claims to the eastern territories and, consequently, the practicality of the plans of their subsequent absorption.

It is highly significant in this connection that the compromise proposals of the leaders of the Dniester region and the local corps of deputies concerning such measures of relaxation of the present extremely tense situation as the Dniester region being accorded the rights of an autonomy within Moldova or, at least, an official decision of parliament and the president of Moldova on the abandonment of a merger with Romania were categorically rejected by Chisinau officialdom. The latter merely additionally persuaded the population of the Dniester region as to the justification of its apprehensions concerning the real prospects of "Romanianization" of the territory of its habitation and reinforced its resolve to fight to the end for its rights and for self-determination.

The Romanian and Moldovan sides are trying by all possible propaganda methods to remove from consideration the national aspects of the conflict in the Dniester region, bringing to the fore as a counterweight their exclusively political interpretation of what is happening. To judge by everything, Bucharest and Chisinau are afraid, not without reason, that, in the event of the Dniester region gaining autonomy on a national basis, this would inevitably lend additional impetus to the analogous efforts of the Hungarian-speaking population of Romanian Transylvania. Such a turn of events would, naturally, be incompatible with the prevailing idea in Romania of the creation of a single unitary Romanian state.

As far, however, as the prudent labeling of the leaders of the Dniester region as being of a pro-communist persuasion is concerned, it would seem more than paradoxical obtaining such information from former high-ranking functionaries of the communist parties of Moldova and Romania and, moreover, given the absence of any specific corroboration of its authenticity. At least, the real reasons for the darting of the Dniester region leaders from extreme to extreme, which has, indeed, taken place, in the latter's attempt to find even some support following the virtual denial of this on the part of Ukraine may be understood. As already mentioned, it was by no means the fault of the representatives of the

Dniester region that consideration of the request concerning the reunification of the Dniester region with its Ukrainian roots as involuntary protection against the threat of impending Romanianization for the Slav nation of the Dniester region was artificially thwarted.

Against the general background of what has been said the recent statements of M. Snegur, president of Moldova, on Moldova's renunciation of claims to Northern Bukovina and Southern Bessarabia could hardly fool anyone given the parallel absence of sufficiently convincing confirmation on the part of the Romanian leadership. This is all the more valid given the existence of the by no means concealed extremist aspirations among the political forces which are in opposition to the present authorities and which are attempting to make the maximum use of the intensification of national-patriotic passions concerning the "eastern" territories in the struggle at the impending general election in Romania. There is every reason, therefore, to regard the assurances of the president of Moldova merely as an involuntary tactical move in order to win even the passive support of Ukraine at the stage of the planned establishment of full control over the Dniester region prior to its incorporation within a future unitary Romanian state. Attesting to this, in particular, is the fact of the abrupt change in M. Snegur's position involving a switch from political methods of a settlement of the conflict, which he declared back at a news conference of leaders of CIS countries in Kiev on 20 March 1992, to categorical military confrontation immediately following his visit for consultations to Romania, where he was assured of complete support in the struggle against the "rebel" Dniester region. After all, it remains an indisputable fact that, following the well-known statement of officers of the 14th Army stationed in the Dniester region of their resolve to prevent the emergence in the Dniester region of a new Nagornyy Karabakh, it was merely the prospect of coming up against the armored equipment of the 14th Army which put a stop to the realization, which had commenced, of a large-scale offensive of the Moldovan armed forces against the Dniester Republic.

But what, one wonders, was, in fact, the need for such haste and energy in the sudden attempt to resolve at a stroke the problems of the Dniester region purely by power methods, despite the mass casualties among the civilian population of the Dniester region, aside from the losses among its defenders, inevitable given so "impulsive" an approach. One notices primarily the obvious synchronicity of Chisinau's sudden switch to purely power politics in respect to the Dniester region and the visit of an official Ukrainian delegation to Romania. After all, against the background of the measures implemented by Ukraine earlier to block uncontrolled communications across Ukraine with the Dniester region, as a display of loyalty to Chisinau and Bucharest, any carnage involved in the restoration of so-called "order" in the Dniester region would inevitably make Ukraine a virtual accomplice in the possible tragic events with all the ensuing consequences for relations with Russia and a new wave of anti-Ukraine sentiments among tens of millions of Russians. But was not the power action planned by Chisinau (and, most likely, Bucharest also) an attempt to make Ukraine an involuntary hostage to the manifestly

reckless policy in respect to the Dniester region, with no particular thought being given to the negative consequences of a strategic nature for the entire region as a whole.

The answer to this question may be illuminated to some extent upon an analysis of the main paradox of the situation in question, which is that the sole legal basis for the present plans for the "Romanianization" of the Dniester region is merely the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. And yet its illegality and denunciation have already served as the grounds for recognition of the independence of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia within the framework of the restoration of the status quo of 1940, that is, the time of formation of the Moldavian SSR thanks to the parallel disconnection from Ukraine of its artificial autonomy providentially formed by Stalin in 1924 and used in 1940 for the realization of his geopolitical plans.

But if the precedent of the consequences of the denunciation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in the form of restoration of the status quo of 1940 for the Baltic countries has already been recognized by the entire world community, this legal situation should without any doubt extend to the same extent to the part of Ukraine's national territory which was chopped off at the same time. In the overall legal context, therefore, the situation in the Dniester region cannot be merely a purely internal concern of Chisinau (or Bucharest), and Ukraine has every reason to participate on terms equal with the other parties in determination of the future of the Dniester region within the framework of a solution of the conflict by political methods.

[23 Apr p 2]

[Text] Given Ukraine's manifestly wait-and-see position in respect to the Dniester situation, the stimulation of foreign policy activity in this direction of the leadership of Russia expressed, in particular, in the decree of B. Yeltsin, president of Russia, on the transfer to the jurisdiction of Russia of the 14th Army, which has changed fundamentally the strategic situation in the Dniester region and the region as a whole, was perfectly natural.

It should be mentioned for objectivity's sake that the attitude of B. Yeltsin, president of Russia, toward the conflict in the Dniester region is akin to the maneuvering of Romanian President I. Iliescu under the pressure of the political opposition operating, as in Russia, with radical national-patriotic slogans. As far as Russia is concerned, we may point as a graphic example of such pressure to the statement, which preceded the appearance of the above-mentioned decree, of a number of Russian organizations of the Union of Officers type on the placement of the fullness of responsibility on Russian President B. Yeltsin and Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the armies of the CIS, in the event of their permitting mass bloodshed in the Dniester region. For this reason the evaluation of the official reaction of Russian President B. Yeltsin to such a prospect should not amount merely to routine accusations concerning Russia's pro-empire intentions. This is all the more valid if it is considered that not that long before the sudden reorientation of M. Snegur, president of Moldova, toward a policy of categorical confrontation with the supporters of the Dniester Republic

(with the inevitable bloodshed) neither B. Yeltsin nor Ye. Shaposhnikov had objected to the transfer of formations of the CIS Army on the territory of Moldova to its jurisdiction. Then followed a toughening of Moldova's position and the well-known affirmation of the concurrence of views of Romania and Ukraine of the events in the Dniester region, which virtually united the hands of Moldovan President M. Snegur for the realization of punitive measures in respect to the Dniester region. Therefore, the appropriate response to this on the part of the Russian leadership may be classified merely as precautionary and connected primarily with the domestic political ferment within Russia itself, given the obvious assertiveness of forces of the extreme right on the eve of the Sixth Congress of People's Deputies of Russia.

A typical manifestation of such assertiveness are also the interpretation of the events in the Dniester region heard at the mass meeting on 5 April 1992 in Manezh Square in Moscow and reflected in the television news merely as a deliberate provocation of Russia and the appeals connected with this for a demonstration for Russia's "opponents" of its full military power if, they say, hostilities are imposed on Russia.

It is not hard to guess against whom it is planned spearheading such combat readiness. After all, it should be clear to anyone that there is just one possibility of the realization of measures of unilateral military support of the Dniester Republic by Russia by way of a break through the territory and air space of the Ukraine. For the artificial priming of such a breakthrough it is perfectly sufficient initially, for example, to organize a local raid in the direction of the Dniester region even of some army formation, which is formally out of control, or simply of a volunteer armed formation of the Cossack type in the expectation of natural opposition on the part of Ukraine. The logical continuation of such a scenario could be the commitment of main invasion forces under the formal cover of the slogan of assistance to the "pioneers" and prevention of their disarmament by the armed forces of Ukraine. At least, this is a most likely scenario of the realization of the appeals heard in Moscow on 5 April 1992 from the television broadcasts for defense (against whom and for what?) of the national pride of the Great Russians, but in fact merely for formal justification of any military action against Ukraine, given the absence of even the least pegs in the form of interethnic conflicts or any oppression of the Russian-speaking population in Ukraine itself.

The preventive measures of the leadership of Russia and the results of the meeting in Chisinau of the foreign ministers of Moldova, Ukraine, Romania, and Russia which followed this made it possible to prevent an escalation of the events in the Dniester region in the direction desirable for radical national-patriots of all stripes. But where are the guarantees that the situation might not in this way once again slip out of control? The question also is whether Russian President B. Yeltsin might not attempt in the style typical of him to subsequently wrest the initiative from the Russian national-patriots in order, from purely tactical considerations at least, to neutralize the charges of a betrayal of Russia's interests already being laid against him by the radical national-patriots.

An echo of this frame of mind was the speech of Russian Vice President A. Rutskoy on board the cruiser Moskva at the time of the recent visit to Sevastopol, in which he expressed confidence in the inevitable revival of the greatness of Russia and assured the Black Sea Fleet sailors that in the very near future "everything will be put in its rightful place," and it remains to assume that the priority place in the plan for the revival of Russia announced by the Russian vice president will be occupied by Ukraine.

The proposal of Russian President B. Yeltsin concerning the establishment of Russia's state borders with all contiguous countries, which he expressed at the Sixth Congress of People's Deputies of Russia, could also be a method of such a "rearrangement". The abandonment by so distinguished an author of his very own idea of the "transparency" of the borders of the countries of the CIS testifies to an obvious intention to use the demarcation of the state border for the "settlement" of relations with his neighbors in the requisite tone and primarily with "rebellious" Ukraine by way of measured territorial claims initially along the line of the future state border. It is highly characteristic that the supporters of the establishment of a strict state border not only in Russia but in Ukraine also employ, as a rule, one and the same reference to the unchecked crossflow of commodities, despite the roadblocks posted everywhere. But the overall ascertainment of the existence of return commodity flows, even if unchecked, makes it possible to attribute such justification to the category of arguments, not real reasons, for such plans of border demarcation of the CIS countries.

Ukraine's fundamental national interests first and foremost, and all kinds of interested curtsies apropos the constructive nature of Ukraine's position, like those so generously bestowed by the Romanian side on the Ukrainian delegation during its visit to Romania, least of all, should be made the cornerstone upon an examination of its possible position in this situation. A full concurrence of views on the crisis situation in the Dniester region was declared during this visit. But if an attempt is made, for all that, to move beyond the framework of purely diplomatic etiquette and to switch to the sphere of actual policy, such an affirmation may be taken, at best, as a purely formal combination of the wish and reality. This proposition is all the more substantiated against the background of the unrealistic nature, to put it mildly, of the policy of the leadership of Moldova, which, to judge by everything, has been sanctioned by Bucharest and which would just about have discredited Ukraine's neutrality in the event of realization of the "general punishment" of the population of the Dniester region, with the inevitable mass bloodshed, which had in fact been timed to coincide with the Ukrainian delegation's visit to Romania.

For this reason Ukraine, which has found itself between two poles of radical national patriotism, should be interested to the maximum extent in the immediate and complete defusion of the center of tension in the Dniester region, which could be reflected in most unpleasant fashion in the relations of Ukraine and Russia, which, under any circumstances, remain the priority in Ukrainian foreign policy. In turn, this will require a more balanced attitude toward the interests of the Slav nation of the Dniester region, without

that unthinking orientation merely toward the opportunistically changing position of Chisinau.

Upon the determination of Ukraine's attitude toward the sometimes diametrically opposite requirements of its western and eastern neighbors there should be consideration and a solution also of the following dilemma: To what extent may compliance with the above-mentioned principle of the permanency of borders counterposed by the Moldovan authorities to the right of the Slav population of the Dniester region to self-determination apply only to part of Moldova's borders, given the elimination of its borders with Romania which has in fact been realized. Ultimately the Helsinki accords themselves make no provision in the legal plane for so selective an approach in observance of the guarantees of the stability of the state formations in Europe which exist at this time. In this connection the concept of observance of the guarantees of the inviolability of Moldova's borders, given the preservation of its status as a sovereign state, merits full support on the part of Ukraine, corresponding in parallel to the analogous demands of the population of the Dniester region, which fears the negative consequences for itself of the otherwise sufficiently real "Romanianization" of the Dniester region.

Following the world community's recognition of the illegality and the denunciation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Ukraine has every reason to lay claim to a return to it of the Dniester region in the event of attempts in this form or the other to annex it to Romania. This proposition is all the more pertinent given the existence of the real alternative of the proclamation of the Dniester region an enclave of Russia like the Baltic Kaliningrad Oblast, with a similar saturation with forces and equipment, which has already given rise to the appearance of officially expressed misgivings on the part of the governments of Poland and Lithuania.

For this reason Ukraine should not even at this stage be distancing itself from practical measures to stabilize the situation in the Dniester region itself and even, on the contrary, assuming full responsibility for guarantees of the security and national rights of the Slav nation of the Dniester region. This could also be expressed in the use, coordinated with all the parties, of Ukraine's armed forces for delimiting the antagonistic contingents with the parallel withdrawal from the conflict zone of units of the 14th Army, which has been transferred to Russian jurisdiction, with their redeployment in Russia. It would seem that both Chisinau and Bucharest should be imbued with an understanding of the entire seriousness of the situation and should assist a possible Ukrainian peace-making mission in the Dniester region.

Granted all the outward effectiveness of the argument between Ukraine and Russia over the affiliation of the Black Sea Fleet, the situation in the Dniester region, which now represents a kind of Trojan Horse deep in Ukraine's strategic rear (given the presence there of Russia's 14th Army), could have far more serious consequences for the future of Ukraine and the region as a whole than all the problems connected with the Black Sea Fleet put together. The latter, incidentally, was characterized by Z. Brzezinski, former U.S. secretary of state, merely as potential scrap metal

(LITERATURNIA UKRAYINA of 2 April 1992) and requiring, in addition, tremendous resources for its upkeep. At the same time, on the other hand, the declaration on the Dniester region adopted on 8 April 1992 by the Sixth Congress of People's Deputies of Russia (on the basis of Russian Vice President A. Rutskoy's report) testifies to Russia's firm intention of reserving the Dniester region as a permanent sphere of its interests, maintaining the presence of Russian armed forces there, at least.

Given the constant lagging of Ukraine's foreign policy behind the course of the development of events, be it the situation in the Dniester region, the division of the Black Sea Fleet, or the fate of the nuclear weapons deployed in Ukraine, it is essential to switch from the virtual impromptu nature of the decisions which are being adopted to their systemic forecasting prior to their subsequent implementation in foreign policy practice.

Thus, for example, following the unconcealed see-sawing on the question of the transfer to Russia of nuclear weapons for their technological elimination, the idea of Ukraine as an unpredictable partner which still preserves, it is said, concealed ambitious plans to possess weapons of mass destruction, which the West intends countering with all available means, has become widespread overseas. The recent demarche of U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker in connection with Ukraine's delay in removing tactical nuclear weapons to Russia also testifies to this. But U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker guaranteed Ukraine support only in fact in the event of methods of nuclear blackmail being employed against it. The question concerning more realistic blackmail of Ukraine by means of conventional forces and arms following the handover of the nuclear weapons on its territory remained wholly open here. Similar points were retained in the subsequent demarche of the NATO military leadership. At the present time a general trend toward the expression of distrust of Russia's intentions concerning the Ukrainian factor, which was reflected, in particular, in the corresponding statement of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine of 10 April 1992 and the calls of many people's deputies of Ukraine for withdrawal from the CIS, has emerged in parallel in Ukraine at the present time. Considering these aspects, perhaps we should, without further ado, in connection with the very disturbing situation taking shape around Ukraine, propose to the authors of the said memoranda a combination of the prompt transfer of the nuclear weapons remaining on the territory of Ukraine, on which the NATO countries insist, and Ukraine's admittance to membership of NATO. After all, membership in NATO, the prospect of which even Russia does not deny in principle, would be for Ukraine not only a firm factor of its national security but also economically more expedient than the allocation, at the expense of a decline in the living standard of the populace, of approximately 40 percent of its budget for the assurance of so-called defensive sufficiency. And the latter is in no way additionally guaranteed under the conditions of the planned neutral status of Ukraine, what is more.

Realization of this proposal could also put an end once and for all to the variety of numerous instances of speculation concerning the endeavor of Ukraine, allegedly concealed

from the world community, to possess nuclear weapons as the sole objective reason for the delay in their transfer to Russia in accordance with the agreements reached earlier. There would simultaneously be an opportunity to demonstrate vividly to the whole world community that Ukraine requires merely guarantees of its independent stable existence and that the preservation of peace is the arterial direction of the development of Ukrainian statehood without claims to regional domination and the creation of any threats to its neighbors, in both the East and the West.

P.S. Unfortunately, the meeting of foreign ministers of Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, and Romania held in Chisinau on 17 April of this year in fact concluded without result: A conceptual solution of the problem of the Dniester region was carried over to the next meeting, for which no precise date was set.

Kryuchkov Lawyer Discusses Accused 'Putschists,' Attacks Press

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[Interview with former KGB chief Yuriy Pavlovich Ivanov by Olga Volkova; place and date not given: "Yuriy Ivanov: 'In Court, Presidents Will Have to Reply to Questions Coming From Someone Other Than Convenient Journalists'"]

[Text] Continuing with the subject of the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency], one which is a permanent fixture of Aleksandr Litvinenko's "Politburo" writers' program, we offer below an interview with Yuriy Pavlovich Ivanov, a lawyer and the former chief of the KGB. The answers reflect the personal opinion and the interests of the interviewee.

[Volkova] Some people have the opinion that it was almost out of the goodness of their hearts that the conspirators did not give the order to storm the White House. You have been communicating with Kryuchkov for a long time, and you know the other defendants as well. From your vantage point, does such an opinion have any foundation?

[Ivanov] I think that you journalists know absolutely nothing about the defendants. More precisely, you think about them in stereotypic categories. And the stereotypes are quite distant from reality. My opinion of these people is quite certain—the people being held in confinement in the GKChP case are people of which the country can be proud. I am just now reading some of the volumes of material regarding the actions of the GKChP's administrative members, if I may call them that—Baklanov, Tizyakov and Starodubtsev. I would also perhaps include in this group CPSU Central Committee Secretary Shenin, because this is a person who spent the larger part of his life not in party offices but at construction projects in Siberia. Excuse me, but all of the space in your newspaper would not be enough to list the awards these people deservedly received from their motherland (from Tizyakov's "For Valor" medal to Baklanov's and Starodubtsev's "Hero of Socialist Labor"). They got them not for talking profusely at party congresses and for fawning on the leadership, but for many years of

labor to which they devoted themselves fully. In my opinion we are simply "eating away" what had been created by the labor of these people (you can call it socialism, or whatever). And what do you think, let us say, of Yanayev? Your first reaction would be to tell me that his hands shook at the press conference. I am not about to dispute that, though of course this is not at all amazing in such a tense situation. What is more amazing is something else—when the hands of certain Russian leaders could be seen shaking in this way simply after a weekend. Except that for some reason the television cameras don't want to pick that up. As far as Yanayev is concerned, in my eyes he has been the most highly principled AUCCTU [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions] chairman of the last few decades. And I remember his straightforward speeches. On the eve of his arrest he wrote a speech that he wanted to give to the deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet. It focused primarily on the pain he felt for the simple working people, for the perishing fatherland. Believe me, his writing talent simply cannot be excelled. I am certain that after the speech is made public in the court proceedings, it will be duplicated and posted on every street corner.

But when it comes to the general impressions I get from studying the case, the deeper I study it the stronger two of my feelings become: pain for our clients, and anger and hatred, if you will, toward those who are holding them behind bars.

[Volkova] Hatred is a very unprofessional feeling for a lawyer.

[Ivanov] But can a lawyer relate disinterestedly toward that which he feels to be humiliating to his clients? I of course have no right to express anger in the course of my professional activity, but this does not mean that I am forbidden to feel it. But the main thing lies not in a lawyer's emotions but in the future of the trial. The main thing to me is how this will all be perceived by our people.

[Volkova] What feelings will they be experiencing in your opinion?

[Ivanov] A feeling of injustice. I'm sure that this feeling is precisely what the main result of the GKChP case will be, and not the terms that the members of the GKChP will receive if the court is just as unobjective as was the investigation. However, I'm also certain that in this sense the indictment is doomed. The procurator has neither convincing legal grounds for finding fault in our clients on the basis of criminal law, nor a body of evidence that is in any way sufficient.

[Volkova] But Stepankov and Lisov assert the reverse.

[Ivanov] They are simply capitalizing on the fact that they hold a monopoly on information regarding the case, because we lawyers are bound to silence, and therefore we are simply deprived of the possibility for rebutting with valid arguments at this stage. Consequently, Stepankov and Lisov are presently able to expound their monologues before commissions "with impunity," and bathe in the rays of glory in the newspapers and on the television screen, without encountering any opposition. Neither deputies nor journalists are

in a position to check the truth of the assertions of this duo. And the principal lawyers on Yeltsin's team—Shakhray and Fedorov—are unable to see how weak the accusation is either. First of all, they are scholars, and not practicing lawyers, and secondly they specialized in an area other than criminal law and procedure. Moreover in order to correctly evaluate the prospects of the case, you have to be familiar with it, and it spans 125 volumes. As far as I know, neither Shakhray or Fedorov have studied the case, and by the way, Fedorov does not have the right to do so, because the minister of justice is not endowed with such competency. (As far as the powers of Shakhray's organization are concerned, they are unclear to me).

Things have evolved such that we are about to witness the greatest political trial of Russia's history. The powers that be are not supposed to have an objective interest in its outcome, but they have turned everything over to two persons who either do not understand the sort of "half-baked" case they are taking to court, or who are putting on an act of cheerful optimism. But the closer the trial date comes, the closer they come to their opponents—the lawyers. And at that time, in the trial, the real value of this "case" will become evident. I for example clearly see that no matter what element of the trial you consider, it will not withstand the test of strength.

[Volkova] Can you back that up with something specific?

[Ivanov] Certainly. Consider the central links of the forthcoming inquiry. What, for example, will they be looking for? If it is said that the president of the USSR and his government were the principal objects of violation by the "putschists," then we will emphasize the following points in particular:

- How were they able to cut off Gorbachev's telephone service at the peak of the swimming season on the Crimean coast?
- how was it that the bodyguard of the president of the USSR, which was armed to the teeth, was able to occupy a ring defense around the dacha in Foros together with the president and his faithful assistants, abandoning the defensive lines only to take a dip in the Black Sea?
- and how was Generalov, the modest, unarmed deputy chief of the KGB's administrative and supply directorate, able to force these "Schwartzeneggers" of ours into such a defense? What sort of torture did he have to resort to in order to take from them the keys to the garages in which the radio- and telephone-equipped presidential motor vehicles were kept? And why didn't the good lads simply break the locks off of these garages, or even steal the keys from their place in the desk that everyone knew about?

And in general, how was it that the Georgian Gamsakhurdia and his family were able to break out of the besieged bunker in battle, while instead of preparing for a breakout, for several days the president of the great Soviet Union did something entirely different—he worked on what he was best at—a speech, recorded by the household after the visit by Baklanov's "malevolent" group?

The court will have to resolve numerous issues of this sort, and there will be no avoiding them, because the court examination is to go into what appear to be even the most inconsequential details of the incident. The court, you see,

cannot determine beforehand which circumstances will end up at the top at the time of the sentencing, and which will assume a secondary position.

[Volkova] But hasn't the Russian general procurator recently been emphasizing more and more often that the putsch was directed not so much against Gorbachev as against Russian structures and Yeltsin?

[Ivanov] You're absolutely right in noticing that. The leaders of the investigation insist on placing the Russian president in the center of the proceedings. Although it would seem that he is even more vulnerable than Gorbachev. When you get right down to it, all the members of the GKChP did was put light restrictions on Gorbachev for just a week. A congress that was to make the final decision on the lawfulness of the country-wide state of emergency they announced was to convene on their initiative on 26 August 1991. When you think about it, you find that this was only a "putsch for a week." Nothing of this sort has ever been witnessed in world history. But our procurators haven't given any thought to this.

On the other hand when it comes to Yeltsin, what did he do? He didn't just cut Gorbachev's telephone service off. What he did in fact was to summarily "liquidate" the post itself of USSR president, and the Union as a whole. No parliament gave him this right, and subsequent confirmation of his gross violations of union and republic legislation by the Russian parliament has no legal significance. It is entirely obvious that according to elementary logic, Yeltsin must bear even greater responsibility than the members of the GKChP. There is no way to avoid these comparisons, and they will be a constant leitmotif of the GKChP trial.

Consider in this case that the questions that will have to be answered in court will be coming not from convenient journalists but from professional lawyers, and this, as they say in Odessa, is two large differences. And the hopes that the court might constrain defense are insubstantial. Everything will proceed publicly and, I hope, in front of television cameras. All of the presidents are of course extremely confident in themselves, but I very much doubt that they will be able to improve their image over the many hours of questioning (and the number of just lawyers alone in the trial will be a couple of dozen).

[Volkova] Relations between the prosecution and defense are very tense. The leaders of the prosecuting group are forever saying that the defense is "abusing its rights" and "ignoring our warnings." On their side, the lawyers are saying that the prosecution is holding a monopoly on information, and that it is "injecting its own (the prosecutor's) version of the August events into the consciousness of the people." Is such tension normal?

[Ivanov] The fact is that in a trial in which the procurator goes against a lawyer in a situation where the defendant has not confessed his guilt (this is precisely the situation we have here), the conflict is predetermined by nature. But the tension is attributable to more than just this objective cause: In this case it is also predetermined by the campaign being waged in support of the prosecution's version, a campaign the Procuracy initiated in the mass media.

And the press, riding the wave of the post-August euphoria, is not being especially critical of the facts, and sometimes out of pure subservience it has created endless myths or half-myths. I am referring to things like the "arrest lists," "the storm of the White House," "Yeltsin's arrest," etc. Rather than carefully and meticulously checking out these half-myths, the prosecution allowed itself in the very first days to make assertions that are totally impermissible from the standpoint of presumption of innocence, which is basic and mandatory to an investigation. I have collected these assertions together in the form of copies of newspaper articles or recordings of radio and television statements. By logic, the leaders of the prosecution should have been challenged, but there is no sense in this, because Stepankov himself was the author of these impermissible statements. Such that the appraisal of the prosecution's lack of objectivity will have to be submitted to the court.

What is going on now? The Procuracy wants to transfer the case to the court. Its design is simple: The main burden of responsibility will transfer to the shoulders of the court. And the court will hardly dare to vindicate the "putschists," because if it were to recognize the myths and half-myths as unproven and undependable, it would enter into the sharpest possible confrontation with the Russian leadership, to which these half-myths are dedicated. I believe that the Procuracy's design is clear, and that it may come to pass.

Perhaps I'm being too pessimistic, and my work during the years of stagnation, when the courts "rubber-stamped" indictments, is having an effect, but I have little faith that another Kovi, someone who will be absolutely objective, will preside over the trial. Someone who is capable of acquitting the defendants.

But there is one thing I have no doubt about: that the sentence will be extremely unconvincing, that the evidence is too weak, that it will be all too obvious that politics are playing a role in this trial, and not justice. Such that nothing good awaits my client. But I am certain that thousands upon thousands, and perhaps millions of common citizens will take the sentence handed down in this trial as an act of vengeance, which means that they will join the ranks of the opponents of the present Russian leadership, and they will vote for the opposition. Such that overall, the legal and not the political result of the trial will be the most important. I don't envy the judge, who will become the "hatchet man" in either case. Yes, the Moscow leadership might just get what's coming to it, and it will probably have to contend with pickets, and perhaps even demonstrations. My hope is that they will occur.

[Volkova] You keep saying that the press lacks objectivity. How justified are your attacks upon journalists?

[Ivanov] The case is being illuminated in the press depending on the political views of the particular editorial office. And because the press is now mainly in the hands of persons who call themselves democrats, the members of the GKChP are naturally being portrayed as malicious, narrow conservatives. It must be said that in my experience as a lawyer, it has been commonplace for the press to beat a person who is arrested, and consequently a man who is

down, violently and with relish. Someone who is under arrest, after all, is unable to put up any resistance. Kryuchkov takes the attacks on himself rather calmly. But I for example try not to read what people like our academicians Shatalin or Arbatov are saying. I get disgusted. I put the paper aside, turn on the television set, and there they are again. Kryuchkov only laughs: "You can't get away from them. Their kind have always been around, offering advice to all general secretaries and all presidents!"

The one thing that did hit him especially hard was the slander in ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, which asserted—hypothetically to be sure—that he, Shenin and Pavlov have enormous sums of hard currency abroad. Though perhaps it would hardly be right to reproach the journalists for this, because they were only repeating what was told to them by Russian Supreme Soviet Deputy Surkov, a member of the parliamentary commission investigating the GKChP case. I think that after the investigation into the party's money reaches its conclusion, it will of course establish that Kryuchkov has no money abroad, and never did. After this we will necessarily file a suit against Surkov, and then he will have to explain in a court proceeding whether he had cooked up such fabrications on his own or with someone else's urging.

But in general, the articles are sometimes so false that you are simply overwhelmed by amazement. For example on 25 February 1992 MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS carried an article titled "Pavlov Foresaw the Failure of the Putsch." It was signed: "MIN-KIN." It asserts that "according to informed sources" while Pavlov was in Sweden "in May 1991" he engaged in petty contraband, selling "commanders' watches." It hardly need be proven that this is false, and that Pavlov had not been in Sweden. But what do you call the journalist who wrote this? A dimwit? Or a provocateur? I'm certain that all of this will be straightened out, and we will forget about it. But the main thing is this: How could the editor's office have allowed such material to be published? There is, after all, the concept of the professional honor of publishing affairs. But look at what the Procuracy does. The moment they receive information on contraband they take the case to court! If this is in fact false, then how about prosecuting for the slander? I'm certain that they have Pavlov's statement. But no, they're holding back, since this is grist for their mill, after all. And when it comes to "MIN-KIN," the road to the leadership of the prosecution will now always be open to him.

It must be said that the hardest thing to do after such articles are published is to console the wife of my client, and his children.

Unfortunately, there is not enough time to run to every editor's office with rebuttals, and to courts with suits defending my client's honor and merit.

Let me conclude on this joyless note.

KGB Recruitment, Fear Tactics Said Still in Effect

924C1495A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 14, 5-12 Apr 92 p 9

[Article by Yevgeniya Albats: "Shadowy Figures"]

[Text] "I remember clearly: it was October 25, 1985. I was 41 and had one book to my credit; I wanted to become a full-time writer, but was still involved in a project for Leningrad Radio, where I had been working. That day I was summoned by the personnel department chief, who immediately introduced me to a smartly dressed young man by the name of Boris Tkachenko, a major at the Leningrad KGB. Tkachenko suggested, or requested, that I should help them. I agreed. I felt like a chekist in Gorbachevian guise."

I saw the man on several occasions: small and frail, he always seemed to be shivering with fever. The preceding piece is an excerpt from his hand-written confession. His name is Lysov, a member of the former USSR Writers' Union.

When I asked if I could mention his name in my article he shrugged indifferently.

Here and further on I will only use known and proven names. Lysov, a KGB secret agent, or informer to be more precise, lives in constant fear. He is one of hundreds of thousands, if not millions of helpers of the KGB, now known as Russia's Security Ministry. Not all of them are informers, of course.

There is a group of "professionals," i.e., KGB career officers acting under cover of various occupations—deputy directors of security procedures at research institutions, those in charge of "relations with foreigners" at educational establishments, translators, hotel ushers, telephone exchange engineers, and journalists, to name but a few. They receive the same pay as their civilian colleagues, with extra for their rank and service record.

Last December 27 the 1st deputy chief of today's Security Ministry, Anatoly Oleinikov, told a commission of the Russian parliament that "there are no more undercover agents."

This is the truth, but not the complete truth. Agents still operate undercover, only now they are officially referred to as "attached" personnel.

The second largest group is that of "trusted persons." Former officers of ideological counterintelligence—now fashionably referred to as the "counterterrorism service"—cannot name specific functions of the "trusted persons," who are usually given one-off tasks and have no financial or documented relations with state security agencies. Viktor Ivanenko, who progressed from rank-and-file officer to chief of the short-lived Federal Security Agency, told me: "Personnel managers are very trusted persons—they can be relied on to provide accurate information and keep silent."

Alexander Kichikhin, a KGB Lieutenant-Colonel, maintains that a couple of years ago many media bosses, enterprise managers, heads of educational establishments, party

cell organizers, telegraph operators, etc., were "trusted persons." Their task was to simply report popular feeling in professional circles. They were paid nothing, but were sometimes given bonuses like foreign trips as tour group leaders, free of charge of course. In the majority such people had no scruples. Some of them were unaware of being listed as KGB trusted persons, while others believed it was the name of the game.

Gen. Filipp Bobkov was believed to be the best KGB expert in dealing with people in the arts. He stood at the cradle of ideological counterintelligence. Some sources say he had files on everyone he had ever contacted, while others counter that he was very discriminative.

The third largest, and probably most dangerous group of the KGB's subjects, are "secret agents"—code-named guards, observers, consultants, agents of influence and residents. The KGB had files on all of them. "Guards," "observers" and "consultants" at various industrial outfits had to report the general state of affairs, and the opinions of personnel.

Agents of influence make up some 10 per cent of KGB secret agents. One agent of influence was Andrei Sakharov's physician, who tried to talk the insurgent academician out of making public speeches, statements, etc., for reasons of health.

There is a manual on how to recruit agents, who should not be under 18 or over 60 (the latter are used as keepers of safe houses at best), with no previous ties to the KGB or the Interior Ministry and no criminal record. The KGB preferred to deal with people it or the Interior Ministry, had compromising material against. The 6th department of the Technical Service (in charge of correspondence inspection) provided information on whether potential recruits corresponded with people abroad.

The next step is to have a "talk" with the potential "helper." Some personal experience: twelve years ago when I was a young journalist, I attended an international congress on space technology. I was approached by a man named Ivanov, about 35, bearded and likeable who worked in the security department of the USSR Academy of Sciences—the sponsor of the congress. He asked me whether I wanted to participate in other congresses, including those held abroad. I was eager, naturally. The only thing he wanted in return was to have copies of my interviews with foreigners (I spoke good English), and to know some other details about the interviewees—interests, opinions of this country, etc. He even played up to me: "You're a pro, after all." I mumbled something about having a lot of work. He didn't press. At a later symposium he approached me again. That time I told him rashly that I had no time for two jobs. I was barred from trips abroad for the next eight years.

Not long ago I told the story to Kichikhin, who called Ivanov a fool. Kichikhin believes he could enlist practically anybody—either by promising something the person wants or by explaining that there is no other way.

What recruiting methods are used by the KGB? Some "victims" come of their own free will. "When I worked at a plant in Voronezh," I was told by Col. Rubanov, "I had a

hard time checking voluntary 'helpers.' More often than not they wanted to depose their boss and take his place."

Some people are apt to say: "We're all victims of the system!" But that does not mean everybody was eager or ready to sell his or her soul to the devil. Also, I don't think many people cooperated just because the lives of their families were endangered.

"If you worked abroad or wanted to, you'd have to contact the KGB," I was told by a high-ranking official who prefers not to divulge his name.

It certainly is a great temptation to smear everybody in filth and thus save oneself the trouble of repenting.

First, not all Soviets working abroad agreed to the "contact." Secondly, even if they did... "Thou shalt not judge..."

There are a lot of temptations for which a man will sell his soul: from a good apartment to a good job, to a trip abroad, to a good kindergarten for the kids.... The KGB will promise everything, yet getting this "everything" once you are on the hook is quite another matter.

There can even be romantic reasons, or the wish to fight corruption in the higher echelons.

A good journalist I know (let's call him N.) told me that he worked for a magazine intended mostly for foreign readership. Nearly all staffers were KGB agents. At first N. was swept away by the romanticism of intelligence work. Later he understood he was hooked. These days he gets occasional requests to describe the situation in the country, and writes what he would write for the magazine—in very plain terms. Another journalist, Mikhail Kazakov, told me he was threatened that if he didn't cooperate his brother and his wife would never be promoted at their place of work.

Viktor Orekhov, a former captain of the KGB who served 8 years in prison for warning dissidents of impending arrest, believes there are four main reasons why people start working for the KGB: career considerations, compromising materials, fear of the KGB, and the victim's belief that the KGB never gives up. "In my eight years' work only one man, a student, refused to cooperate, although I threatened him with all sorts of things. I had the task of recruiting 4 or 5 people a year," says Orekhov.

In 1991, before the abortive putsch, KGB recruiters had to find two new agents a year. Some of them recruited five and received bonuses, others were reprimanded if the boss believed they could do better. Failing to recruit one agent entailed a 30 per cent reduction in bonuses—this was the order of the day in early 1991.

Those who agree to cooperate write a contract of sorts and are obliged to keep the fact a secret. Finding a code name is a difficult affair—it should be easy to remember, yet not reminiscent of the actual name of the agent or his close friends. On signing the contract the new agent is obliged to write his first report, and he is on the hook.

Some recruits refuse to sign the contract. They are then requested to write down basic facts and names—"so the innocent won't suffer," and they're hooked all the same.

Vadim Bakatin says that even having a talk with a KGB officer could be sufficient to start a file on the person.

What are the meeting places? According to Lysov his controller used to call at his flat, or invite him to hotels or even a safe house. The keeper, an old woman, would greet them and then go to the kitchen to drink tea. Maj. Tkachenko asked Lysov about conversations on the radio and in the Writers' Union, and once wanted him to befriend a Jewish writer who had relatives in New York.

The last question is payment. Orekhov told me that a lot of controllers spent the agents' fees on drink, paying the money only to those in dire need of it. More often than not controllers just helped their agents to get promotion or publish a book—it varied.

Many Soviet correspondents abroad were made to report their meetings—primary and subsequent—with foreigners and to make copies of interviews. Some of them were even forced to go to places where career intelligence officers feared to tread. If the journalists refused, they told them: "If you don't you'll be home in 24 hours. And you did sign the paper in the Central Committee in Moscow, didn't you?" The paper signed in Moscow read: "I promise to observe the rules of conduct of a Soviet citizen abroad."

How many KGB agents are there in the country? Recently KGB chief Vadim Bakatin told me that the figure was about to be made public. But then President Gorbachev vetoed the decision. Bakatin also hinted that his staffers misinformed him about the actual figure. Another source cited the figure 400,000!!!

If one is to extend the practices of the defunct GDR or Czechoslovakia to this country, the figure should correspond to 1 per cent of the adult population.

KGB Col. (Ret) Yaroslav Karpovich of ideological counter-intelligence insists that even this figure is too low. Karpovich claims that approximately 30 per cent of the adult population have cooperated with the KGB in one way or another.

Alexander Kichikhin is even more pessimistic: his estimation is 60 to 70 per cent. Unbelievable, or is it?

Have things changed in the past few years? Not much, I'm afraid. The more zealous KGB bosses of today stand for working "in a new way." In particular they say that files should be kept only on agents charged with combat tasks. The rest—the "guards," "observer," "consultants," etc., who make up 50-80 per cent of the agents—should have no files. Recruiters and controllers should have a wider choice of methods to maintain secret cooperation.

Kichikhin tells me that the call has been heeded: of late his colleagues have been trying to recruit agents from among "socially active circles." "Kryuchkov told us to recruit agents in the democratic faction of the Russian parliament," said Kichikhin. "And from among Communists?" I asked. "What for?" he shrugged.

One ranking officer was delighted: "There are quite a few of our people among the parliamentarians!"

I cannot share his delight: the experience of Stasi in the GDR and StB in Czechoslovakia shows that former security officers can use the files they have on their agents among politicians to try and destabilize the political situation.

That is why I'm confident that KGB archives should be opened, however painful it may be. Otherwise the files may become a short leash round the necks of politicians who can then be manipulated.

The former socialist countries show us the way to avoid this. Those who run for public office or work at a state-owned enterprise should have a document to prove they have never cooperated with state security. In private businesses, you need no such document.

They say that a lot of files have been destroyed of late. Maybe so. But there are registers of agents and their controllers, and department chiefs at the KGB had lists of all agents their staffers controlled. These registers may complicate the whole affair. One counterintelligence officer told me that agents who have no files, yet are listed in registers, end up beholden to their specific controllers, for they don't know whether their files have really been destroyed or not.

This is yet another reason why archives should be opened. Every citizen of Germany, for instance, has the right to see his or her file, if any. In civilized countries this is called the right to information, and the secret services are obliged to provide it.

"When I saw that I was hooked, I tried to rupture my ties with the KGB, and was told that they would not hesitate to make my status public. Now I'm afraid to quit my job," lamented N.

This fear is the strongest point and the social breeding ground of today's state security. Such fear has tremendous power.

Col. Rubanov angrily told me: "Don't you understand that the notion of a 'KGB agent', or 'informer' as you journalists like to call them, doesn't reflect the KGB-society correlation. Rather, it reflects the mentality of this society!" **MENTALITY!**

To conclude, I believe that all those who have become informers by reason of fear or by way of coercion should not wait for it to become public, and if they can't repent publicly, they should leave their public offices, lay down their mandates, quit their jobs at newspapers and magazines. And for one simple reason: not to be tools of the Lubyanka.

Such a step is not easy. But it's always better to take the step yourself. For the reward is freedom.

Attempts to Block Search for CPSU Funds Alleged

924C1509B Moscow *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA* in Russian No 21, 20 May 92 p 9

[Article by *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA* staff correspondent Kirill Privalov: "Party Money Is Buried Deep; Otherwise, the 'Kroll Associates' Would Not Have Ended Up on the Satire Page"]

[Text] Paris—"The appearance in the Russian press (take IZVESTIYA for 6 May 92) of the report of \$100 billion found in the accounts of party-Soviet embezzlers of public funds is certainly no accident," a Paris lawyer states in an interview with LITERATURNAYA GAZETA.

"Judge for yourself: The main point of the information is that competent Russian organs have doubts about the plausibility of the results of the investigation which is being conducted by the American investigation agency Kroll Associates," said the person with whom I spoke, who wanted to remain anonymous. "On what basis? The fact that, as IZVESTIYA writes, 'It turns out that the Supreme Soviet and the government know very little about the Kroll Associates investigation agency. A. Sevostyanov, a General Procuracy employee, said that the organization itself is located somewhere in the United States. It is run by one Jules Kroll.'"

It turns out that high positions in the Russian Government are occupied by people who are either incompetent or so acutely "competent" that they are trying to discredit one of the leading private investigation agencies in the world. Jules Kroll, a former adviser to President Kennedy and an eminent American democrat, heads this powerful organization which was created out of former employees of the FBI, the CIA, and other secret agencies which specialize in embezzlement and verification of the solvency of bank clients. Such dubious turns of phrase as "supposedly" or "they say" are inappropriate when referring to Kroll Associates. The Kroll Agency has 300 employees just in New York, where the organization's headquarters are located, plus there are branches in Washington, Los Angeles, Paris, London, Hong Kong, Tokyo... All the largest world banks and all the advocacy offices engaging in financial matters regularly "access" the Kroll electronic information network.

"The guarantee of the success of Jules Kroll and his associates is professionalism and confidentiality," continued my companion, a person who is extremely well known in French legal circles. "For instance, when American television found out about the investigation of the case of the millions Husayn had hidden away in Western safes, it was at the request of the Kuwait Government itself, which had hired Kroll Associates to do this work. It was precisely because of the Kroll Agency's high level of effectiveness and confidentiality that the Russian Government selected it for conducting the search for the stolen national property. I know Jules Kroll fairly well. It is one of his rules that he must receive a considerable part of the payment before he will begin the investigation. There were probably no exceptions for the Russian Government either."

Yet we read in IZVESTIYA: "But neither the president's press service nor the information service of the government of Russia confirmed the fact that one of the state leaders gave his official blessing for the search for the party money abroad to be conducted by Mr. J. Kroll. Moreover, in the Procuracy there is another authorized worker, who does not wish to give his name, who said that the activity of the American investigation agency cannot be regarded as altogether legal."

"It seems to me that by accusing Kroll Associates certain influential forces in the high organs of Russian power want to cast a shadow on your government," said my companion. "They say that, burning with desire to settle accounts with the party, it has hired suspicious types in the West. Incidentally, I have heard that Kroll's workers experienced a deep resistance to the legitimate desire of the Russian Government to return the people's property to them during their trip to Moscow. Not that anyone openly impeded their investigation of the archives of the former Soviet officialdom, but they received no help in Moscow either. The current information about the \$100 billion transferred to foreign banks over the last 20 years was also leaked in order to make the Kroll Associates investigation more difficult. And it was made to seem as though this was discovered by the agency."

POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Russian-Latvian Relations Assessed After Moscow Talks

924C1448A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 7 May 92 p 2

[Article by Andrey Sorokin: "Russia Is Rehearsing the Part of a Great Power; Latvia Is Playing the Role of a Sparring Partner"]

[Text]

Contacts

As NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA has already reported (No. 84, 30 April), the Moscow round of Russian-Latvian consultations at the end of April were concluded without results. The schedule and dates for the withdrawal of units of the Northwest Group of Forces of Russia from the territory of Latvia remain uncoordinated, as previously.

In itself, the obscure result of the negotiations can hardly be considered a surprise, which deserves detailed study. The reluctance of the Russian leadership to accelerate the demilitarization of the Baltic region, which is prompted by considerations of an internal political and especially material nature, has made itself felt rather clearly to this day, and, moreover, not only in the Latvian case.

However, this time, the emissaries of Riga went back home not only with unfavorable results, to which it is hard to get accustomed, but also after listening, incidentally, to a series of extremely unpleasant statements in a harsh tone from Russian colleagues. And this circumstance deserves more intent consideration both on the part of the Balts and also on the part of members of the Commonwealth.

It must be confessed that Latvia in its time tried to give its powerful neighbor a reason for an exasperated monologue. It is sufficient to mention steps that directly affect, if not the state interests of Russia, then its pride as a state: Territorial claims to part of Pskov Oblast; prolonged petty intrigues of the Latvian citizenship, which were accompanied by attacks directed at "Russian-speakers"—potential citizens of the Russian Federation; customs restrictions levied on army transport that were offensive to the military... And a recent

event—the establishment of customs barriers around the Baltic Fleet's Liepaja base, together with military aviation flight restrictions—finally caused a sharp reaction from Russia.

"We are encountering a situation where the Latvian Republic took unilateral action," declared Sergey Zotov, Russian Federation ambassador at large and head of a group of Russian experts, during the negotiations. "The illusion of bringing pressure on the Russian Federation in this way is without substance. As a part of the Russian state, the armed forces enjoy immunity from the authoritative displays of another state. The steps of the Latvian Republic on customs restrictions are provocative and demand immediate cancellation."

We will note, however, that the Latvians also have weighty reasons to be concerned over the safety of their own economic borders. The appearance in the Latvian press of information on the sale to Iran and Libya of two submarines of the Baltic Fleet has not been commented on distinctly on the part of the Russian military leadership, which places Riga in a rather ambiguous position.

But Russia is already incensed, and Latvia has been given to know unequivocally that the dream of conducting elections in the Sejm (autumn of 1993) with the military presence of a foreign power most likely will remain unrealizable. "Russia intends to withdraw its forces in the shortest possible time, but this shortest possible time is calculated not in months, but in years," declared Sergey Zotov. "It is determined not by an intention somehow to interfere in the internal affairs of Latvia, but by the necessity to create an infrastructure for the deployment garrisoning of troops that are being withdrawn."

Russia is inclined to view the process of demilitarization as "the cornerstone of our future friendly relations." Such guarantees, based on the words of Sergey Zotov, are quite curious: "It is understandable that we will not be able to send the withdrawn units to the Far East, probably they will remain hereabouts. And it is necessary to think about what influence the embittered young people, who were chased out of Latvia with a stick, will have on our relations." This, apparently, is a reminder that tiny Latvia, as before, has a direct border with a huge Russia. Which, in general, does not intend to interfere in the internal affairs.

No less indicative are the considerations of a general nature voiced by Zotov that touch on the political foundations of Russian-Latvian relations: "The new Russia does not bear responsibility for the crimes of the former leadership of the USSR, including the occupation of the Baltics in 1940." Interesting in this regard is the evaluation of the Soviet-German Nonaggression Pact and its consequences, which were fatal for the Baltics: "Mention of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact is irritating. Perhaps it is the purpose of the Latvian side to immortalize the name of the criminal? Especially because the original 'secret protocols' have not been found, which does not permit examining them juridically. Russia is the juridical, but not the political heir of the USSR."

Russia's new approach to the problem of its military presence in the Baltics is also declared accordingly—an approach that in no way jibes with the hopes of Latvia: "Both de-jure and de-facto, the Baltics were part of the USSR; therefore, Russian troops cannot be viewed as occupation troops, and their presence on the territory of Latvia as illegal. Undoubtedly, the troops also performed the function of providing for the security of the Baltic states."

It seems that, by virtue of the aforementioned passages, Latvia has been prepared in full measure for the fact that the resolution of the question on the withdrawal of troops for the most part will depend on the favorable disposition of Moscow. Also quite perceptible is the sound of the threat of a switch of Russian-Latvian relations on the whole onto the rails of power—in the event that Riga does not "deserve" the indicated favorable disposition.

It is not only Latvia, probably, that will have to think about the new aspects in the position of Russian diplomacy. The ambassador at large is a figure, of course, who is by far not the last in the state hierarchy, but, nonetheless, he is not of that level who in his own name, and as if in passing, would make threatening statements of a strategic nature. It has to be assumed that Latvia simply "was lucky" to become the most convenient object for fine-tuning the timbre of the state voice of the Russian Federation. The disrespectful attitude of this small country is to a maximum demonstratively inconsistent with the real correlation of forces which, naturally, provokes Russia to a stern response.

But, on the other hand, various states of the former USSR succeeded in distinguishing themselves with no less discourtesy. On the threshold of an apparent inevitable collapse of the CIS, Russia clearly needs a fairly good conceptualization of its "small" foreign policy. And in this context, the "Latvian limbering-up" by no means represents an incidental episode.

'RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA' Editor on Significance of New Sponsors

924B0207A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 19 May 92 p 1

[Article by Anatoliy Yurkov, editor-in-chief of RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA: "To You, the Readers of 'RT' [RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA]"]

[Text] Beginning with this issue, RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA becomes the publication of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia and the Collective of Journalists of the Editorial Board. With that composition of sponsors, the newspaper went through reregistration in the Ministry of the Press and Information of the Russian Federation last week, and it was given the new reregistration certificate No 01078.

What does this act mean for the readers of the newspaper, for the editors, as well as for the new sponsors?

Is the direction of the paper changing?

I will allow myself to answer the question with a question: Is the social protection of the man of labor in present-day

society really guaranteed by legislative and executive power so much that the very discussion of this has ceased to be topical?

Or have we been scared of disgrace on the part of those who have power and are we hurrying to sprawl before them in loyal politeness. Although directly and indirectly, now one, now the other official gives to understand: Tone down the criticism of the government—and life will become easier.

Things will become easier for all of us when the authorities elected by the people and having been handed power by it will start to assess everyone of their steps by the measure of use for people, the state, and the nation. And when we—a journalist, designer, director, or lathe operator, and people of any profession—will receive the guaranteed possibility of manifesting ourselves as free individuals.

Life, for the time being thinly, leaves us possibilities for the expression of a measure of talent, knowledge, and professional skills. Life simply deprives journalists, drivers, bricklayers, physicists, and academicians of their jobs—unemployment has stepped over the threshold of our house.

Can RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA get away from these problems? Do they really in the least degree worry the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia? Or do Russian industrialists and entrepreneurs not collide with us every day?

Thus, why should we change course and get away from problems that worry our readers?

People assert that the transition to the market requires sacrifices. Most likely, that is how it is. But why is it that the working people must submissively make these sacrifices, but the state official and the speculator-second-hand dealer only reap the fruits? With the general fall in production there is an extremely differentiated fall in consumption: Someone turns to bread and groats, and someone to caviar and other delicatessen.

Nowadays almost every director solves an insoluble task: The plant is operating, it turns out products which the consumers snatch up with their arms, but there is nothing with which to pay the workers their wages. The life of labor collectives is now full of absurdities: They pay people wages in kind—with tights and shorts, wooden toys and television sets, nails and reversible rugs. It has recently come to the point where at the cash register window people will register for "postal boxes" for the receipt of portable rockets, carbines, and even a bomb.

We all expected reforms, as deliverance from eternal bondage to poverty. But incompetent governing, it would appear, will not increase prosperity for us, and if it will increase it, then for a small part of society, having left the rest in the never-ending line of the oppressed and outraged for alms.

The Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs unites the intellectual capital of the nation, which remains, unfortunately, unclaimed by the new reformers. In it were gathered entrepreneurs and industrialists who know and are able to undertake reforms and see their promise. We are

inclined to make more intensive use of this capital in the pages of the paper in order for our readers, too, to be introduced to the idea of competent democratic reforms. You know, it is not without reason that a reformist movement of practical actions—the All-Russian Union "Renewal"—arose precisely within the depths of the industrialists and entrepreneurs.

RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA remains true to its platform—to consistently hold on to the positions of common sense—in politics, in economics, as well as in state building. We cannot agree with the actions of any government, however popular and reformist it calls itself, if its reforms do not take into account the distinctive features of nationalities, lead to the impoverishment of nations, and especially—of the needy strata of the population, and to the breakdown of states because of nationality conflicts. RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA does not accept reforms at that price, but it unequivocally shares the policy of reviving the economy, prosperity of the people, and statehood through competent democratic reforms.

The multistructure character of the economy, which, evidently, offers the only salvation for all the states of the CIS, by no means presupposes the isolation of one neighbor from the other, perfidious government interventions in the long-standing traditional relations between enterprises producing parts for use by others, leading to the chaos and general slump in production. The multistructure character of the economy during the introduction of private and shareholder ownership begins precisely with the complete independence of labor collectives from the higher administrative structures, with the legal right to be master of their jobs and the product of their labor, with law which no one can take away.

Unfortunately, the last years present to us too many examples where the interests of nations, peoples and states are placed on the altar of the cult of the personality of one leader, or, to be more precise, ruler. People have grown tired of bad government, the ambitions of politicians, who spend all their mental ardor and talent for the explanation and proof of a trivial question—who among them is the most important. This eternal menial-puerile conflict has grown into a battle on a state scale. The permanent "explanation of relations" at times does not leave the statesmen time for worry about their subjects, the well-being of the Fatherland, and honest service to the cause. The game—who outplays whom—always ends in defeat. Defeat not only for the politician, but also for the people.

RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA has not participated and will not participate in similar games. It has more earthly tasks—the interests of labor collectives that are creating the power and glory of the nation, commodity abundance, and stability in society.

The axiom: Without the past, there is no future. But the idealization of the past is fraught with the same dangers as the oblivion of its lessons. When the past becomes the subject of fruitless day-dreaming and is elevated to an ideal toward which one must strive without fail and even return, then all the signs of an attempt on the future are revealed. For the forces of revenge, which still recently were in power

and practically pushed the country onto the path of catastrophes, are without fail making use of the opportunity to retrieve what has been lost. These forces should not be underestimated—they make skillful use of the up to now unprecedented difficulties that have been brought down on the country, however, not without their help, and the disorder similar at times to a kitchen quarrel in the camp of the present rulers, and the centrifugal forces of nationalist isolation, accelerated by the motley nationalist leaders. They use everything, only to again savor the incomparable gifts of power. Of course, personal power.

I understand I am risking to bring a wave of anger on myself. But let us try to reason soberly and honestly. Regardless of the decision pronounced by the Constitutional Court of Russia, the real restoration of the CPSU and RCP [Russian Communist Party] is hardly possible. First of all, because at the base of these parties a good dozen of political formations has already formed, whose unification into one party is not prevented by anything. They do not want to unite. Because every one of the leaders of any of these parties is aspiring to the role of the Great Gensek [General Secretary]. In order, let us return to the beginning, to savor the gifts of power. What is more, the CPSU itself by August 1991 was no longer unified and monolithic, it was inevitably moving toward a split. Into two, three or four parties—this is not what is important. The split in the political backbone of the state and society inevitably led to catastrophic shocks throughout the territory over which the party colossus had held sway. This is an objective trend, and not the intrigues of enemies, with the myth about which a significant part of our fellow countrymen still does not want to part. One can and must understand all who think this way. There can be no question of their guilt, for children are not guilty of anything who continue to love the father who brings them up and is convicted to death. Nothing human is alien to peoples.

RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, to the last day, came out in support of the preservation of a renewed democratic Union, in which equal nations and peoples would build a new life, basing themselves on the many-sided possibilities of each other, utilizing the advantages of decades-long economic relations in the competitive struggle in the foreign market. This struggle we are now completely losing, becoming increasingly strongly consolidated in the role of the raw material appendage of the West. Yes, there is no return to the old. The USSR died, buried under the fragments of the political system which the CPSU was.

We are convinced the liquidation of the Union was not an objective necessity in the biography of our peoples. Can one expect that the Commonwealth will become the renewed form of the existence of peoples and republics, which will replace the totalitarian dictate of the center? I would like to believe that this is how it will be. In any case, RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, remaining a newspaper that is distributed throughout the entire territory of the CIS, will promote the acquisition of new features by the Commonwealth—features about which our readers write: mutual respect and equality, close contacts in politics, economics, state building, and social guarantees. The Tashkent meeting, in any case, makes it possible to hope that these dreams of ours are not groundless.

So then, what will change in RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in connection with the change in the membership of its sponsors? I think that a radical break will not take place. We will strive for the objective reflection of the realities of life; starting from the realities, we will defend our interests.

Incidentally, about the realities. Today a problem, which is extremely urgent for the new society that is being formed, rises in its full magnitude. The problem of social partnership. The question already is, either we render each other, the economy and the state lifeless with permanent strikes, or we learn to solve social conflicts through negotiations, taking into account the vital interests of our partners. A difficult, unequivocal problem, which, one can say, has not at all been elaborated for our reality. RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA is inclined to discuss it in its pages and invites all who have something to say to a dialogue.

I would like to complete this explanation to the readers on an optimistic note. The co-sponsors of RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA have agreed not to interfere with the political course of the paper and not to encroach on the social pointedness of our statements.

But they will help us to live through the material and financial burdens that have come down on the independent press of all levels. We hope that for the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs the concerns and aspirations of the editorial collective will become as close as prior to this they found understanding and support among the independent trade unions of Russia.

ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

22 Exchange Groups Meet in Samarkand

924A1154A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 13 May 92 p 3

[Article by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA correspondent Rustem Tepl: "Politicians Divide, Exchange Operators Unite"]

[Text] Samarkand—A meeting took place in Samarkand of the representatives of 22 exchange unions and associations of the CIS, the Baltic region, and Georgia. Having accumulated market economy experience, the exchanges of the former USSR republics which became so swiftly and firmly established in our lives are now suddenly confronted with a serious problem of survival. The single economic space which is being soundly destroyed by politicians and parliaments has infinitely narrowed the capabilities of all partners functioning within it—from small cooperatives to industrial giants. And the exchanges, as intermediary structures among goods producers, have had difficulty surmounting waves of economic anarchy, tax and licensing exclusions. Worst of all, this destructive process is taking place against a background of the odiously incompetent notion that the "exchange-speculator" is in fact the main culprit with respect to soaring prices and slowdown of the movement of goods from seller to buyer.

Alas, business people still have not learned how to confront this image which has taken shape in the mass consciousness.

You just cannot explain to everyone that the exchange is simply a crossroads of interests, the range scale of market prices, a place where sore points in the economy are identified. When goods are scarce—the price rises; when there is an abundance—it falls.

However, there can be a surplus of products at a time when super-high customs duty or inaccessible licensing rights do not enable them to be sold where the need exists. The attempt—positive on the whole—to shield the domestic market and maintain its prices accessible to the population has its negative aspect: trade falters, monetary circulation dies down, the cash shortage is clearly felt, etc.

How can business people participate so as to avoid these processes, destroy artificial barriers in the path of products and money, preserve a unified economic, currency, and information space for the CIS, Baltic region, and Georgia? This was the subject of a very candid and thorough discussion in Samarkand, where more than 120 representatives from every corner of one-sixth of the planet's land mass met at a "roundtable."

"A few centuries ago Timur was able to unite dozens of peoples under the star of Samarkand," K. Usmanov, head of "Toshkent," the largest exchange in Uzbekistan, noted in this regard. "And after 600 years, we are faced with this very same task of unification."

While politicians dispute who is the most independent, and parliaments forge laws of prohibition rupturing centuries-old ties among peoples and labor collectives, the exchange operators, still condemned in our general everyday consciousness, are organizing in their torment a coming-together process, a process of unification. And this was especially felt in Samarkand. As representatives of a diversity of peoples and religions, they spoke in one language, understanding that this was good, and not evil. They were worshipping a single god—pragmatism, tearing away the ideology of ethnic isolation.

The example of A. Zamota, cochairman of the association of Moldovan exchanges, is striking: There are no problems among the exchange operators of Chisinau, the Dniester Region, and Gagauzia. In other words, business people are forming an entirely different, peaceful climate of cooperation as a counterweight to the aspirations of diverse political trends, movements, and fronts.

The list of examples of such peacemaking on the part of businessmen whose words resounded at the Samarkand conference is a lengthy one. And unity of interests led to a unity in drawing up resolutions as well.

First and foremost, the Samarkand Declaration was adopted, in which members of the Association of Exchanges of Central Asia and Kazakhstan (ABSAK) announced creation of the Forum for Democratic Reforms, with the aim of protecting economic transformations and the individuals who are actually participating in this process.

"The aggregate of problems in the republics is growing far more rapidly than problems are being resolved. It is the mission of the forum to act as a third force, a force called

upon to accelerate economic reforms along with governments and the oppositions which criticize them, through political as well as legal-constitutional means."

This is the view of one of the initiators of the unifying conference in Samarkand, V. Yergashbayev, executive director of the "Toshkent" exchange. Vladimir Vakhobovich was supported to one degree or another by the Russian, Ukrainian, Central Asian, Baltic, and other exchange operators—while rejecting, true, an organizational pyramid in the form of a "transnational party of exchange operators," as this tendency was characterized by K. Zatulin, cochairman of the Interregional Exchange Union and general director of the International Association of Heads of Industrial Enterprises.

Instead, conference participants adopted an appeal to presidents, heads of government, and parliaments of independent states of the former USSR—"Towards a Unified Economic Space and Uniform Trade Regulations." This appeal contains a proposal to review exchange legislation presently existing in the republics and replace the system of licensing and quota assignment with regulated customs duties, to establish a single system of interbank accounting, etc.

"We value highly the results of the Samarkand conference," ABSAK President S. Berketov declared in a meeting with oblast leader P. Abdurakhmanov. And in seeming confirmation of this, he announced that all conference participants had transferred 100,000 rubles to the Samarkand development fund.

This is how we all should unite to accomplish worthy undertakings.

Central Asian Exchanges Criticize 'Inert' Political Leadership

924A1186A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
7 May 92 p 1

[Text of ABSAK declaration; place and date not given: "The Samarkand Declaration of the Association of Exchanges of Central Asia and Kazakhstan (ABSAK)"]

[Text] The members of ABSAK [Association of Exchanges of Central Asia and Kazakhstan] note that the efforts of the leaders of the five independent states of Central Asia and Kazakhstan to create a unitary economic space are encountering inertness in administrative structures. The constructive ideas of the democratic public and business circles are being slowed down by conservatives who cling to the administrative-command system, which is in its death throes.

The critical situation in society and the economy is ample ground for the development of the destructive tendencies being utilized by conservative forces. The sharp weakening of power structures, the wild outburst of spontaneous privatization, the social and inter-ethnic conflicts, the unformed democratically oriented political parties—all this is creating a situation of instability and is impeding the natural socioeconomic development of our region.

The association confirms its aspiration to develop commercial ties between the kindred states of Central Asia and Kazakhstan and consequently to expand the market space. The members of ABSAK declare the need for entrepreneurs and the democratic public to join forces and for the creation of a Forum for Democratic Reforms.

The basic goals of the Forum are:

- to provide for the economic revival of the states of Central Asia and Kazakhstan through the broad development of market relations, acceleration of the processes of destatization, utilization of the very rich natural resources of the republics, restoration of economic, cultural, and other ties with foreign countries, and reconstruction of the entrepreneurial stratum;
- the strengthening of the constitutional authorities and state legal foundations and the formation of a civil society;
- the opposition to destructive forces impeding the development of the market and entrepreneurship;
- the guarantee of conditions for the resolution of all problems and conflicts on the basis of civil accord; the consolidation of all progressive forces for the revival of moral values and the original culture of the peoples inhabiting our republics.

The Forum is firmly in favor of the acceleration of economic reforms and the further democratization of society and categorically rejects the possibility of a return to the totalitarian past. Consequently it shall oppose any forces slowing down the logical development of our society.

The Forum is prepared for constructive dialogue with all political and public forces of the states of Central Asia and Kazakhstan to whom the ideals of democracy and progress are dear.

Passed at the Special Session of the ABSAK Board, 23 April 1992.

Heavy Industry Wants Direct Ukraine-Russia Ties

924A1186B Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
19 May 92 p 1

[Article by A. Bogachuk, PRAVDA foreign trade correspondent; place and date not given: "While the Politicians Argue, Ukraine's Labor Collectives Arrange Business Ties with Partners from Russia"]

[Text] In Donetsk, another meeting has taken place of the founders of the inter-branch corporation "Dneprmetall," which includes more than 30 of the largest enterprises and production associations of the base branches of industry in Ukraine.

"The economy's collapse, the pricing disarray, and the rupture of economic ties," relates the corporation's president, general director of the Dneprodzerzhinsk metallurgical complex, Yuriy Borisov, "has forced us to look for reliable partners linked to us by a single technological chain and mutual interests. This means above all the miners and coke workers who supply us with coal concentrate and coke, the enterprises of Vtormet, and our colleagues from the pipeline plant, whom we supply with half-finished products. We sat down at the negotiation table, looked each other in the eye, and without any intermediaries, without any ministries or departments, came to an agreement about mutual supplies of output, business cooperation, and mutual assistance. Along with the metallurgies, six associations from the coal industry of Donetsk, Lugan, and Dnepropetrovsk oblasts and several coke-producing plants have joined the corporation on a voluntary basis. Later, machine-builders from the "AvtoKrAZ" and "Tochmash" associations and the Druzhkovskiy coal machine-building plant joined us as well.

"Concern for our partners' interests and a procedure for facilitating as much as possible factories producing parts for use by other factories has helped us to establish steady work for coke workers and to stabilize the production of rolled iron and half-finished products for the pipe makers at the Dneprodzerzhinsk metallurgical complex and have brought many coal-mining enterprises out of failure. With the establishment of horizontal links, the miners of the Donetsugol association have been able to make up for the lag allowed in January, and in the first quarter have yielded an additional 92,000 metric tons of fuel."

"As we all know, by no means does the language of economics always coincide with politicians' current interests. The economists' vocabulary does not have political ambitions, but it does have a firm concept of economic efficiency. The association gets more than half of its components," says the general director of "AvtoKrAZ," Viktor Zakharov, "from enterprises in Russia and other states of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]." "We are vitally interested in preserving ties with our former suppliers. Mutual interest and dependence have led the collective of the Belgorod metal construction plant of Russia to join the "Dneprmetall" corporation. With the help of this plant," asserts the general director of the Druzhkovskiy machine-building plant, Yevgeniy Konstantinov. "We have created an entire 'family' of hydraulic timberings for the miners of the Donbass."

In short, while the politicians are arguing and clarifying relations, the commanders of heavy industry in the Southeast of Ukraine, in conjunction with their traditional partners from Russia, are seeking and finding ways to escape the crisis and revive the economy. Under extremely difficult conditions, the "Dneprmetall" corporation is providing steady work for its partners, decent earnings, and a normal life for more than half a million workers in base branches.

Drug Use, Production Up in Central Asia; Burma Role Decried

*BK2405140392 Moscow Radio Moscow in Burmese
1300 GMT 23 May 92*

[Article by TRUD correspondent (Kazekoskiy): "Concerns About the Expansion of International Drug Trafficking Enterprises' Influence in the Central Asian Region"]

[Text] The narcotics produced in the Golden Triangle region, which borders Myanmar [Burma], Thailand, and Laos, is presently exceeding normal output. The Golden Triangle region consumes about half of the more than 2.5 million tonnes of opium produced by the laboratories of opium kingpin Khun Sa. The remaining opium is refined as heroin and exported to Western countries by various routes. The former Soviet Union is daily facing the increasing external pressure of narcotic drugs along its border, and the Central Asian countries and Kazakhstan are deeply worried about falling into the sphere of influence of international narco-mafia gangs.

According to the statistics of an international organization fighting the narco-mafia gangs and the illicit narcotic drugs trade, the narcotic drug production in the regions of the former Soviet Union is greatly increasing. Now, poppies and

one type of marijuana plant are cultivated on more than 1,250,000 acres. Statistics reveal that in the previous year the general amount of Soviet illicit narcotic drug trade was about 15 billion rubles, with 1.5 million drug addicts.

According to estimates by specialists, Kazakhstan alone is exporting about 25-30 tons of opium, marijuana, and other narcotic drugs to the drug market. At present, drug traffickers seem to be very active in the regions of Lake Issyk Kul to the (Telequania) villages in the Osh region, the (Morgav) coastal areas, the (Coleaf) region in Tajikistan, and the Pyandzh region close to Afghanistan. But the valley near the city of Chu in that region resembles a perpetual narcotic drug producing center.

Just as the drug traffickers from the former Soviet Union's Golden Triangle region are flourishing, so is the number of drug-related crimes, which has increased alarmingly in the previous year to about 40,000 in the entire Soviet Union. What will happen in this kind of situation if opium kingpin Khun Sa becomes directly involved and pulls the strings? The situation has become truly frightening this year because of the relative ease of importing narcotic drugs into the Central Asian region, and there are mounting fears of the emergence of a second Colombia—small opium-producing countries, in these ancient regions.

POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Shifting Deputies 'Blocks' at Congress Viewed

924C1469A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 16, 19-26 Apr 92 p 6

[Article by Olga Bychkova: "Boris Yeltsin's Government Can Stand Up for Themselves; MPs Don't Think So"]

[Text] When the Russian Cabinet left Saturday's session of the Congress and headed to its headquarters, some members addressed a small rally called by the Democratic Russia in order to aggravate Congress deputies. The policemen guarding the Kremlin said: "Oh, no, looks like this is another change of government."

The Cabinet not only made the policemen and crowd of supporters of democracy believe they mean business but also deputies of the Congress who until recently didn't take the government seriously.

Boris Yeltsin in charge of the government so as to give it political protection, can now be confident that "the boys in pink trousers" can stand up for themselves.

Parliament can now see you can win by skill, not just by numbers. Nearly one thousand deputies refused to admit defeat and pretended all was going normally like it should between legislative and executive branches. But there are signs that the deputies will never be the same after the 6th Congress.

The ferment inside factions of deputies was boosted and at long last shows that it makes some sense. The development is paralleled by those that followed the 1st Congress of People's Deputies and the failed coup last August. New configurations have emerged in addition to the rival blocks of "democrats" and patriots. The attempt on April 13 by first vice-chairman of parliament Sergei Filatov to find a compromise between parliament and the government was greeted by stormy protest from more than the opposition. When Ruslan Khasbulatov, the Speaker, tried to explain, saying "we shall work together with the President," he was hackled by both radical "patriots" and radical "democrats."

Some deputies, as always, protested against the Speaker's unparliamentary language. Some protested at his clear change in attitude to the President. At this critical point, the parliamentary blocs divided into "moderates" and "radicals."

The Russian Unity bloc opposed to the government, remains more or less unchanged. Those taking a radical position are irreconcilable "patriots," like Sergei Baburin and Viktor Aksyuchits, who are committed to Slavophile ideas and Soviet ideology. Unlike "democrats," they have a clear advantage as they uphold their own interests rather than the changing interests of those in power. That's one advantage of being in opposition. As a leader of the Russia faction Nikolai Pavlov remarked: "There are only a few truly independent deputies. More than two hundred are

engaged in one way or another in executive branch structures, or cannot break with the advisers. There are only three heroes who parted ways with "democrats"—Astafyev, Aksyuchits and Konstantinov." Despite estimates that nearly two-thirds of deputies came to the Congress determined to oppose the government, their number is much smaller. Only one-tenth of deputies are radically opposed to the government if you look at the results of numerous votings concerning confidence in the government.

Strange as it may seem, many radical democrats prove less consistent supporters of the President and his government. Due to lack of coordination (because they have no strategy of their own), "democrats" suffered a tactical defeat at the hands of the opposition. For example, they had a plan to take no part in the voting on economic reform decisions should the President's amendments be unacceptable. According to the RF-Politika analytical centre, the democratic wing at the Congress "still suffers from a lack of a well-adjusted organizational structure... it mostly consists of persons lacking either political experience, serious analytical ability or a high degree of civic consciousness: this is the only possible explanation for their fear of losing their deputy mandate and for their clinging on to official positions."

This landed the opposition, also the main coordinators of the Democratic Russia, with an amorphous bloc until recently. Those left-of-centre joined forces with "republicans" and "social democrats" in favour of compromise and won more supporters.

Emerging from the Congress was a second opposition bloc calling themselves resoundly the Bloc of Creative Forces who refused to take part in governments. The guiding force behind the bloc is the faction Smena-Novaya Politika which is supported by the Workers' Union and Industrial Union. The latter is in opposition, but this is a separate subject. The Industrial Union spent time before the Congress in an anguishing search for its position in the theatre of parliamentary wars. It nearly decided to join forces with the Russian Unity, the toughest government opponents. At the last moment they decided to join a less pronounced opposition. This is because the faction, made up mostly of industrial managers, is in opposition to the ministers to whom these managers are directly subordinated. The vacillations of the Industrial Union reflect ill-considered moves by the President himself who had been too busy to find time for diplomatic talks with members of the opposition before the Congress and with those his economic reform depends for its progress. Quite probably, he could have agreed on some matters with the Industrial Union. However, the Industrial Union are not quite sure what they want and they only consulted on the matter Grigory Yavlinsky when the Congress was already under way.

The policemen guarding the Kremlin were right in their own way. They may have seen what the Congress delegates failed to accomplish. The delegates will go back to their homes after the Congress and may think they now live in a Soviet and socialist country because they voted for this name.

Report on Political Struggle for Islamic Revival
924C1443A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 8 May 92 p 3

[Article by Aleksey Malashenko: "Muhammadanism in Russia: The Struggle for the Revival of Islam Is Political"]

[Text] A regional conference of the European branch of the CIS and Siberia of the Islamic Revival Party was held recently in comfortable and clean, as compared with Moscow, Saratov.

The first conference, constituent, of the IRP [Islamic Revival Party] had taken place in June 1991 in what was still at that time the Soviet Union. In the initial period of its activity the IRP had added to its name the adjective "all-union," written with a small letter, it is true. Several months later constituent congresses of branches of the IRP were broken up in Tashkent and Dushanbe, which contributed to a considerable extent to the growth of its popularity and the reinforcement of its ranks. Supporters of the IRP in Turkmenia and Kazakhstan were simply unable to organize in cells at that time.

An abrupt rebuke of the IRP was heard from the Soviet administration and the official Muslim clergy. Mufti Mukhammad-Yusuf Mukhammed-Sadyk, chairman of the Religious Administration of Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, condemned political activity under Islamic slogans and declared that there could be no parties in Islam.

The IRP went virtually unnoticed in Russia. The voice of several hundred inhabitants of the Caucasus and Tatars was simply not heard in the "revolutionary storm" which had been raised in those recent years. This attitude toward it also reflected the general approach of both the Soviet and the present authorities to Islam in Russia, come to that.

It is to Russian Islam, because it had long been "noticed" in Central Asia. How it had been "noticed" is a separate story about the style of part of the Moscow press and the infantile sensitivity of Central Asian politicians and journalists.

The movement into the political arena of the Tajik and Uzbek and now Kazakh and Azerbaijani Islamists—and in Tajikistan they are laying claim to a place in a possible coalition government, what is more—has somehow undeservedly overshadowed the fact that at the sources of the Islamic political revival was the modest and, generally, moderate IRP, which incidentally laid no claim to participation in power.

The IRP has primordially been inclined toward Muslim fundamentalism. And although its program contains no direct indications on this score, ideas close to fundamentalism are nonetheless reflected in its press organ AL-WAKHDAT and the speeches of its leaders. It is interesting that the IRP on the one hand considers the term "Islamic fundamentalism" largely artificial and inadequately reflective of the essence of the movement for the revival, political included, of Islam. On the other, it categorically objects to the conversion of Islamic fundamentalism into some general bugaboo. And here it is right for in the majority of

publications fundamentalism is still identified with extremism, which, as is known, occurs not only in the Muslim world.

In the Near and Middle East Russian supporters of the revival of Islam aspire to the restoration of the primordial values of "their" civilization—standards of relations between people corresponding to Islam and the principles of social justice, simply put, a return to the Islamic way of life. At the same time, however, there is no common opinion in the IRP leadership, evidently, as to the party's ultimate purpose. For example, Valiakhmet Sadur, a founder and the ideologue of the party, believes that the main thing is primarily the creation of the conditions for an "Islamic way of life" and that the party itself should in the future occupy a place close to that which has been occupied in politics and society by the Muslim faction of the Russian State Duma. His opponent—the radical Geydar Dzhemal, member of the IRP Coordinating Committee—is of a more emphatic frame of mind and calls for the immediate creation of an Islamic Republic virtually.

These disagreements within the IRP, like others also, between its moderate and radical wings might seem to some people a "tempest in a teapot." But....

It is a question of the strengthening Muslim political movement, and the way in which the persuasions in it ultimately prevail could subsequently be reflected in the stability of certain regions; of a movement which objectively aspires to occupy the social and political niche among Russia's Muslims natural for it.

The ideas of Islamic revival are widespread in all three of the most important habitats of Russian Muhammadanism—in the Volga-Urals area, in the North Caucasus, and in cities of the Center, primarily Moscow and St. Petersburg. Let us for an example cite such an influential secular organization as the Tatar Social Center, whose program contains a special section devoted to Islam, which says, *inter alia*: "The Tatarstan Social Center supports the convening of a Muslim congress of the country representing all Muslim social and political and other associations...." It would be appropriate to recall also that Dzh. Dudayev, a supporter of a secular state, took his presidential oath of office on the Koran and, in addition, will manipulate, if necessary, such a double-edged concept as jihad.

Every conceivable color and nuance—from Islamic democracy and enlightenment through extremely radical fundamentalism—has been acquired by political Islam in Dagestan. Unfortunately, the dangerous trend of the use of Islam in interethnic conflicts between Muslims themselves has emerged in this republic in recent months (how can we not recall here the sharp criticism of nationalism on the part of the IRP and also of the Islamic Democratic Party, which operates in Dagestan!).

Appearing somewhat one-sided against this background is the statement of Yuriy Shanibov, chairman of the Caucasus Confederation and now a notable politician in the Caucasus region, who at the start of the year maintained that "in the Caucasus the Islamic factor is extremely weak" and that "it

is being played up for their own purposes by Patriarch Aleksiy II and Gleb Yakunin."

However paradoxical, for that matter, even in this strange opinion an echo of the truth may be discovered: Truly, religious-political radicalism was to a considerable extent a consequence of the tactical blunders of the Russian leadership (by no means Father Gleb).

Political Islam is today experiencing a natural process of polarization. The radicals are linking their hopes with the upsurge of Islam in the North Caucasus, which is being objectively stimulated by the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, which, in the event of it switching to the inter-creedal category, would be practically insoluble. At the same time, on the other hand, Islamic radicalism did not "work" at the time of the events surrounding the referendum in Tatarstan.

The demands of the radicals for a struggle for the creation of some Islamic state formations and their support of Muammar al-Qadhdhafi and Saddam Husayn do not meet with understanding among the majority of Muslims, who are interested in more mundane issues.

The position of the moderate wing of the Islamic political movement, which is consistently and increasingly skillfully pursuing a policy of enlightenment, propaganda among Muslims of religious knowledge, and propaganda of Islamic literature, is more comprehensible and closer to people in this respect. Indicative here was also the Saratov Regional IRP Conference, at which, together with political questions and criticism of the Russian leadership in respect of the referendum in Tatarstan, questions of Muslim enlightenment were heard as the leitmotiv.

Muslim enlightenment is of immense significance, it would seem, particularly for the Muslims of the Volga-Urals region—Tatars and Bashkirs. The position of these peoples is truly unique for they are virtually the sole Muslims "locked" in enclaves far from the borders of their own civilization. Add to this the degree of dispersion of the Tatar people and their diffusiveness over vast expanses. Was this, all together, not the deep-lying, motivational impetus, concealed beneath layers of economic interests and political intrigues, to the struggle for sovereignty? Whatever the case, a dramatic process of recognition of their detachment from their coreligionists and the considerable loss of cultural distinctiveness most closely connected with Islam is now under way in the Tatar people. The kind of forms which this process might subsequently assume, and not only among Tatar Muslims, will also depend to a large extent on who is able to assume the mission of the virtually inevitable combination of Islam and politics. It is with good reason that the IRP believes that the struggle for the revival of Islam is, all else aside, a political struggle also.

A generation of politicians and religious persons capable of actively and at the same time prudently acting in Muslims' interests is taking shape in Russian Islam. The participation in social and political activity of the Muslim clergy also is a sign of the present Islamic Renaissance. Specifically, its spokesmen actively made their presence known at the

Saratov Conference, at which Magomed Bidzhi-ulu, imam-leader from Karachay and vice president of the local millimajlis, and Mukaddas Bibarsov, the excellent speaker and journalist, imam-regional administrator of the Muslim associations of Saratov and Volgograd Oblasts, and the creator and an author of MUSULMANSKIY VESTNIK, which appears in the Volga region, were particularly noticeable.

The immediate future will show whose positions among Russian Muslims are more persuasive.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS

Shmelev Criticizes 'Harshness' of Reforms, Notes Dangers Ahead

924A1189A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian No 8, 8 May 92 pp 1-2

[Interview with Nikolay Shmelev, chief researcher of the United States of America and Canada Institute, by Nikolay Vishnevskiy: "Shmelev: 'The Worst Dangers Lie Ahead, and We Must Do Our Utmost to Prepare for Them'"]

[Text] Nikolay Shmelev, the 55-year-old chief researcher of the United States of America and Canada Institute, was one of our first scientists to substantiate the need to make the transition to the market. His celebrated article in NOVYY MIR and his critical speeches at various congresses and forums had the effect of a heretical revelation at that time. He recently became a member of the president's Consultative Council, but he comes to Moscow on quick visits, since he is working under contract in Sweden.

[Vishnevskiy] What was the reason for your mysterious disappearance—were you shrinking into your shell, or was it because of your position "above the fray?" Because of disagreement over the shift to the market, which you had really been advocating for many years? Because of the internal opposition characteristic of the Russian intelligentsia? Was this spiritual emigration by a market advocate in the first wave?

[Shmelev] A little bit of everything you mentioned. I also retired to the background because this is the nature of my character. I am working in Sweden at the Stockholm Institute of Economics in the Soviet Union (to which they now add the prefix "ex-") and East Europe. My contract is until the end of the year, but I will probably return by the fall. I am writing a book there which I wanted to write, and conditions finally developed so that I can do this: I don't have a single telephone call during the day.

[Vishnevskiy] Is this fiction or a scientific work?

[Shmelev] I recall a joke from my childhood: books may be about love, war, or economics. This little book is about all three areas—love, war, and economics.

[Vishnevskiy] If you take economics, which is giving everyone in this country a headache, how do you assess what is taking place now?

[Shmelev] I have a somewhat melancholy feeling of...satisfaction. On the whole, my predictions are coming true, but our life during the course of the reforms is not developing

the way I thought it would. The Gaydar team is technically doing everything correctly—I agree with them and I support them. But my disappointment stems from the fact that they are doing this in a terribly inflexible and harsh way. My suggestions, which I made seven years ago, differed in only one way: do the same thing, but make it as painless as possible. I do not want to blame them—the shortsightedness and appalling economic incompetence of the Gorbachev leadership led to the point that the “reform” operation cannot be painless. Our children have acquired a terrible legacy, but I think that even under these conditions the harshness of the reforms is excessive, all the same. Two points are important in the fundamental plan here. First, a real impetus has not been given to privatization—not the large enterprises (this problem will take 20 or 30 years), but the small and medium-sized businesses. Privatization is impermissibly slow in the rural areas. The second point is that the action of social shock absorbers has been delayed in compensating for the burdens resulting primarily from the free prices. I have always thought that the mountain of useless money which was formed during the Ryzhkov and Pavlov years was our worst problem. It was not a nationality or a political problem, but precisely this problem which broke up the country when the money stopped working in it. I agree with the government that unless we get rid of the “extra” money, nothing will be accomplished—don’t believe anyone who suggests anything other than the camps, because nothing will turn out anyway. But how do we do this? We can do it as Stalin did in 1947—replace the old money with new money on a ratio of 10 to 1 in a single cruel blow one night, robbing the people of 90 percent of their money. Our government actually did the same thing—it robbed the people of 80 to 90 percent without giving them any compensation. This is what hurts the most, the main point where I differ: money should have been redeemed from the market, providing at least something in exchange: from flatirons to plots of land.

[Vishnevskiy] But doesn’t it seem to you that many professional critics of the government such as you are not taking into account the objective fact that the Gaydar team may also realize the urgency of all these problems very well, but because they expected to remain in power only for two or three months, they were forced to act hastily when they simply had no time to do everything all at once?

[Shmelev] What can be done when there were a number of very serious errors which are hard to explain even from a professional point of view? It is understandable that balancing the budget is priority number one, but the tax system that was established can hardly be justified by any short-term interests. No one anywhere in the world taxes investments and expenditures to modernize production, not to mention the fantastic level of the turnover tax. I also find the policy on foreign currency incomes just as inexplicable. The government is almost using Interpol to find out who is holding money in other countries. According to Western estimates, a minimum of \$20 billion was left there last year. No one has ever been able to determine such answers by police methods, even with a KGB division. Foreign currency must return by normal methods, but our bank has been unable thus far to adopt the formula—do not ask

where the money comes from and what it is used for, just pay the usual interest and guarantee that it is not confiscated. More than one error may be found, although on the whole, I repeat, I support this team. But I am very much afraid that after the second release of prices, when nothing is left of the people’s reserves, there will be a real wave of strikes. People will begin demanding—and they have every moral right to demand—because it is impossible for them to live at today’s wage level. The miners have taken theirs, and others will take theirs.

[Vishnevskiy] Don’t you agree that the government achieved at least one significant success by its drastic measures—the West’s decisive turn toward wide-scale support for the reform in Russia, and this alone is worth a great deal?

[Shmelev] The West did this out of a sense of self-preservation; there were no other motives. If we explode or there is a pugachevshchina [referring to 18th-century rebellion by cossack soldier Pugachev] or a makhnovshchina [presumably reference to another revolt], everyone will suffer because of it. This is a normal, practical approach; it is only regrettable that the West just made up its mind to do this: three or four years ago the country could have been protected from a great deal of suffering. Without international financial support, we will not resolve the short-term problems, primarily turning the ruble from worthless trash into currency, or carry out the entire gigantic structural perestroika. The government realizes this, but all our fellow citizens, including those making speeches from their high tribunes, should understand this, too. Otherwise... Three generations built the insane asylum, and three generations will be coming out of the insane asylum. We are the only one of 160 countries in the world where the importation of foreign capital is considered something suspicious. This is fantastic xenophobia and the stupidity—write it this way—simply the stupidity, nothing more, of many of our leaders, deputies, and the public at large! They will buy up the country? Who is in a position to buy up this monster covering one-sixth of the globe! But we still become hysterical because of this! I recall that 23 or 24 years ago I wrote my first official report to the Politburo—which vanished forever there, stating that we should join the International Monetary Fund. At that time it was considered counterrevolutionary heresy, although in fact it means only one thing—we recognize the rules of the game accepted throughout the world and we take advantage of this source of financing which the whole world enjoys. The money that is given, thank God, should be taken. But here is the question—will we waste it, spend it on food, or use it for something important? This will be one of the principal problems for us now.

[Vishnevskiy] But is it possible to solve the dilemma of all the postcommunist societies—by combining the necessary membership in the world community which you are pressing for with more or less painless survival of the inevitabilities which accompany this era (unprecedented price increases, production decline, and unemployment)—by criticizing the government?

[Shmelev] No one has either theoretically or practically devised a way for us to painlessly extricate ourselves from the pit we were driven into by the bolsheviks when they established an absolutely uncompetitive economy. Perhaps the Chinese have proved to be the wisest of all by prolonging the process for decades and making it as painless as possible, but they have had bloodshed as well—this is very evident to everyone. Our virtually dead economy is on the operating table. There is a chance that it will begin to come out of this situation where there is a surgeon's scalpel, where a life-giving solution is injected, where oxygen is provided, and where there is intensive therapy. There should be no illusions: there is no magician that can revive this lifeless thing in an instant. If life stops its decline next year and begins to improve by a millimeter—that will be good. We are a healthy people, and after being sick I do not think we will be any worse than others. As far as joining the world community is concerned, we have not revealed ourselves to the world one iota yet! We still have the notion that we only need to whistle and everyone will come running to us. But no one needs us! This should be realized—no one really needs this monster, or our resources, or our land; our brains may still be needed a little. And we must persuade and attract for a long period of time, and establish the most inviting regime, not one that is prohibitory, before major capital comes to us instead of small fry or desperate loners. Taiwan has a 20-percent tax on profits, but we aim at taking 60 percent away from our partners. But why should they come to us and suffer in some Tyumen—or if, God forbid, there is an explosion or Pugachev comes and takes everything away.

[Vishnevskiy] Have you met with President Yeltsin on this trip to Moscow?

[Shmelev] No, the Consultative Council has not convened. It should be at the end of May, and I will come for it.

[Vishnevskiy] But if you had the opportunity, what is the first thing you would say to the president now?

[Shmelev] I would say that now, this year, I see thousands of dangers, including political ones. I see two important economic threats. And we must do our utmost to prepare for them. The first threat is of a new and even more extensive wave of strikes. The second one is that enterprises which are not viable will begin shutting down by this fall; these are the objective parasites which either make what is not needed or turn out a thoroughly bad product, which do not want to change, and always hope that they will be saved by cheap credits and subsidies. I do not want to intimidate anyone, and unemployment is looming on the horizon, but we have a great many opportunities to resolve this if we make very serious preparations for it. In the final analysis, our services sector is in such a primitive state that many people could be given employment in it. All this is a serious threat; I cannot accuse the government of not understanding this, but I do not sense a keen realization.

[Vishnevskiy] Viewing the Russian problem from Sweden has not made you optimistic, apparently.

[Shmelev] What reason does one have for particular optimism? But it is good if you look at it this way: the ratio between my optimism and pessimism is 51 to 49.

Impact of Tax Policy on Business Activity Stressed

924A1189B Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian No 11, 19 May 92 p 7

[Report by Working Center for Economic Reforms attached to the Russian Federation Government: "Taxes and Business Activity"]

[Text] In order to understand the economic process, we have to take existing realities into account—this is the conclusion of the Working Center for Economic Reforms attached to the Russian Federation Government.

Two circumstances have to be taken into account in assessing the influence of tax policy on economic activity.

FIRSTLY, under the inflationary conditions (the wholesale price index in relation to December 1991 was registered at 4.82 in January 1992, and it rose by a factor of 1.75 in February and 1.28 in March), the economic activity of enterprises is depressed by the irregular increase in the relative prices of different commodities and uncertainty about the future dynamics of the interest rate. These factors make it extremely difficult to plan economic activity over any kind of long term and put obstacles in the way of investments.

Wholesale Price Index in Relation to December 1991

January 1992	February 1992	March 1992
482%	843.5%	1,079.7%

And until the monetary system is normalized and the inflation rate is brought down to 1 or 2 tenths of a percent annually, the primary objective of tax policy is fiscal. Without this, reducing the level of the tax press to stimulate economic activity and implement structural reforms makes practically no sense.

Reduction of the value-added tax rates for dairy products, vegetable oil, flour, and a number of other products in February 1992 can serve as an illustration of this. This measure, which was taken to stimulate a decrease in prices, led only to increased profit for producers and trading enterprises, and of course, a decline in income for the budget.

SECONDLY, the structure of the tax system being used has to be taken into account. The increase in the level of taxation this year is based on the extension of indirect taxation, mainly through introduction of the value added tax and excise taxes. These taxes make up about 56 percent of the budgetary receipts. At the same time, the amount received through direct taxation, compared with last year, has decreased somewhat. Thus, the tax rate on profit this year is about 12 percent (taking tax exemptions into account), as opposed to 27 percent in 1991.

The conduct of economic factors which they attempt to shift to other tax burdens is transformed under the influence of

any changes in the tax system. As the result, prices, wages, the volume of consumption of individual commodities, the ratio between savings and consumption, the volume of investments, and so forth are subjected to modification. During the period that a value-added tax is introduced or its rates are changed, the degree of flexibility in prices and wages is the most important factor from the standpoint of the direct consequences of measures such as these.

With the relatively slow adaptation of prices and wages, the shift in the tax depends on how quickly it is reflected in them, that is, on the ability of enterprises to raise prices and of employees to obtain an increase in wages. Partial indexing of wages leads to a loss in competitiveness and a decline in profit and investments. Decreasing employment leads to a decline in wages and in the final analysis, to the tax being shifted entirely to the consumer.

But export taxes, it appears, are also needed after the price liberalization process has been completed. They should hold the export volume of energy resources and raw materials in check, and, consequently, prevent an increase in domestic prices to the world level over the period required for processing industry enterprises to adapt to the new level of prices for the output of the basic sectors. In this connection, introduction of a unified system for taxing the exportation of energy resources and raw materials and the application of a single customs duty are being contemplated.

Freeing the prices for energy resources will lead to a very substantial increase in the incomes of extractive enterprises. For this reason, the most important problem in improving the tax system is the introduction of taxes which make it possible to obtain rent from the use of mineral deposits owned by the state.

The system of direct taxes on profit and the incomes of physical persons also needs to be changed in stages and improved.

An extremely simplified procedure for collecting the income tax from physical persons should be noted. Their income, which is subject to taxation, is defined as the total income less the amount that is not taxable, expenses to support children and the disabled, and so forth, as well as expenses supported by documents (included in the cost price of a product).

An approach such as this is adequate for an economic system in which most of the property is owned by the state and prices are set strictly by the central government. But under market conditions, profit, as well as the income of physical persons, should be adjusted by taking into account the increase in value of financial and material assets, an evaluation of stocks and reserves that have been built up (in the event of asset depreciation, as well as risks and unforeseen expenses).

The inflationary nature of the current economic situation is not being taken into account sufficiently in taxation.

It appears to be most expedient to put the Law on Taxation of Enterprise Income, which has already been adopted, into effect. The principal argument usually made in support of it

is that taxation of income, that is, profit and the wage fund, will prevent an accelerated increase in the amount of funds used for wages.

Without becoming involved in a polemic about the effectiveness of this tax in the area of income policy, we will note only that under the present conditions, the taxation of wages (the rate of deductions for social insurance is 37 percent) is substantially higher than the tax rate on profit. At the same time, eliminating the tax on profit will lead to imbalance in the tax system, since there will actually be a unification of the tax rates on profit and the wage contributions that are set (including social insurance).

But the main point is that the tax on profit makes it possible to monitor the combination of other taxes being paid by an enterprise. Introduction of a tax on income entails the need for very substantial changes in bookkeeping and its transformation into a form that is absolutely not in line with practice in the world.

It is quite clear that it will be extremely difficult for the tax service in our country to ensure that the declaration of incomes is accurate and up-to-date. Only those who receive wages and other incomes from their main place of work and persons whose permanent residence is not in the Russian Federation are exempt from the declarations. With secondary employment and the development of business ownership expanding in scope, the number of citizens who must declare their incomes will be very significant, and it is doubtful that the tax service will be able to provide for effective control over this process.

The circumstances cited speak in favor of the principles of a tax schedule for physical persons. At the same time, only the sum of factors and increments for length of service in regions of the Far North, and so forth, are taxed separately from other incomes under the Law on Income Tax. Removing the unitary aspect of a tax would make it possible to limit income declaration to business ownership activity. But it is expedient to tax the incomes received from those holding two positions and interest and dividends from the source without combining them with other incomes.

Improvement in local taxation is an important objective.

All the considerations cited are quite important, and they will undoubtedly require legislative changes in the tax system.

Nongovernmental Organizations on Employment Problems

924A1171A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 15 May 92 p 6

[Article by Leonid Pereplatchikov: "At What Door Should the Unemployed Knock?"]

[Text] A conference of nonstate organizations dealing with employment problems in CIS countries began in Moscow yesterday. The Triza Employment Society, which is familiar to Moscow residents from the "Fairs of Professionals," was the organizer of this representative forum.

More than 20 public and commercial organizations engaged in the placement of specialists in jobs and their selection and retraining, in the rendering of information services in the area of employment, in the interregional transfer of manpower, and in protection against unemployment have been registered and now operate in Moscow alone.

Triza alone has 14 agencies in Moscow, where every month suitable jobs are selected for approximately 5,000 Moscow residents. The Youth Employment Society, the "Druzya Moskvyy" [Moscow's Friends] Society, the Moscow Personnel Bank, the TRIZA-MENATEP Competence Agency, and others cooperate with us actively.

How efficient is this activity? In the Russian Federation 9 to 14 million people annually change their places of work and more than 90 percent of them offer their services at the free labor market. Our expenditures per person placed in job or receiving consultation on this problem are 2.4- to 2.5-fold lower than those of state labor exchanges. Trizva has accumulated unique experience in such work, which, as it turns out, is of interest even to U.S. specialists.

The conference opened yesterday gives us the unique opportunity to become a member of the Association of Nonstate Employment Services and to receive consultations from experienced specialists of the "LIKA-Limited" Patent Agency and a private university of business and management. Reports and speeches at the conference will touch upon such topics as active policy in the field of employment, the contract hiring system, and profitable work of nonstate employment organizations at the labor market.

Triza plans to hold the next "Fair of Professionals" on 21 May—Day of Protection Against Unemployment.

Decree on Energy Resources Prices

925D0414A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 20 May 92 p 2

[Decree No 318 of Russian Federation Government, Moscow, issued 18 May, "State Regulation of Prices for Energy Resources and Other Types of Products and Services"]

[Text] For the purposes of stabilizing the work of industry, restraining inflationary processes, and preventing unjustified overpricing by suppliers of energy resources, the Russian Federation Government decrees:

1. Introduce state-regulated industrial wholesale prices for crude oil in the amount of 1,800-2,200 rubles [R] per tonne and for natural gas—R1,100-R1,600 per 1,000 cubic meters, c.i.f. the consignee, for all customers except the public.

The value-added tax for these types of output is levied in addition to the prices established above.

2. Grant the Russian Federation Ministry of Fuel and Power the right, in coordination with the Russian Federation Ministry of Economics, to establish markups and discounts

on state-regulated industrial wholesale oil prices that consider transport outlays more precisely, taking into account the distance and distinctive features of delivering the product.

3. Establish for gas-marketing organizations (resellers) a discount of R160 per 1,000 cubic meters of natural gas for delivering it to them at state-regulated industrial wholesale prices.

Natural gas for later sale to the public is released to gas-marketing organizations (resellers) at the wholesale price of R216 per 1,000 cubic meters, for sale to the public at R260 per 1,000 cubic meters.

4. Recognize that it is necessary to form a Russian Federation Ministry of Finance price-regulation fund.

Approve deductions into this fund for deliveries of crude oil and natural gas in the amounts set in Appendix No 1.

The Russian Federation Ministry of Finance, in coordination with the Russian Federation Ministry of Economics and the Russian Federation Ministry of Fuel and Power: Approve within a two-week period the sources and the procedure for establishing and using the price-regulation fund.

5. Establish that the sale of energy resources on the Russian Federation domestic market by enterprises and organizations, regardless of agency subordination or form of ownership (including exchanges), at wholesale industrial prices that exceed the established maximum amount of state-regulated prices (including R2,200 rubles per 1 tonne of crude oil and R1,600 for 1,000 cubic meters of gas) is a violation of state pricing discipline, for which the corresponding penalties called for by existing legislation are applied.

6. For purposes of providing effectiveness in the work of reproducing energy-resources reserves, establish deductions at the rates of 10 percent from the enterprises' prevailing wholesale prices for oil, natural gas, and gas condensate and 5 percent from the enterprises' regulated wholesale prices for coal, for the support of geological exploration and prospecting, the deductions to be included in the prime cost of extraction.

7. The Russian Federation Ministry of Economics, jointly with the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance, upon submission by the Russian Federation Ministry of Fuel and Power: Approve before 20 May 1992 the new state-regulated wholesale prices for enterprises for coal, shale, and the products of their beneficiation, as well as motor and boiler fuel and kerosene, taking into account the new state regulation of wholesale industrial prices for crude oil.

The Russian Federation Ministry of Finance, jointly with the Russian Federation Ministry of Fuel and Power: Determine the amount of the subsidy for the coal industry and the procedure for granting it.

The Russian Federation Ministry of Fuel and Power: Develop within a three-month period, jointly with the Russian Federation Ministry of Labor and Employment of the Population, a program for closing underground and surface mines that are not promising, the program to call

for, in particular, the creation of new workplaces and measures for social protection of the workers in accordance with existing legislation.

8. The Federal Power Commission: Provide before 20 May 1992, through regional power commissions, with the participation of the organs of executive power of the republics that make up the Russian Federation, the krais, oblasts, and autonomous entities, and the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, for revision of the appropriate rates for all customers (except the public), taking into account change in the price and rate levels that are called for by this decree.

9. Approve the maximum coefficients for raising prices and rates for the various types of output for production and engineering purposes and for consumers' commodities and services that have major social significance for which state regulation of prices and rates are preserved in accordance with Appendix No 2.

10. Convert to the use of free rates for hauling freight by air, motor-vehicle, and river transport. In formulating the rates, the standard for profitability should not exceed 35 percent of the prime operating cost of hauling freight for all enterprises and economic organizations, regardless of agency subordination and type of ownership, that extend these services to all freight senders (and freight receivers), including the public.

11. Grant to organs of executive power of the republics that comprise the Russian Federation, the krais, oblasts, and autonomous entities, and the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, taking into consideration changes in the level of prices for energy resources, the right to establish and regulate rates for the hauling of passengers and baggage by all types of transport in city (including subway) and suburban service, motor-vehicle transport on interoblast lines (or interrepublic lines within the Russian Federation), air transport on local airlines, and river transport in local service and at ferry crossings.

12. Establish a maximum level of state retail prices for liquefied gas that is sold to the public for household needs (in addition to the release of gas for motor-vehicle filling stations) in the amount of R5, including the value-added tax, for 1 kilogram.

13. The Russian Federation Ministry of Economics, upon representation of the Russian Federation Ministry of Fuel and Power: Approve prior to 20 May 1992 and put into operation new retail prices for motor gasoline and diesel fuel, taking into account the change in prices for crude oil.

14. Henceforth, until approval in accordance with the Russian Federation Law, "Mineral Resources," of the procedure, terms, forms, entities, and criteria for setting rates of payment for the right to make use of mineral wealth: Establish payments of 8 percent of the enterprises' appropriate regulated wholesale prices for the right to extract coal, oil, and gas, these payments to be included in the extraction costs.

15. The Russian Federation Ministry of Communications, in coordination with the Russian Federation Ministry of Economics and organs of executive power of the republics that make up the Russian Federation, the krais, oblasts,

autonomous entities, and the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg: Establish a list of the basic communications services that are extended at state-regulated prices and rates to enterprises and organizations within their jurisdiction, and prescribe a maximum level for these prices and rates.

16. The Russian Federation Ministry of Finance and organs of executive power of the republics that make up the Russian Federation, the krais, oblasts, and autonomous entities, and the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg: Consider in the republic budget of the Russian Federation and in the corresponding budgets of the regions: subsidies for housing and municipal-services activities and transport services that are extended to consumers at state-regulated rates and for production of the basic types of agricultural products, as well as grants for financial support in the sale of automotive gasoline and liquefied gas for filling up the cars of various categories of the handicapped.

17. Establish that change in the price and rate levels for goods and services that are sold at state-regulated prices and rates and change in the list of goods and services for free sale are made by the Russian Federation Government at the representation of the Russian Federation Ministry of Economics.

Recommend that organs of executive authority of the republics that make up the Russian Federation, the krais, oblasts, and autonomous entities, and the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, consider, when changing regulated prices and rates for consumer goods and services of social significance, increase in the population's income.

18. Establish that the delivery of crude oil, natural gas, and petroleum product to countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States be made at foreign-trade prices under the terms called for in bilateral (or multilateral) intergovernment agreements. In so doing, the established value-added tax is imposed on top of the foreign-trade prices.

Where there is an absence of agreements about terms for delivering these energy resources, they are sold at free foreign-trade prices, which are oriented to world prices, or under the terms of clearing settlements that are based on world prices. In so doing, the minimal level of foreign-trade prices for crude oil is established as R2,200 per 1 tonne, for natural gas—R1,600 per 1,000 cubic meters. Shipments of coal are made at free foreign-trade prices which consider, along with other conditions, the subsidies that have been stipulated for coal-mining enterprises that are located in Russian Federation territory.

The hauling of passengers and freight by all types of transport in the Russian Federation in service between countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States is performed at the rates called for in bilateral (or multilateral) intergovernment agreements.

19. Make a reassessment of petroleum product and coal that are sold at state-regulated prices, as well as crude oil and gas (based upon the minimal price levels—R1,800 per tonne for crude oil and R1,100 per 1,000 cubic meters for natural gas), at enterprises and economic organizations, regardless of the form of ownership (except for branches of agricultural production) on 18 May 1992.

Reject the results of the reassessment when replenishing the in-house working capital of enterprises and organizations.

20. The Russian Federation State Customs Committee, with the concurrence of the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Economic Affairs, the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance, and the Russian Federation Ministry of Fuel and Power: Develop and introduce new schedules for export rates for shipments of energy resources, taking into account changes in domestic prices thereof within the Russian Federation.

21. In order to provide for a saving of energy resources and for the structural restructuring of energy-intensive production facilities, the Russian Federation Ministry of Economics, jointly with the Russian Federation Ministry of Fuel and Power: Develop within the Russian Federation Government, with the participation of the ministries, agencies, and scientific organizations and enterprises concerned, a set of measures for saving energy in branches of the

national economy that will include, along with other statutes, a system of subsidies and tax, credit, and other privileges, as well as penalties for the overconsumption of energy resources.

22. Declare the following to be no longer in effect:

—the first and second indentations of paragraph 1, paragraph 2, the second indentation of paragraph 3, and paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of Russian Federation Government Decree No 12 of 4 January 1992, "Features of the Regulation of Prices for Products of the Fuel and Power Complex";

—paragraphs 1 and 2 of Russian Federation Government Decree No 93, 17 February 1992, "Urgent Measures for Normalizing the Situation in the Republic's Oil and Gas Industry"; and

—Russian Federation Government Decree No 94 of 17 February 1992, "Change in the Procedure for Formulating Prices for Liquefied Gas Delivered to the Public."

23. Put this decree into effect on 18 May 1992.

[Signed] *B. Yeltsin*

Appendix No 1 to Russian Federation Government Decree No 318, 18 May 1992

Deductions Into the Price-Regulation Fund of the Russian Ministry of Finance for Deliveries of Crude Oil and Natural Gas

State-regulated wholesale prices for industry (not counting the value added tax)*	Standard for deduction into the price-regulation fund (in rubles) for each 100 rubles of increase in wholesale price above the minimal level
Crude oil (rubles per tonne)	
Less than 1,800	Deduction is not made
From 1,801 to 1,900	60
From 1,901 to 2,000	70
From 2,001 to 2,100	80
From 2,101 to 2,200	90
Gas (in rubles per 1,000 cubic meters)	
Less than 1,100	Deduction is not made
From 1,101 to 1,200	70
From 1,201 to 1,300	80
From 1,301 to 1,400	80
From 1,401 to 1,500	80
From 1,501 to 1,600	90

*Concrete prices for a sale are determined in accordance with negotiations with the customer (or purchaser) of the product.

Comment. Tables for settlements with customers for crude oil and gas shipped that take the differentiated price levels into account are being developed by the Committee on Prices under the Russian Minister of Economics

Appendix No 2 to Russian Federation Government Decree No 318 of 18 May 1992

Maximum Coefficients for Raising Prices and Rates for Various Kinds of Output for Production and Engineering Purposes and Consumer Goods and Services Above the State Regulated Prices Established in Accordance with Russian Federation Government Decree No 55, 19 December 1991 (paragraphs 2 and 4)*

Services and Products for Production and Engineering Purposes Sold at State-Regulated Prices and Rates

	Maximum coefficients (without value-added tax)** on state-regulated wholesale prices for industry and rates previously established
For haulage of freight by rail (including haulage in local service and small lightweight shipments in direct service), and loading and unloading	1.8
For haulage of cargo by maritime transport (except for haulage on international voyages), services of the icebreaker fleet, loading and unloading, and port services	2
Associated gas and reduced gas	3***
Gas condensate and broad-cut light hydrocarbons	6***
Liquefied gas for household needs	6***
Water taken in by industrial enterprises for water-utilization systems	3****

*At rates for hauling freight, passengers, and baggage at the rate level in effect on 18 May 1992.

**Value-added tax imposed above prices and rates, computed with use of the indicated coefficients.

***Maximum coefficients for raising prices are applied to prices established as of 2 January 1992.

****Maximum coefficient for raising prices is applied to the prices existing for industry (on the date of introduction of this decree into effect).

Services and Products Sold to the Public at State-Regulated Prices and Rates

	Maximum coefficients (taking the value-added tax into account) on prices and rates previously established by state regulation
Haulage of passengers and baggage by rail (except for suburban service)	2
Haulage of passengers and baggage by sea (except for haulage on international voyages)	2
Haulage of passengers and baggage by river transport (except for haulage in local, suburban, and urban service and at ferry crossings)	2
Haulage of passengers and baggage by air (except for haulage on local airlines)	1.5
Kerosene and fuel (coal, peat and coal briquettes, firewood, household furnace fuel, and so on)	2
Thermal energy for heating and hot-water supply, and water and sewer services	2
Electricity, switchboard, for municipal and domestic services for the resident public:	
—in rural and urban communities	2
—in urban communities (except for housing equipped with installed electric stoves and electrical heating installations)	2
—in urban communities (in housing equipped with installed electric stoves and electrical heating equipment)	2

Maritime Fleet Future Pondered

924A1172A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 15 May 92 p 3

[Interview with I. Rogacheva, A. Kolodkin and S. Perfilov, by Aleksandr Golubyev, ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA correspondent: "Where Will the Russian Fleet Sail?"; date and place not given]

[Text] The Russian State Fleet will be 300 years old in 1996. During these three centuries, Russia has been rightfully

regarded as a great sea power. Will it succeed in retaining this status up to its jubilee year, though? The Association of International Maritime Law, the International Association of National Funds for Peace, the Mir Okeanam [Peace to the Oceans] Committee, the Association of Maritime Captains, and scientists and specialists of the CIS, Georgia, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, the United States and Great Britain held a joint meeting, devoted to the approach of the jubilee date and the problems of the Russian fleet of today. The participants in the meeting adopted an appeal to the President of Russia. The ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA correspondent met with I.

Rogacheva, people's deputy of the Russian Federation, deputy chairman of the Commission for the Budget, Plans, Taxes and Prices of the Supreme Soviet of Russia, doctor of Economic Sciences, professor, A. Kolodkin, president of the Association of International Maritime Law, vice-president of the International Maritime Committee, honored scientist of the Russian Federation, doctor of Juridical Sciences, professor, and S. Perfilov, chief specialist of the Commission for the Budget, Plans, Taxes and Prices of the Russian Supreme Soviet, to chat with them about the way in which the Russian fleet will arrive at its 300th anniversary.

[Corr.] Just why has the need arisen today for this meeting, the idea of which, as I understand it, is to draw the attention of the authorities and the public to the approaching 300th anniversary of the Russian fleet?

[A. Kolodkin] In the first place, we would not like to have this wonderful date be overlooked because of the present dramatic events taking place in Russia. In the second place, and the main reason, is the fact that a multitude of problems have piled up today which relate to the economic base of the maritime fleet and its management. They are caused by the fact that, out of the fleet of the former USSR, only 52 percent of the ships have been left to Russia—with its vast territory and extensive maritime boundaries. Out of 17 shipping companies engaged in operating the commercial fleet, 9 have passed to Russia. The Russian Federation has at its disposal today 800 commercial ships, but very few ships of the refrigerator, passenger and tanker type are left.

In addition, there are problems about the legal regulation of the activity of the fishing, commercial, scientific-research, naval and river fleets. It cannot be said that we are in a legal vacuum or in a state of chaos here, since the norms of the Union are in force in Russia, and they do not run counter to the Constitution of the Russian Federation and its other legislative acts. In particular, the USSR Code of Marine Navigation, the Ukase on the Continental Shelf and others are in effect. They must be amended, though, since the United Nations Convention on Maritime Law, and the legislative acts of Russia pertaining to property, enterprises and entrepreneurial activity went into force after they did. Russia needs its own laws. Therefore, there is an urgent need for it to create its own code of commercial navigation and laws on inland sailing, the continental shelf, territorial waters and an exclusive economic zone.

Specialists are justified in saying that Russia's participation in the United Nations Convention on Maritime Law must also be determined. The question of its going into force is virtually a foregone conclusion—out of the 60 ratifications needed, there are already 53—and on the whole (except for one, part XI, which pertains to the deepwater development of the bottom, which is so far unsatisfactory for us and for other maritime powers, such as, for example, the United States and Great Britain), its provisions are in our interests. Work is being done right now with a view to giving the convention a universal nature. This is very important, for after all, if Russia is not included among those ratifying the

convention, this will, in my opinion, be in clear contradiction of the course that we have proclaimed toward the primacy of international law in relations with other countries.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA reference note] The first legislative act pertaining to the Russian fleet was the resolution of the Boyar Duma, adopted on 20 October 1696, at the insistence of Peter I: "We Must Have Maritime Ships." The boyars thus laid the basis for creation of a permanent State navy and transport fleet. By 1700, 40 ships and 113 rowing ships had been built. With the aid of the fleet, Russia succeeded in consolidating its hold on the Black, Azov and Baltic seas, and on the shores of Russian America in the 18th century.

[Corr.] Because of the formation of independent states on the territories of the former union republics, problems have obviously arisen concerning the interrelations with the countries that have an outlet to the seas. One can probably mention more than just the Black Sea fleet here?

[A. Kolodkin] Of course, take just the Caspian. It was formerly regarded as a Soviet-Ukrainian sea, and a number of agreements regulated the activity of the two countries. Now, several independent states have an outlet to the Caspian Sea: Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Iran. They say that Dagestan also wants to have its own independent maritime policy here. There is now an urgent need for agreements between these countries on protection of the marine environment, fishing and developing the bottom. Let us not forget that the problem of our inland waters will also arise, as for example, the Volga—how will countries that have an outlet to the Caspian make use of this river?

There are problems on the Black Sea as well, even aside from the naval fleet. Georgia has its own shipping company, Ukraine has three, and we have the large Novorossiysk in operation. Unless there is close cooperation on protecting the marine environment of this region (incidentally, Russian representatives have already signed a convention on this subject), in view of the shipping and development of the continental shelf, we will hardly be able to make efficient use of the Black Sea.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA reference note] In the first half of the 19th century, Russia began to lag behind the Western powers in the sphere of maritime shipbuilding: while England and France built a large number of steamships, we built only a handful. The Anglo-French fleet completely dominated the theaters of military action, and Russia lost its Black Sea sailing fleet during the Crimean War. By the end of the 19th century, however, the country had at its disposal 129 naval and 667 commercial steam and armor-plated ships.

[Corr.] How soon can we expect the drafts of laws pertaining to the fleet to appear in parliament?

[I. Rogacheva] The present parliament has been working for two years. At first, many of the deputies greeted my speeches on this subject with a smile. For some reason, agrarian and railroad problems were given unconditional

priority, and the problems that worried the two-million-member detachment of seamen were left in the shade. The ice began to break during the discussion of the draft of the Law on Safety. The need to draw up laws on the territorial waters, continental shelf and 200-mile economic zone in a three-month period was written into the decree. This was entrusted to our commission, specifically, the subcommission on economics and finances of the World Ocean. The present staff of parliament still has three years ahead of it and, you may be sure, the new Supreme Soviet will not come to a blank space.

To solve all the problems facing the maritime fleet successfully, though, there must be a parliamentary committee on maritime affairs. We now have a group of specialists who will work out the first legal acts on the most important problems.

[A. Kolodkin] They must include a law on the maritime merchant fleet, first of all, on determining the state's economic policy with respect to the development of the fleet, as is done in all developed countries.

[I. Rogacheva] And a law on subsidies. The fishing fleet is state-subsidized in all states. Unless we do this, with unrestricted prices for energy carriers, 1 kilogram of fish will cost approximately 200 rubles [R], and the 240,000 members of the sailing crew will be left without a job. Therefore, we need a state policy on the fleet which would make it possible to retain fleet types such as merchant, fishing, scientific-research and river.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA reference note] The rapid development of all types of domestic maritime fleet began in the mid-1950's. By 1965, the country's maritime transport fleet constituted 1,187 ships and was in sixth place in the world. In the history of the maritime transport fleet, the 1970's-1980's remain as a period of widescale introduction of specialized ships. During this time, specialized shore complexes were also built and automated sectorial control systems were developed on a large scale. A powerful nuclear-submarine nuclear-warhead fleet was created and surface ocean-going ships equipped with nuclear weapons were built. The cruises of the Arktiki to the Northern zone and the Vladivostok to Antarctica were impressive.

[Corr.] Great hopes are probably placed on conversion of the naval fleet today?

[A. Kolodkin] The participants in the meeting of which you were speaking decided to appeal to the government with a request that it be the initiator in convening the United Nations Conference on Conversion, including naval weaponry, and sent the appropriate document to the President of Russia. We must not lose the intellectual potential that the Russian fleet has at its disposal. We will not forget that in the sphere of the scientific-research fleet, our country, even in the so-called stagnant years, was in second place in the world. This must be preserved, by participating in international programs and making use of conversion.

[S. Perfilov] One must take into consideration here the fact that the program for development of the Russian fleet should be comprehensive in nature. For example, Japan has

over 50 laws on the fleet. In our country, the most varied organizations, working either at the Ministry of Agriculture or within the framework of the Ministry of Transport, are studying the problems of the fleet. That is, nothing is coordinated. As a result, we may come to the 300th anniversary of the fleet without the fleet itself. After all, the point is that half of the Union fleet has been left to Russia, and this satisfies its needs by only two-thirds. Indeed, this fleet is basically old. While the world average "age" of ships is 12 years, in our country it is 16. At the same time, the international norms for ship operation with respect to ecological considerations are growing increasingly stiff, and it may turn out that one day they will stop letting our ships enter the ports.

Furthermore. Let us assume that by 1996 we will have gradually written off half of the ships. This will lead to the fact that by the end of this year, Russia will have to pay \$1.7 billion to transport cargo, and by 1996 this figure will grow to \$3 billion. Only about 40 percent of the union shipbuilding enterprises have been left to us. We must think about the future today. Incidentally, I have given the figures only for the transport fleet, but the powerful fishing fleet, and the scientific, and the river fleets have similar problems.

[I. Rogacheva] The ships of the fishing fleet were as a rule built in the former CEMA countries and capitalist countries. Now we cannot get them from there, and one trawler costs \$120 million. Right here, we must talk about conversion. To what extent can we use the capacities of the Navy enterprises for the transport and fishing fleet? All the concerned parties should take part in this, particularly since there is also a problem with fleet repair. Seventy-five percent of the ships are due to be written off, but we cannot come to this. So, perhaps, the navy shipbuilding and ship repair yards could help in this to some extent?

[S. Perfilov] There are other problems as well. For example, there are not enough ports. There are two left on the Baltic and one on the Black Sea, and they are not deep-water ports. The program should take this into consideration, as well, just as providing the fleet with personnel. This means that the problem of the fleet is all-embracing.

[I. Rogacheva] I would like to say something more about the personnel problem. The point is that there are people of various nationalities, who have come from other regions, working in the North and the Far East. If they all go back to their homes at the same time, the fleet here will be 80-percent stripped. In order to avoid this, we should protect their rights. Who will pay a pension allowing for added payments for the North in Ukraine, when a person returns home from Russia? There is the same problem with the housing. The Committee for Maritime Affairs could become the body which would solve these problems at the parliamentary level. It could protect the rights of the seamen in privatization of fleet property, as well. Today the fishing collectives are ready to buy this property, taking its wear into consideration. The fishermen are trying to create joint-stockholding companies and people's enterprises. There are forces, though, which are preventing this.

To sum up everything that has been said, I would like to add that we have not covered all the problems of the maritime workers today: a large detachment of maritime specialists remain beyond the framework of this conversation, for example, those extracting minerals on the continental shelf. I hope that this is the beginning of a great deal of talk about legislative protection for these people. Only after joining the efforts of all the specialists on marine affairs now, only by solving all the problems of the fleet as a complex, can we hope to succeed in greeting the 300th anniversary of the Russian State Fleet in the manner befitting a great maritime power.

'Aeroport' Association Work Highlighted

924A1191A Moscow VOZDUSHNYY TRANSPORT
in Russian No 20, May 92 p 4

[Report by B. Sidorenko: "The 'Aeroport' Association and the Path to Tomorrow"]

[Text] The "Aeroport" Association was one of the first to emerge on the ruins of the MGA [Ministry of Civil Aviation] in March last year. It is common knowledge that it is hardest for the pioneers, and it was not easy to establish it. It managed to develop competitive activity only by August. And soon after, the association transferred its first income of 4,000 rubles to the fund to deal with the consequences of the attempted coup in August.

Today, after a year, this is one of the prestigious organizations which already has 64 corporate members. It is well known, and its work is being followed with interest by colleagues from the World Airports Organization (AASI). On the eve of May Day in Prague, at the AASI-Europe Board of Directors, where the problems of developing East European airports were being reviewed, speeches were delivered by V. Potapov, general director of the TsUMVS [International Air Services Central Administration] (he is a member of the AASI-Europe Board of Directors), and V. Ezers, chief of the Riga Airport.

In late April, a scheduled conference of the "Aeroport" Association discussed the results of its first months. The report by its president, L. Shcheglov, and the speeches by participants cited specific examples of the association's activity and specified tasks for the future. This is the subject of today's report.

The Tenacious Embrace of Monopoly

The movement to separate airlines and airports and to give the latter full independence has evidently slowed down now. Many of the speakers were concerned about this. The airports cannot be developed when they remain in a monopolist structure of unified aviation detachments and administrations.

What is the association undertaking? At its instruction, the Academy of Civil Aviation has drafted and distributed to localities the "Concept of a system of independent civil airports and the basis for their activity under the new conditions."

Several versions of a system of independent airports are being reviewed, but in any event, the monopoly of airlines

and OAO's [unified aviation detachments] that has existed thus far in the structures of Russian civil aviation and in the CIS states must be broken up.

The system (a group or association of airports) will begin operating independently within the limits of each airport; it will not be isolated, but integrated in the world air transport system through the international organizations AASI and ICAO [International Civil Aviation Organization]. An airport should not be dependent administratively on an airline, of course—that is nonsense. Their interrelationships are based exclusively on economic and commercial principles. Incidentally, the academy is now working on methods for "airline-airport" settlements.

Do we have models today for breaking up the old structures and moving forward? Yes. They include the airports in the Baltic, Uzbekistan, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Irkutsk, Novosibirsk, and a number of other airports. The conference urged that the example of those that are moving forward be followed.

All Roads Lead to Kiev

The Center for Retraining Airport Personnel was established within the framework of the association, using the base of the KIIGA [Kiev Institute of Civil Aviation Engineers]. Two groups have successfully completed on-the-job training in an ADP [airport control tower]. Two groups of specialists have also been retrained for the specialized airport vehicle services. A group of ESTOP [lighting support and electrical installation] employees is now being formed. Instruction plans have been developed to train specialists in 10 different areas of ground service.

A Data Base for Everyone

The association staff believes that development of a data base will be very useful to them. A computer program has been developed and specialized manuals for all airport equipment have been obtained. And even the staff employees, all professionals with considerable experience, are prepared to provide all kinds of assistance. In making expert assessments, in selecting equipment, and in determining the foreign partners and partners from our side. As well as advising where to turn with respect to one problem or another—either to Aeroprojekt ["Aeroprojekt" State Planning and Surveying and Scientific Research Institute] or to the GosNII GA [State Civil Aviation Scientific Research Institute].

It was noted at the conference that the data base unfortunately has not been adequately utilized thus far by the members.

The introduction of new equipment and scientific and technical developments in mechanization and automation is an important direction. This includes the concentration of funds, enlistment of science in the development of new types of equipment for airports, and the establishment of economic programs. It is very important here to ensure that the direction chosen applies to everyone. So that there is no longer a need for each one to invest millions (which are in such short supply) individually in one advancement or another.

And now a little more detail about the implementation of certain programs which were discussed at the conference.

The Ecology

The association has distributed publicity brochures on environmental problems: removing the waste water from "Arctic region" liquid and petroleum products, reducing emissions in the atmosphere from airport vehicles, using fluorescent lighting, reclaiming production waste, and automated monitoring of air and waste water pollution.

However, many members of the association still refuse to take part in financing these operations and to obtain the necessary instruments and equipment. It is understandable that many cannot pay for the ecology today. They have nothing to live on. But it is necessary to realize, the conference emphasized, that failure to deal with this work today will set an aviation enterprise back several years tomorrow. And the fines which airports will have to pay in the not too distant future will be substantially more than what is required to finance this program today.

Despite the difficulties that have emerged, "Aeroport" has turned its attention to tomorrow in this work. The "Aviaekologiya" NPP [Scientific Production Enterprise], which will provide services in preparing for ecological and noise restriction certificates, monitoring harmful effects on the environment, and so forth, has been established.

Mechanization and Automation

The "Science-Production-Service" NPTs [Scientific Production Center] was established for this purpose. In particular, it has developed a device for removing the layer of rubber and old markings from VPP [runways]. The association has concluded contracts with the "LIAZ" NPO ["Likino Bus Plant" Scientific Production Association] to develop a new large-capacity ramp bus (up to 210 passengers) and to provide aviation enterprises with 35 buses for personnel transportation. The Trolleybus Plant imeni Urtskiy in the city of Engels will manufacture a less expensive bus trailer for small airports.

Good cooperation with the Kirovsk Plant and MGO "Kommash" was noted. "Kommash" will provide sprinkler and snow removal equipment and pavement cleaning and floor washing equipment for association members. At the Kirovsk Plant in St. Petersburg, agreement was reached to provide roadbuilding equipment, tractors, front loaders, multipurpose road machinery, and wheeled bulldozers.

It is especially important that along with the large machinery, the Kirovsk Plant will be providing airports with the K-20 minitractor, which can be used to transport ground equipment, baggage carts, and various small cargoes. It is planned to test the minitractor at Pulkovo, and then to form a specialized mobile transport facility on its base.

Quite a few specific examples of this kind were mentioned at the conference. The association is actively assuming responsibility for the technical reequipment of aviation enterprises.

After the conference ended, I met with several of its participants. I asked each one the same question: What is the association providing for you and what are the benefits of association membership?

V. Sidorenko, director for airport construction and operations of "Tyumenaviatrans":

"There are more than 20 aviation enterprises in our structure. When the Ministry of Civil Aviation disappeared without leaving an organ behind to provide continuity, we were left without guidance from the top. For this reason, the association was welcomed right away as the structure to provide coordination for our activity and to resolve the problems we could not "make headway" with by ourselves. The association is performing this function. Specialists on its staff are very familiar with our bottlenecks and help to eliminate them one way or another.

What have we been able to accomplish with the association's help thus far? Obtain buses, for example. While we managed to obtain one or two before, we have already received six buses for personnel transportation this year. We managed to rectify the problem of obtaining bitumen for the airport pavements, once again with their help, we received 500 tonnes from the Ufa Combine. We also obtained bitumen mastic for airfield repairs.

In the not-too-distant past we were obtaining this through "Aviazakaz." Now each aviation enterprise is ahead of the problem. But after all, there are usually over 100 places where we can find what is needed. By bringing us together, the association is helping us to get the machinery and materials we need through joint efforts. In his address to us today, A. Larin, director of the Department of Air Transport, emphasized again that aside from the functions of state administration and regulation, he does not want or intend to assume responsibility for anything else. So as you see, there is no one else to resolve problems but the association.

We are pleased that close contacts are being established with foreign firms with the help of the association. Despite the fact that our industry, especially the military, has potential on the whole, no one wants to do anything to develop domestic airport equipment at present. For this reason, we are compelled today to purchase machinery abroad and to use foreign technology, although this is also very expensive.

I would particularly like to stress the importance of organizing joint ventures in this stage, and the association is also involved in this. Everyone is very hard-pressed for foreign exchange, but when some of the machinery produced in a joint venture is sold for rubles, this is convenient for everyone.

B. Shakhshvarov, chief of the Borispol Airport:

It is probably premature at this time to give a complete appraisal of what the association provides.

First of all, there has never been a unified organ, even in the former Ministry of Civil Aviation, to direct activity in the area of technical reequipment, construction, and development of the economy and commerce. We believe that the association is precisely such a voluntary combination of

aviation enterprises which can resolve all the problems based on the concerns of the airports themselves.

As for specific examples of the association's activity, we can refer to the formation of a training center based at the Kiev Institute of Civil Aviation [Engineers]. Before this we never had such a center, and the training of ground service specialists was uncoordinated. Now everything will be put on a scientific basis, in accordance with programs, and this naturally will produce a substantial gain. To the extent that the training center and its base are improved and developed, there will be further, more extensive opportunities to train the specialists in airport services.

V. Tkach, director of the "Aremeks" Firm:

The name of our firm means "airport-repair-export." We have been in existence for a year now, first as a small enterprise at Plant No. 402, and now as an independent firm. The "Aeroport" Association became our principal founder in April this year.

Our main activity is focused on the repair of VK-1 and RD-45 engines for cleaning airports and runways. These engines were manufactured at one time for military aircraft about 40 years ago. According to our information, there are 300 to 350 such engines in CIS countries' civil aviation, but no one is repairing them. We have now undertaken this task.

We have certain problems, of course. Both with production space and our location on the territory of Plant No. 402. The association is coming to our assistance today. It is the association that is concluding an agreement with the plant on our activity.

Before last year our program called for the repair of 55 engines. We fulfilled it. We have now taken 15 engines for service maintenance. And this would not be the limit if we had additional space.

We are now negotiating with naval aviation leaders to obtain a number of engines which are about to be written off and have parameters similar to our engines.

In addition, the association is helping us to organize the planned repair of engines, primarily for enterprises that are association members. And of course, we will be making offers through the association for repair in other CIS states as well.

Decree on Aid to Housing Construction

924B0207A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian No 11, 19 May 92 p 3

[Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation, dated 6 Mar 92, No 140, Moscow, "On State Support for Cooperative Housing Construction"]

[Text] In connection with the sharp increase in the cost of housing construction in the conditions of the operation of free prices and an increase in the interest rates charged by banks for credits, the Government of the Russian Federation decrees:

For the organs of executive power of the republics, krays, oblasts, autonomous formations, and the cities of Moscow

and Saint Petersburg that are a part of the Russian Federation, to compensate needy citizens who are registered for improved housing conditions not less than 70 percent of the increase in the cost of construction, taking into account the tax for added cost and the increase in the payment for bank credit for cooperative housing construction begun prior to 1 January 1992. In so doing, to attribute 50 percent of the funds allotted to cover the compensation expenses to the expenditures of the republic budget of the Russian Federation.

For the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation to make provisions in the draft republic budgets of the Russian Federation for the necessary allocations for the indicated purposes.

[Signed] A. Shokhin, deputy chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation

Order on Preservation of Personnel Records of Liquidated Enterprises

925D0409B Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian No 11, 19 May 92 p 3

[Order of the Government of the Russian Federation, dated 23 April 1992, No 781-r, Moscow]

[Text] In order to secure the social and legal protection of citizens, the prevention of the loss of personnel records and the improvement of their preservation and use:

1. To establish that the enterprises, organizations, kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and other organizational structures being liquidated, regardless of their form of ownership, hand over to their successor, or in the absence thereof, to the higher organ in accordance with the procedure provided for by the basic rules for the work of department archives.

2. For the institutions of the state archive service to carry out measures to guarantee the safety of the personnel records of enterprises, organizations, kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and other organizational structures that are being liquidated, regardless of their form of ownership, in case of the absence of a successor and a higher organ.

3. To recommend to the organs of executive power of the republics, krays, oblasts, autonomous formations, and the cities of Moscow and Saint Petersburg that are part of the Russian Federation, to examine in the necessary cases questions of the creation of archives for preservation and use of personnel records and to allot for this purpose the corresponding facilities, staff, and a wage fund for officials.

[Signed] A. Shokhin, deputy chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation

Academy of Sciences Associate on Strike Situation

924A1179A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 16 May 92 p 2

[Article by Yelena Kremetsova under "Workers' Movement" rubric: "Strict Reforms Give Rise to Harsh Strikes"]

[Text] The strike movement of teachers and physicians is shaking the social life of the country that has already been shaken and is even shaking it considerably more than the

strikes of miners, aircraft dispatchers, or taxi drivers, which have become a common occurrence. Prof. of History Leonid Gordon, associate of the Institute for Employment Problems of the Russian Academy of Sciences, comments on the situation.

The strikes of teachers and physicians are an integral part of the entire wage movement representing the interests of the huge majority of the people. It is called a "workers" movement, because Russia has long since ceased to be Nekrasov's country of the "muzhik," that is, the peasant. Statistically a movement of the bulk of the popular masses is defined by the moods of 85 percent of the population—workers and the middle stratum of the intelligentsia. The opinion, that is, the position of strikers, is determined exclusively by current material interests—a vulgar view of the matter.

Until the beginning of the reforms, everything was simple and clear for the people: down with the old, give us the new. The primary task was to make sure that democratic forces come to power and after that, they thought, everything will happen by itself, as though on wheels. Wageworkers could not imagine all the difficulties of the transition, nor could anyone.

But the situation changed radically with the coming of a government that intended to carry out reforms. In two respects. First, the task of fighting against an antireform government disappeared for a very influential but small branch of the workers' movement. And a new task arose, that of supporting the authority carrying out reforms. A new task also arose for restorationists of state socialism, the ideological opponents of reform, and that was the fight against authority. Opposite movements exchanged roles and the degree of their external action in bringing their ideas to the mass consciousness.

Secondly, the beginning reforms also exacerbated and revealed many calamities caused not so much by the tactical mistakes of the reformers as by the crisis of socialism. Statistics confirm that the increase in prices began not in January but had already been occurring for many years. And the disintegration of economic ties did not begin in 1992 but in the early 1980's, as indicated not only by the decline in the rate of increase of production but also by the suppliers scurrying around the Union exchanging through any means the metal and output of their enterprises for the physical resources needed for their production.

Meanwhile, both of these aspects are changing the positions of the opposing sides, just as the gentlemen alternate with the ladies in a minuet. The position of the opponents of reforms becomes simpler and more understandable to the masses in the person of the movements "Working Russia" [Trudovaya Rossiya], "United Front of Working People," and many leaders of the old trade unions. It is formulated approximately as follows: "Life is awful! It is necessary to bring back socialism at once." And when the head of the Armed Forces of the Russian Republic says that we have practically no opponents of reforms, then he is preaching a false premise. As a sociologist, I can say that there are those who oppose not the strategy and tactics but the very idea of

reforms. And the mistakes of the reformers gave them people who were formerly in favor of reforms. As of today, the antireform branch of the workers' movement—"Working Russia"—represents one of the main moving forces in all of the most recent mass meetings and strikes.

And although the prevailing opinion among the passive and democratically oriented milieu is that there is no danger of a restoration of state socialism, that opinion does not seem convincing to me personally.

The people are turned off by the lip-smacking insolence of some of the new business people and secondhand dealers and by the attitude that a stratification of the society into poor and rich is inevitable, which in reality is often dictated by the ability to "grab" state financial and physical resources. People cannot put up with such injustice. And this understandable feeling is a factor of danger for reforms.

The only guarantee against a recoil is overwhelming and massive public support of the idea of reforms. But support for reform is weakening as we watch. For this reason, the democratic wing of the workers' movement found itself in a much more complex situation. Its adherents are quite sober and realistic-thinking people who understand and accept the thesis that "it is necessary to endure." But they are skeptically scornful about any assertions to the effect that an "improvement of life" will begin by the fall. And they certainly do not think that all of the actions of the authorities are good and correct.

For example, workers categorically reject statements of demagogues about the possibility of carrying out a 100-percent indexing of all wages and salaries. But they cannot agree with the government's assertion that it is impossible to prevent the sort of catastrophic shortage of money that we see right now. When in the beginning stages of the reforms there was an abrupt decline in the purchasing power of tolerable wages, democratically-oriented workers were prepared to assess this circumstance as a kind of payment for the quenched thirst for reforms. But when they did not receive their wages for months because of the lack of paper money, they began with full justification to accuse the government either of being insufficiently qualified or of being unwilling to work or to use its authority where necessary.

As paradoxical as it may seem, it was precisely the role of politics that was underestimated in government policy. In my view, the main thing should not be the problem of overcoming the budget deficit but the problem of establishing the conditions favoring an increase in the subjects of the market and democracy. And they include not only entrepreneurial groups and political parties but also democratic trade unions, without which there can be no civilized market.

The government put all of its political emphasis on the "strictness" of reforms rather than on their completeness and consistency. And realizing that the reason for the current calamities is the insufficiently energetic and skillful implementation of the reforms, the democratic wing of the workers' trade-union movement chose by no means the worst tactic for the expression of its position—support in

combination with criticism. But this tactic of balancing on the verge of a strike is extremely complex for it is very difficult to see the margin beyond which the criticism of particular mistakes develops into statements against the fundamental line.

As for strikes, the "tactic of balancing" was manifested in the following principle: democratic trade unions must not renounce strikes once and for all. Such a renunciation may make the hardships of the reforms unbearable. But in contrast to trade unions that are striving to curtail the reforms, they are trying to minimize their number and to resolve everything possible locally without transferring their tasks to Gaydar and Yeltsin.

A shining example of the policy of democratic trade unions is the agreement between the Union of Worker Committees of Kuzbass and the administration of Kemerovo Oblast, under which the administration obligates itself to carry out systematic reforms locally without retreating from difficulties and commits itself to coordinate all of the most important reform measures and personnel appointments with the Council of Worker Committees. And the democratic committees obligated themselves to avert strikes as long as the administration keeps its word.

It would not be a bad thing if such an agreement could be achieved everywhere in the scope of the federation. Especially since the forces that could take on the local authorities can be found everywhere, as the recent strikes of physicians and teachers demonstrated.

In my view, the claims of the medical people and teachers are absolutely just. These are not selfish claims but socially responsible demands of the intelligentsia. And despite the fact that their actions are creating momentary complications, by the way, the latest poll of the Public-Opinion Institute [VTsIOM] showed that 54 percent of the population is solidary with the strikers.

Despite the widely prevailing opinion, even the quasi-strike forms that the "rebels" chose to attract attention to their problems are justified. For if all physicians and teachers followed the sentimental reasoning of those who receive three times as much and love to speak of duties and the necessity of self-denial by the intelligentsia, we would not only continue to put up with injustice but would also soon find ourselves without doctors and teachers. It is another matter that in practice the declared form of carrying out the strikes was often violated. Thus, in Moscow, it was precisely the children's polyclinics that were closed most intensively and there were cases in which people were refused emergency help. And it must be recognized that one could sense an unwillingness to compromise in many of the actions of strikers. But the authorities, who should have made use of a preventive compromise approach, also must act in a spirit of mutual concessions. The government could have implemented the current wage increases a little earlier or in a differentiated and gradual manner without going to extremes.

I see as a negative phenomenon in the strikes of the intelligentsia the fact that to the undeniably just demands of the specialists were added other demands having to do with

support for particular administrative and political persons that were not so indisputable. In Kuzbass, for example, the teachers' movement was involved in disputes between supporters and opponents of Tudeyev, whose position with respect to democratic reforms appears rather dubious.

In principle, however, the workers' movement is an integral part of the market economy and especially of the transition period. And if anyone at all through some miracle were able to put an end to the strikes, this would be a disaster for the society: the market would take on the harshest forms for working people.

To avoid spontaneous or protracted conflicts, the authorities and all supporters of reforms must do all they can to stimulate the creation of the conditions for the establishment of a democratic workers' movement. And this means that they must do away with the remnants of the actual lack of freedom and inequality of trade unions.

Until now, the overwhelming majority of the people here have joined trade unions other than under their own free will. To this day, membership dues have been collected automatically through the accounting office. The pseudo-mass nature and compulsion make the official trade unions weak. Meanwhile, the existence of alternative new organizations now requires the general reregistration of trade-union membership. Let every worker decide whether he wants to remain in the old trade union, establish or join a new one, or not belong to any at all.

But even if the majority of the population takes the latter position and only a minority remains in the trade unions, the new democratically formed organizations will still have real influence and power that is significantly more beneficial than what they have today. Especially since there is nothing more dangerous in the present phase for the implementation of reforms than the element of dissatisfaction and lack of protection of hired workers.

Telephone Service Charges to Rise

924A1179B IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 May 92
Morning Edition p 2

[Article by Sergey Leskov under "Events and Commentaries" rubric: "The Telephone Is Becoming More Expensive. But This Is Not a Telephone Conversation"]

[Text] After the publication of the item "Ministry of Communications Is Freeing the Prices for Its Services" in No 107, many readers called the editor's office and asked about the specific mechanism that will guide the newly independent communications enterprises in determining their new rates.

As confirmed to us by V. Boldin, deputy minister of communications of Russia, the mentioned order will be signed on 15 May. But the "rules for action" will be determined within a few days after consultation with the enterprises. It is necessary to coordinate many questions, including the one that most concerns readers: How will the time rates be set for owners of personal telephones? At the same time, it remains incomprehensible why it was necessary to hurry with the signing of an order whose mechanism of action has not been worked out completely. One way or

another, Deputy Minister V. Boldin promised to provide IZVESTIYA with full information on the new telephone rates at the beginning of next week.

Since they are still considering the optimum version in the Ministry of Communications, however, it appears to us to be helpful to repeat the questions and doubts that most often bother the readers of IZVESTIYA. By the way, many of these questions were raised by one person, Candidate of Technical Sciences M. Gelman, which once again confirms the fact that the essence of the problem is not hidden behind seven seals. The Minister of Communications of the USSR had already experimented with time rates for telephone conversations in a number of cities. It turned out that expenditures for the installation of the necessary meters and the outlays for the preparation and remittance of money orders exceed the expected profits many times over. Was previous experience considered? And did they consider the experience of municipal gas and water services that renounced the use of meters to measure use by consumers, having established an average charge? The experiment in Shyaulay led to almost a halving of the length of conversations on home telephones and to a corresponding increase in the use of official telephones. Was this effect taken into account? Quite recently the Ministry of Communications was not able to guarantee the production of sufficient three-minute meters for public pay telephones. Perhaps this time it was not worthwhile to begin such a large-scale action? Many of our on-duty and information services are organized in such a way that one has to stay on the telephone for a long time to get through. Is it not simpler to organize the work of these services properly and not to charge the subscriber a supplemental payment, for which he is justly indebted to the Ministry of Communications?

There are many questions. We add that the change in rates is taking place, as is always the case here, in an arbitrary manner, without taking into account the opinion of consumers. This merely confirms that any monopolism—that of the Ministry of Communications in the case at hand—leads to unrestrained price rises. Yes, it is true that the situation of communications workers is difficult today and that they are granted loans at exorbitant rates. But is it not in the interests of the state, which must be primarily concerned with the development of communications in the country, to offer preferential loans to the Ministry of Communications? It is not just that this measure would help the average consumer. Precisely such a policy, judging by world experience, would be the most effective one for the development of the communications systems necessary to normalize the state's economy.

Official on Progress, Problems in Agricultural Reforms

[924A1171B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 13 May 92 p 2

[Interview with Yu. Melkumov, deputy minister of the Moscow Oblast Administration for Land Use and Land Resources, by Yelena Tokareva; place and date not given: "In the Traditions of Russian Idealism"]

[Text] In the interview "The Private Farmer Was Invented Especially In Order To Preserve the Kolkhoz" of August 1991 Yuriy Martuyshov, chairman of the Committee on Land Problems of the Moscow Oblast Soviet of Workers' Deputies, and Yuriy Melkumov, his deputy, announced to ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA that the partisan sorties by private farmers represented a flank war against land monopolism and global mismanagement. In fact, a year ago only rare, exotic demarches by private farmers, which did not affect the cornerstone—public land use—disturbed the unshakable calm of land monopolists—sovkhozes and kolkhozes. Without reforming the kolkhoz and sovkhoz system and without transforming public land ownership into private ownership no land reform was possible—this was what the oblast soviet assumed at that time. Almost 1 year has passed. Two, as they said, fateful documents—the presidential Ukase on Some Measures for Implementation of Land Reform and the government Decree No 88 on the Procedure for the Reorganization of Kolkhozes and Sovkhozes—were promulgated in winter. Reformation of the public system began.

What will Yu. Melkumov, who works as deputy minister of the Moscow Oblast Administration on Land Use and Land Resources, say now?

[Tokareva] Yuriy Semenovich, let us begin with a clarification: What was debated at the Congress of People's Deputies? What question concerning the purchase and sale of land was blocked by agrarian deputies?

[Melkumov] As the saying goes, do not believe your ears. The congress discussed the question of who deserves to sell land—our mother—not the question concerning the constitutional assignment of the right of purchase and sale of land and private land ownership. Today land is being sold and kolkhozes and sovkhozes are the leaders in land sale. They are followed by rural and rayon soviets and then, by the military. The gradation is based strictly on who is a monopolist and to what extent.

[Tokareva] Now it is clearly obvious that land reform is deadlocked. Sovkhozes have protected themselves very well against reforming. The number of farms not subject to reforming owing to their allegedly special intellectual value and use of unique technologies has increased severalfold as compared with previous years. In Moscow Oblast before Yeltsin's latest ukases the indivisible list included 100 farms and now, almost 300. This is how the system has reacted to the attempt to reform it.

[Melkumov] As has now become clear, collective [ownership] is not being reformed into collective-share [ownership], but only into large private, as though landlord, ownership. Today with all their pitiful land, material, and monetary shares people are falling into servitude to sovkhoz directors, such as they have not experienced since the time of serfdom.

[Tokareva] Yes, Viktor Ten, our permanent author from Kaluga Oblast, writes that "the shareholder peasant has fewer rights than the former kolkhoz member, who at least was protected by the trade union and had a constitutionally assigned right to housing." In a joint-stock company

housing is assigned as "indivisible." At the same time, most chairmen and directors have already privatized their homes. Bylaws contain the following point: "A person who leaves for a nonvalid reason loses the right to dividends in accordance with the decision of the general meeting. His share is not transferred to anyone and the person who leaves cannot receive it." The list of nonvalid reasons is not presented and such a formulation gives unlimited scope for abuses.

[Melkumov] Another deadlock has arisen as a result of the implementation of land reform in our oblast. Into what is Moscow Oblast being transformed in connection with the distribution of average rayon shares? Private farming appears to be absolutely lacking in land. It can count only on receiving an average rayon land share of 1 to 3 hectares, which is completely without prospects. Today it is dying as a serious stratum of rural owners, because one can work efficiently on land only on plots of no less than 30 to 40 hectares. The very idea of average rayon land shares is destructive for agriculture, because it produces a depressing inadequacy of land and leads to the situation from which Russia got away during Stolypin's period. To break everything into small pieces raises the terrible possibility of killing cultivated farming in general. Therefore, today the appearance of a list of farms not subject to an atomic division into land shares, one can say, is a healthy reaction of the system and its attempt to preserve itself and large cultivated farming.

[Tokareva] You yourself, in the best traditions of Russian idealism, told me last year that reform is worthless if it does not affect sovkhozes and their gigantic latifundism based on serfdom. Well, they have been affected and it turns out that it is impossible to reform them.

[Melkumov] It is possible to reform them, but, obviously, not by a simple division—only by financial measures; for example, by cutting them off from the financial nipple.

[Tokareva] They can be cut off only by forcing them in all cases to look for a private investor and by cutting off state financing in general.

[Melmukov] Why? The state can also appear in the role of a private investor, but it can give money only for programs and not in general. But this is what turns out: The state is powerless in the fight against this structure and is completely unable to control its capital investments, to fight against their ineffectiveness, and to dismiss insufficiently conscientious officials. Alas, our state does not know how to protect itself against economic inefficiency. Therefore, the system known under the pseudonym of public land use can be neither reformed nor killed in a short time. It can die off only by itself. Credit should be given to the great reformer—the process is going on. The intellectual potential of the system is leaving it most actively: specialists and people capable of something are going away—they are going into private farming and entrepreneurship.

[Tokareva] Nevertheless, I do not understand why does the government, which calls itself the government of reforms, not carry the matter of land reform to its conclusion?

[Melmukov] This points primarily to the fact that our state is of an ideological rather than of an economic nature. If I were in Yeltsin's place, this is the first thing that I would tell the government: Fellows, the congress has shown that reform is not being accepted and this means that you do not work well with interest groups and are unable to turn their vital interests to the common benefit. The old structures live and survive extremely well, saying again and again: "Give us the feeder, give us the feeder!" And they find this feeder. An era of structural gangsterism has begun. Land reform is only a particular case of the general process. The need for and the role of authorities lie in reducing the negative aspects that manifest themselves and in acting as mediators and judges in the fight of structural giants.

[Tokareva] Yuriy Semenovich, what about soviets? Seemingly, they are not needed now, or is soviet power really the main hindrance?

[Melmukov] Well, if we proceed from the principle of division of power, representative power also has its place. If it does not exist, there will be no division of power, but an ordinary repainting of the nomenklatura nobility.

As it seems to us, reform can no longer continue only at the upper Russian level. The crisis confrontation between the government and the congress is an eloquent symptom of this. Obviously, the second stage in reforms—regionalization—is beginning. Owing to its territorial feature, land reform especially needs to be attached to specific conditions of regions.

During the winter of 1992 we, nevertheless, plan to carry out a reorganization of all farms, including those that do not fall under decree No 88. However, this reorganization will be carried out according to individual plans with due regard for the features of every farm. We consider it important to preserve the real potential of the agrarian sector near Moscow, preventing both the further existence of inefficient, economically unsecured latifundias and an unjustified fragmentation of large farms and their senseless disintegration.

Resolution on Livestock Subsidies

925D0413A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian No 11, 19 May 92 p 3

[Text of "Resolution No 289 of the Russian Federation Government: 'On the Introduction of Livestock Subsidies in 1992'"]

[Text] Moscow, 8 May—By way of execution of the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation "On measures to stabilize the economy of the agro-industrial complex" of 4 April 1992, No 360, the government of the Russian Federation resolves:

1. As of 1 May 1992, to confirm subsidy rates for livestock production sold to state resources for all agricultural goods producers, in agreement with appendixes Nos 1-3.

Within a ten-day period, the Ministry of Agriculture of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Economics of the Russian

Federation shall confirm and submit to the organizations involved the procedure for paying out these subsidies.

2. The Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation shall provide for allocations for the payment in 1992 of subsidies

for livestock production sold to state resources, keeping in mind the need to curtail budgetary expenditures for the importation of food.

[Signed] *First Deputy Chairman of the Russian Federation Government Ye. Gaydar*

Appendix No 1 to Resolution No 289 of the Russian Federation Government of 8 May 1992		Appendix No 2 to Resolution No 289 of the Russian Federation Government of 8 May 1992		Appendix No 3 to Resolution No 289 of the Russian Federation Government of 8 May 1992	
Subsidy rates for milk and dairy products (expressed in terms of milk) sold to state resources by agricultural goods producers		Subsidy rates for cattle and poultry, including meat products, sold to state resources by agricultural goods producers		Subsidy rates for eggs sold to state resources by agricultural goods producers	
(GOST 13264-70, GOST 13264-88)					
	Subsidy rates (rubles per metric ton of whole milk)		Subsidy rates (rubles per metric ton of live weight)		Subsidy rates (rubles per 1000 units)
Zone I—Rayons of the Far North and locales equivalent to rayons of the Far North	5000	Zone I—Rayons of the Far North and locales equivalent to rayons of the Far North	15,000	Zone I—Rayons of the Far North and locales equivalent to rayons of the Far North	500
Zone II—Remaining oblasts, krais, and republics within the Russian Federation (besides the rayons of the Far North and locales equivalent to rayons of the Far North)	2300	Zone II—Remaining oblasts, krais, and republics within the Russian Federation (besides the rayons of the Far North and locales equivalent to rayons of the Far North)	7000	Zone II—Remaining oblasts, krais, and republics within the Russian Federation (besides the rayons of the Far North and locales equivalent to rayons of the Far North)	100
Note: For milk intended for processing as children's food, subsidy rates shall increase by 30 percent		Note: Payment of subsidies for meat products shall be made in terms of live weight of cattle and poultry. For a metric ton of live weight of pedigree young cattle, sheep and goats, hogs, horses, and poultry and for raw materials for the production of children's food the size of the subsidies shall increase by 30 percent.			

Weekly to Cover Agricultural Exchanges

924C1496A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
15 May 92 p 5

[Article by ITAR-TASS correspondent: "New Weekly"]

[Text] A unique opportunity—the course and results of deals in all of the agroindustrial complex's exchanges—will be offered to executives and specialists of agroindustrial enterprises, consumers' cooperatives, and exchange structures by a new weekly commercial information newsletter.

It will be published by ITAR-TASS, the Information Telegraph Agency of Russia, in conjunction with the republic Agroindustrial Complex Commodity Exchange, the Moscow International Agroindustrial Exchange, and the Russian Ministry of Agriculture. The newsletter will carry up-to-date information on the goods offered for sale in the major agroindustrial complex exchanges and the results of exchange deals, and information on the buying, selling and exchange of machinery and equipment, fuel and lubricants, building materials, mixed feed, fertilizer, seeds and other goods.

Specialists with the Russian Ministry of Agriculture and other state structures will prepare information on the prices of agricultural products in all regions of the republic, the CIS and abroad, and forecasts of the development of exchange trade and of prices for agricultural products.

Explanations of key government documents on agricultural matters, and news of Russian and foreign agricultural science will also be published.

Executives of agricultural enterprises will be able to place advertisements and announcements in the newsletter at low prices.

The subscription cost of the newsletter for the second half of 1992, taking the value-added tax into account, is 1,400 rubles. A quarterly subscription for R700 is also possible.

Preferential subscriptions will be taken until July 1992. Account No. 609970 in the Operational Administration of the Moscow Business Bank, interbranch turnover, 299093. Copy of draft to be sent to the address: 103009, Moscow, Tver Boulevard, 10/12, ITAR-TASS, AMI, Room 715. Telephone numbers for information: 290-42-39, 291-80-82; FAX:203-23-78.

Increased Drug Trade Expected, Antidrug Campaign Urged

92WD0671A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 7 May 92 p 6

[Article by Aleksandr Barinov under the "Expert Analysis" rubric: "The Russian Drug Trade Is Following a Beaten Path, and Experts Think We Should Use Well-Tested Methods To Fight It"]

[Text] The latest estimates by experts assert that some 5.5 to 7.5 million people are presently using narcotics on the territory of the former USSR. At the beginning of 1991 this figure was only 1.5 million. Experts think that drug abuse will continue its precipitous spread for the next five to seven years, until our social and economic situation becomes more or less stable. Drug usage will peak, according to the experts, in about two or three years. The number of drug addicts in Russia at that time is estimated at several tens of millions.

In the opinion of Valentin Roshchin, head of the Moscow Board for Combating Drug Trade (BBN), Russia is now following along the classic road taken by drug abuse in North America and Europe. The only difference is in the tempo: we are doing in years what other countries did in decades. Our government has practically no time left for pondering or experiments in fighting this evil. World practice has shown that drug dealing has to be counterbalanced at every stage by a certain level of development in the structures that oppose it. Otherwise, it will inevitably get out of control and try to take over the government power itself, as happened in Latin America and Southeast Asia.

Our domestic drug trade is completing the first stage of its development; this means that marijuana smoking has acquired mass proportions. This drug is available to anyone in Russia. The powerful marijuana trade network is functioning basically through markets and military construction units, which allows it to provide an uninterrupted supply of the drug to any part of the country.

Since early 1992, says V. Roshchin, a shift to the second stage has become evident in Moscow. It can be characterized by a larger variety of drugs, mass consumption of synthetic stimulants (the amphetamine group), more complex narcotics of vegetative origin, such as opium, and the appearance of cocaine and heroin on the market. Previously, a "new" drug used to appear on the Soviet market once every five to 10 years on average, but now three powerful stimulants at once have spread in Moscow alone in three months of this year. In September 1991, for the first time, BBN officers in Moscow confiscated from a Soviet drug dealer some cocaine, analysis of which proved its South American origin. The share of marijuana in the total amount of confiscated drugs is declining slowly but surely (it used to be about 95 percent) but the proportion of synthetic drugs is increasing. The production of those drugs is becoming better organized. Last year several underground laboratories were discovered in Moscow and Leningrad, which were making phenamine, a most powerful drug, and using state-of-the-art equipment to do so. It is typical that professional chemists are becoming more and more involved in drug production.

Drug Abuse—A Free Personal Choice or a Crime?

It is common knowledge that some members of the Russian parliament and radical civil rights groups refer to the experience of Western democracies, the United States, Europe, and, in particular, Holland, in their efforts to legalize drug use. Many people in our country think that drugs are legally allowed in those countries, that they are readily available and their use is considered a free personal choice. Their efforts have been rather successful. Last year, the Russian Supreme Soviet eliminated legal punishment for repeated nonmedical consumption of drugs; serious debates are being conducted now about the article dealing with punishment for drug possession in the draft new Russian Federation criminal code. For this reason it might be helpful to look at the foreign experience in more detail.

The ways in which the countries of the entire world handle drug abuse may be described in three categories. The first, the "right wing" one, employs the most severe measures, right up to capital punishment. This group includes Iran, Pakistan, and Malaysia. Second, "the left wing" one, shows the most democratic attitude toward drug abuse. This is the group that includes Holland. But contrary to the opinion existing in Russia, drugs have not been fully legalized there either. They only allow the so-called "soft" drugs, those that do not produce a strong effect and are not quickly addictive. (If marijuana is used constantly, for instance, it would take two to three years to become addicted to it.) The choice of such drugs is restricted by law. But the government has rigid control over "hard" drugs (heroin, cocaine, opium, LSD, etc.) and it metes out rather severe punishment for their possession and trade.

Both these groups are rather small and present the two extremes in world practice of dealing with drug abuse. Most of the countries stay in the middle, as they exercise strict control over all drugs but avoid resorting to draconian measures. Even the United States, a country most ardent in its fight for human rights and freedoms, for instance, punishes people in most of its states for attempted purchase of drugs, besides possession and consumption of them. Democratic England and France sentence their drug addicts in courts to mandatory treatment. It must be mentioned here that this "median" group has obviously shifted to the right also.

Drugs became partially legalized in Holland in the 1950's, an action that was caused primarily by the existing situation and not by a fight for human rights. Historically, "soft" drugs and mostly marijuana spread in this country just as tobacco did; they can be forbidden only after almost half of all adults in the country are put in jail. Holland is a small country in itself (which makes the fight against drug trade and crime in general much easier), and it does not have its own "natural resources" for drugs and their production. Besides, a government that would choose such a model must have very powerful charitable resources with respect to drug addicts. Lack of free syringes and shortages of "medicinal" narcotics will cause an immense growth in crime and the spread of AIDS. However, the Dutch system, which has all these conditions present, also has one important problem: It does not make any allowance for tolerance or the permanent

need of the drug addict to increase his dose. This is the very fact which causes the illegal drug trade and crime to grow in spite of everything. Spain is the most obvious example of this. In 1985 its government followed the example of Holland. As a result, the number of registered drug addicts alone jumped from 200,000 to 1.5 million and the Pyrenean peninsula has become a major transshipment point for the European drug trade.

Narco-Union Instead of the Soviet Union

In the late 1980's, MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] experts were rather skeptical about the existence of a more or less organized drug trade in the USSR. At that particular time, they thought, comparatively small separate groups were producing and selling drugs; sometimes it was just individuals acting without any definite plans and at their own peril. During the last two or three years our domestic drug trade has acquired quite definite features and has assumed its own place in the world of organized crime. According to experts, this narco-business is developing along the lines of a traditional "civilized" model. Almost all the drugs sold in central and northern Russia are brought in, essentially smuggled from Central Asia and Transcaucasia. Most drug dealers are current or former citizens of the same republics. For instance, over 80 percent of all drug pushers arrested in Moscow are not local residents.

Our domestic drug mafia has three components to its structure, making up the classic mafia pyramid. The first component, its foundation, is made up of "retail" sellers. The second component is small wholesale traders and carriers, with "combat" units for the protection of goods in transit and of sellers at locations. The lower part of the pyramid also includes the rank-and-file collectors of raw materials, producers, and production organizers. The third, top part of the structure is composed of the organizers, who do not handle the drugs themselves but are involved in money "laundering." According to Valentin Roshchin, the first group can be totally controlled, at least in Moscow, if drug trade prevention units function normally. The second group can be approximately three quarters controlled, because of its constant mobility and higher secrecy. But the top of the pyramid is practically unreachable at present, even though detectives have sufficient information about it. The drug mafia "brain centers" and their main production bases, which are functioning on a near industrial level, are active on the territories of other CIS countries, mostly Azerbaijan and Turkmenia, and, to a certain extent, Kirghizia and Ukraine. Residents of those republics also constitute the majority of the rank-and-file "soldiers." Eighty percent of all drug pushers arrested in Moscow come from Azerbaijan. It might be interesting to mention that the MVD of this sovereign state has meanwhile stopped not only its cooperation but also all its contacts with the Moscow militia. The Moscow Board for Combating the Drug Trade sends inquiries to this state; they are accompanied by lists of Azerbaijani drug pushers detained in Moscow for drug dealing, but it has received no response to them for the last six months.

The territory of Russia and of Moscow is divided at present among three large "cartels." They co-exist rather peacefully,

as each of them has large potential markets for its goods. But experts think that this quiet will not last for long. The drug trade has risen to a firm top place according to the level of its "profitability," if one compares it to other organized crimes such as racketeering, bank or other fraud, etc. Experts estimate that every ruble [R] invested in the drug trade brings 1,000 rubles in profits, and that the money turnover occurs within a few weeks. It is crazy money, and the competition for it will be of the same kind. At present, the annual profits of our domestic drug dealers are close to R40 billion.

With this in mind, experts predict that the drug trade will continue to gain power within the nearest future and will finally take the leading place in Russian organized crime. Proof of this can be found in both world practice and in data on operations. According to Russian Federation MVD information, drugs are being used more and more often by criminals of various trades as a substitute for money in their deals in selling and supplying weapons, equipment, etc., right down to objects of art. It is not accidental that lately the most "sensational" crimes, seemingly not connected to drugs, have been solved by drug trade combating units. Here are some such cases that occurred in Moscow in the past year: The confiscation of two kilos of gold; the solving of a case of assault and burglary in the Sadoyskiys' apartment; the theft of some paintings by Saryan; the detention of a group of racketeers who had extorted a total of R0.5 billion.

Detectives do not exclude the possibility that a rather powerful "narcotics lobby" already exists in our higher echelons of power. The recent effort "to push" certain amendments to Article 224 of the RSFSR Criminal Code is seen by many people as evidence of the lobby's existence. Most people feel at the least puzzled by the painstaking attention that some legislators are paying to an ordinary article of the Criminal Code (especially just before a new code is to be adopted) at a time when much more important issues remain unresolved.

International Cooperation Will Bring Results

Practically no one doubts any more that our domestic drug trade will very soon start trying to enter the world market, and vice versa. Experts predict that this integration will occur rather quickly and, more important, relatively painlessly for both sides involved. Most probably it will assume the form of close contacts on the basis of mutually profitable "export and import" operations. This possibility is made particularly attractive by Russia's borders, which are practically open to smuggling, and also by the low efficiency in the work of its antidrug trade units. Unilateral efforts by Western countries in their attempt to withstand the Russian drug mafia cannot bring about noticeable results. According to experts, the mafia's cooperation with its Western colleagues will develop along two major routes. The first is mass supplies of "Soviet" marijuana to Europe and later the rest of the world. The CIS countries have no equal in the world in their supply of the "raw material"—hemp. Even Western experts think that the Russian "cartels" will have no problems in capturing the European "soft" drugs market because their present prices are hundreds of times lower than those set by "Western traders." This fact will ensure

the great competitiveness of their goods and gigantic profits. A kilo of hashish, for instance, now sells in Moscow for R3,000-4,000, while in Europe it can fetch \$30,000-40,000. Instances of such smuggling by Russians in spite of our "transparent" borders are no longer infrequent. Recently a foreigner, a citizen of Greece, was detained in Sheremetyevo for the first time as he was attempting to smuggle home half a kilo of Central Asian hashish. According to the Russian Federation MVD, most of our drugs are still going to nearby countries—Scandinavia, Germany, and the former socialist countries—and are gradually moving west.

The second route of integration is the import into Russia and the CIS countries of strong "traditional" drugs for which they do not have their own resources; these are such drugs as heroin, cocaine, some opium, LSD, etc. The demand for these drugs is already considerable. However, there is a serious obstacle to such "imports," and that is the unconvertible ruble. However, the "first swallow" has already arrived: In March, detectives detained in Moscow several dealers who had brought R1.5 million worth of opium from Afghanistan.

Experts also think that CIS citizens will become serious competitors for the "rank-and-file" members of foreign drug mafias. According to V. Roshchin, they already have some information that our compatriots are being used more and more often as "couriers" in drug shipments. Until recently, Nigerians were considered by almost the entire world as the main "professional" drug carriers. There is a simple explanation for this: Our people agree to take more risks for less money.

Experts think that after the ruble becomes convertible, another area will emerge in which our and foreign drug mafias will be able to cooperate, and that is money "laundering." Soviet legislation does not have any mechanisms, not even to mention structures, allowing the origin of money invested in any business to be traced. We can only assume that our drug dealers are already doing this successfully; in Moscow, for instance, about a third of all the people arrested for drug dealing are employed in the area of private enterprise.

Only the Government Can Conquer Drug Abuse

It is common knowledge that the concept of drug abuse combines two different social phenomena—drug addiction proper and drug trafficking. From a purely human point of view these two can be visualized as a group of criminals and a group of their victims. One group, drug users, are terminally ill people; the other, drug suppliers, are essentially their murderers. Until very recently the leaders of our country totally ignored this aspect, which caused the avalanche of drug abuse in Russia. Legally, both addicts and traffickers are considered criminals. We are still fighting against both groups using one and the same method, that of repressions. But it is absurd to think that cops and prisons may cure a drug addict. The demand for drugs will continue to exist, and it will determine their supply. No matter how efficient the war against drug dealing may be, the demand will always ensure its existence. This became an axiom long time ago in all developed countries. The main effort to

combat drug abuse in those countries is directed primarily at prevention, and is undertaken at the national level, especially among young people. (According to statistical data, the most "dangerous" age in this respect is 14 through 17.) The United States has allocated a record sum of \$12 billion from its federal budget to finance drug prevention programs in 1992.

V. Roshchin thinks that Russia at present, however, does not even have any more or less efficient structures for combating the drug trade, apart from not having even any semblance of a government program for drug abuse prevention. As a result of the MVD reorganization that has been going on, with short intervals, since 1983, such structures have to be formed practically from the very bottom. Three years ago, the USSR MVD decided to imitate the American system and set up a countrywide network of independent units, interregional departments for combating the drug mafia. A certain progress has been achieved for the first time. However, in the fall of 1991 these departments were handed over to the local criminal investigation administrations and, in V. Roshchin's opinion, this completely destroyed the units. Besides, traditional militia investigation methods cannot be employed against the drug mafia. Legally, this type of crime does not have a victim, and the work should lead from the criminal to the crime and not the other way round. As a result, almost half of all criminal cases in Russia dealing with drug possession are now being suspended due to lack of evidence. Only one out of 20 drug trafficking cases has sufficient evidence. Moscow is the only exception, because it managed to preserve such a unit, thanks to the efforts of its commanders and the Moscow Office of Criminal Investigation.

The other day the Russian Federation minister of internal affairs ordered the independent units for combating drug trade to be reformed. Another two or three years will be wasted, according to Roshchin, before they start functioning, establish their links, and provide special training to the new detectives.

Report On Rising Crime Rate, Few Solutions Seen

924C1458A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
 in Russian 13 May 92 p 2

[Article by V. Sanatin: "Authority Is Such That There Will Be Nothing To Steal: It Looks Like the New Administration in the Local Areas Is Powerless in the Struggle Against Crime"]

[Text] Yekaterinburg—Sverdlovsk Oblast has set an unfortunate record. For the first time in history the Ural people have moved into first place based on the increase in crime and the low level of its solving. The unrestrained criminal threatens not only one's personal life but also the region's economy as a whole. Many enterprises have shifted to single-shift working conditions at the request of defenseless workers.

The people of Yekaterinburg today are even afraid to go visiting. It is better to sit at home and watch pornography

and killings on cable television. One also does not pine to go to the store: the food counters are simply inaccessible to our puny purses.

The scandal concerning the humanitarian aid that the local oblast authorities distributed was the initial grounds for convincing one of their impotence. The authorities do not conceal the fact that they are trading with the beautiful items from the humanitarian airplanes and that everything is not getting to the disabled children and lonely pensioners. During a meeting with journalists, E. Rossel, the chief of the oblast's administration, expressed himself in the vein that the wearing of fashionable German clothing somehow does not become children in children's homes and other poor people. They say, it is better to sell the beautiful items and use the money for social security and charitable purposes.

After the mountains of humanitarian gifts, which had passed through the oblast "distributor," were converted into goods and passed to free sales, V. Demin, chief of the oblast's Internal Affairs Administration, "conducted up to 400 checks on the trail of the humanitarian aid" ... without finding a single criminal—to the joy of the oblast chief!

Today, everyone is asking in Yekaterinburg: Are the police, which had to inspect 400 times whether the charity was sold correctly, capable of fighting crime?

The new authorities differ from the old communist ones in that they are absolutely unconcerned about the prestige of state institutions that embody the ruler's morals, fairness and wisdom—even a propagandistic and proclaimed wisdom! Everyone remembers morals and the law when he is cheated. How could the opposition trump when the "governor" tried to privatize an 80-square-meter apartment for 5,000 rubles? The radicals sounded the alarm—and the price of the "governor's" apartment jumped to 38,000. Rossel, having studied in the performance of his official duties the oblast and city principles for privatizing housing and not having previously expressed public dissatisfaction, is now indignant and openly talks about the need to transfer housing without payment or privatize for a symbolic payment. True, along with the apartment which he wants to privatize, the oblast head is building a multi-storied private residence in the suburbs. His fellow Ural countrymen cannot determine its cost in rubles and that is why they are calculating it in hard currency. The "governor's" range is estimated sometimes at 1 million and sometimes at 8 million German marks—how much amazement and fantasy is enough for someone?

Russia's Sverdlovsk Oblast had 80,000 crimes last year—75 cases for each investigative worker; 90 percent of them were mercenary crimes in one way or another!

Oh, this self-interest! Even in olden days, not a single cassocked governor was able to cope with this old lecherous strumpet. Now, the "governor" should stamp his foot and put an end to every rayon willfulness—even in privatization! It cannot be....

With a visible strict vertical line from Yeltsin to the mayor of the taiga's Tmutarakhansk, authority in Russia is quite

different: It is multi-layered like a Swiss roll. However, a sour old jam, which every second strives to climb out, stains everything around it and does not occupy its own niche, has been dropped here and there into the new dough. Instead of a system of management, a system of mutual restraint, mutual concessions and mutual anointing was born. It was necessary to divide spheres of influence: Whereas the oblast "observes and assists" trade in metal and lumber—as a rule, hard currency trade, the city must do it for "wooden" currency and push the citizens' own housing—already long ago earned from the state—onto them at a higher price.

Today, each one governs and trades in "his own territory" as he takes it into his head and it is impossible to straighten him out! The system has been oriented so that it is possible to ask something from each other endlessly, extort and wrest from one's hands without producing anything new in all the wide world. It is not difficult to understand how much the criminal world, which is mutually envious, mutually extorting and mutually restraining, is copying this "management" structure.

It is against this background that the struggle of the already combined left and right radicals and centrists against the latter-day "comprador bourgeoisie" is flaring up. As much as this struggle is a patriotic and noble one, it is also a ridiculous and unpromising one. Communists are against communists. Those lost are against those returned. Acquaintances detest each other to their heart's content from childhood. Is this not stupid?

"Governor" Rossel is tired of explaining that he cannot issue an independent law about giving weapons for self-defense to workers in round-the-clock production facilities and to oblast council deputies.

One can only sympathize with the oblast chief. One cannot entrust the battle against crime to casual persons—take stern measures without getting off one's hands. There is no instrument with which one can operate the lower stratum of authority without soiling one's self from head to toe in the old jam and without hurting oneself.

Open and concealed unemployment is providing cadres for the Ural criminal world. Concealed unemployment occurs when one pays a scientific research institute worker 342 rubles a month—a sum which cannot be called even an allowance. Ural heavy industry and the science connected with it have turned out to be more than the puff-pastry Russian authorities can afford. Based on the administration's admission, 34 powerful enterprises, which previously worked in the military industrial complex, have been left to the mercy of fate in the oblast. Moscow is allocating only up to 23 billion rubles of the 40 billion necessary to the on-budget organizations of Sverdlovsk Oblast. Tomorrow, there will be nothing with which to pay teachers, doctors and those same millionaires.

During Gorbachev's time, I criticized Rossel for attempting to deal in Tagil tanks. I am now even convinced that the head provincials, who have no business savvy, would sell first-class Ural tanks dirt cheap as scrap metal. However, if Russia does not maintain the competitive part of the military industrial complex and does not learn to trade in

Ural weapons today for the benefit of the national treasury... we will all be on the street and will grab each other by the throat, tearing the protective Moscow ruble into pieces. We have no other industry!

Also, one cannot fail to remember the radical opposition that startled Yekaterinburg with a thunderous call: "All power to the workers and army committees!" The opposition also pointed out that the reformers are not capable of laying the foundation itself of the reforms—a civilian-based industry. It was for this purpose that the oblast was given a general license in 1990, which permitted it to freely sell five percent of the products produced. This represents more than 2 billion hard dollars! It was proposed that equipment and production processes for food processing enterprises, agriculture, construction,... be purchased for 190 million foreign currency rubles after all the trading operations at home and abroad. Where are they? The new work positions! The alternative for the criminal world's "school-leavers!" The exceptionally resourceful and profitable production facilities. Wages at a high level. Where are they? For two years, we have been asking Mr. Rossel: Have the oblast's responsible people squandered or lost these financial opportunities? There hasn't been any frank or comforting reply.

The former sculptors of cruise missiles would take private residences for themselves. Here is an example: Yevgeniy Korolev, an oblast deputy who at one time headed the organizational committee of the famous Sverdlovsk MzhK [Youth Housing Complex], dreams of this. Previously, he stated: "Apartments for all—including youth!" The youth had a goal in the cities—their own housing. And they could choose: Hang about the streets or pick up a trowel. Korolev is now organizing the Rifey enterprise. Again he says: "Cottages for everyone—including mere mortals." There is no land for Rifey.

In the densely populated Germany that our reformers love so much, it is not obligatory to build a country-house—one can purchase a new one. We travel and we learn, but what is the use? Our people are still doomed to be thieves. Everything in succession: brick, lumber, metal, equipment, land.... Everything that the authorities have kept in their monopoly hands and are afraid to transfer to the disposal of the free companies of a free market. And yes, the authorities themselves are poor and nominal ones. They have not been able to attract the interest of partners who actually have the wood, metal and land at their disposal.

We ourselves have also confronted the people with a dilemma: "Who does not steal, does not eat." Is this not stupid: In industrially lop-sided Sverdlovsk Oblast which is not capable of feeding itself, land service is absolutely undeveloped and there is not a single mechanized commercial or state enterprise which will prepare the land for kitchen-gardens, gardens and those same cottages! Even on the peatbogs and swamps without taking the meager arable land away from the sovkhozes. However, not with an axe, crowbar and shovel in one's hands as our hungry people, who have been left to the mercy of fate, do.

One of the most heinous, inhumane and inexplicable crimes in the oblast today is the encroachment on private property.

The trade outlets of entrepreneurs are burning by the dozens and, next, the garden huts and dachas which they did not manage to open and rob. These are not always mutual accounts. More frequently, they are juveniles, Timur and his band. The great grandsons and grandsons of those who worked hard on a kolkhoz for zero work days or riveted tanks in Uralmash for a front ration of bread—yes, and without having created any basis for the survival of their families' future generations, not to mention equal opportunities.

The village will still leave a criminal at our door! Today, the spring of 1992, the situation in the oblast's rural area is this: There is no seed for the sowing... there is nothing to throw onto the land! How can one dream of new tractors, arable land, the construction of farm facilities, credits, plows, mowing-machines, and threshing-machines for those who leave a sovkhoz with a share of land.

As a result, the half-educated schoolboy gets a place in a line with a well dressed lady. Medical students from the second course begin to understand that robbery and brigandage are more profitable than imitating Hippocrates... only 30 percent of apartment thefts are solved in Yekaterinburg!

There are houses and streets where apartments are robbed at the entrances and totally as if according to a schedule. The impression arises that the "cleaning-out" schedules are hanging in front of the rayon OVD [Internal Affairs Department] men on duty so that the patrol vehicles do not rustle nearby at the necessary moment and do not interfere with the ripping of the pillow! The things are sold to second-hand dealers whose addresses all the riffraff know—however not the police!

The intellectual layer of society has left for business. The personnel, who now staff UGRO [not further identified], evoke a very pitiful feeling. When they suggest to you that you repudiate your statement and raise the word "signature" with difficulty on the repudiated story, you, of course, refuse the services of such a "Holmes."

Is there some way out?

There is. It does not at all lie in platitudes about a shake-up of the police leadership. The way out lies in the strict legal accounting of lower authorities to higher ones. This impresses the criminal nature and directly helps local authorities infinitely. It is ridiculous to call for Khasbulatov to adopt a "moral code for the builder of capitalism" during the next session of Russia's Supreme Soviet. It is ridiculous to restrain local economic initiatives... however, a mechanism for moral and legal monitoring according to vertical authority lines should be re-established!

The criminal nature untwists in the area of economics and natural wealth and around this area. I positively do not understand what is preventing us from establishing an economic police force—at the juncture of KGB interests and the common citizen's interests. Should subunits, capable of restraining corruption and venality stand guard over national state property?

I also do not understand what is preventing us from adopting a severe law "On the Inviolability of Private

Property?" so that the small-time brainless criminal will at least understand the way that lies ahead: He has broken the seal of somebody else's garden hut—he has immediately broken the seal of a "gold coin." He has taken a hut with robbery—15! You see, we are beginning to consider how many times a young lad has violated the law: once, twice, ten.... until we raise a professional.

The authorities, the opposition and crime are today sharing a place under the sun in an undoubtedly rich and hopelessly impoverished Sverdlovsk Oblast. Who will win? Posters: "Yeltsin, remove Rossel!" are thrown out during meetings without a doubt.

When doing this, do the radicals understand or not understand that the entire Russian administration is involved in a tight and firmly gripping Ural plaster cast from which it is impossible to extract Rossel without braking the entire sculptured group? They understand that the war is being deliberately waged to retirement.

The happy country life of a "governor" under the protection of attached police can somehow still take place. For god's sake! However, against the background of the general social impasse, lack of arable land, shortage of money, and hopelessness, this will be a strange life—the life of a respectable "governor" in a ravaged province.

Previously Unpublished Documents Reveal Persecution of Church

924C1489A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 16 May 92 p 4

[Article by Doctor of Historical Sciences Mikhail Byltan: "Cursed Days"]

[Text] At the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of Russian History a group on the history of religion and the church under the direction of Ya. N. Shchapov, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, has begun preparing a collection of documents that pertain to the subject of the history of the Orthodox Church and, for the most part, are being published for the first time.

It is no accident that one of the Bolsheviks' main blows was directed against the Russian Orthodox Church. The idea of goodness expressed in Christian teaching was an obstacle in the path toward a totalitarian regime.

Documents that were previously kept deeply hidden and that enable us to better understand the "most humane human being" have recently been made public. He himself personally called for, demanded and ordered the summary execution, in the name of revolutionary expediency, of as many totally innocent priests as possible. In a 19 March 1922 letter for the members of the Politburo of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), V.I. Lenin wrote: "I am reaching the unconditional conclusion that it is precisely now that we must give the most determined and ruthless battle to the Black Hundreds clergy and suppress its resistance with such cruelty that they will not forget it for several decades."

And what were the actions of the chairman of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counterrevolution and Sabotage, whose official duties required him to liquidate the enemies of the revolution? He insisted on including the church in his "diocese." Church affairs started to be handled by a special department of the State Political Administration that Ye. Tuchkov was assigned to head.

"Militant atheists" staged outright lynchings of priests. Metropolitan Vladimir of Kiev was mutilated, stripped and shot. Bishop Germogen of Tobolsk, who had once been exiled by the tsar, was, for his attempt to free that same tsar from exile, tied alive to the wheel of a steamship and shredded by the blades. Archbishop Androniya of Perm, who was renowned for his missionary work in Japan, was buried alive. Archbishop Vasilii of Chernigov, who went to Perm to investigate that killing, was captured while leaving Perm and shot. In just eight months (from June 1918 to January 1919), according to the information of the TOBOLSKIYE EPARKHIALNYYE VEDOMOSTI [TOBOLSK DIOCESAN NEWS], 19 archbishops, including one metropolitan, 102 priests, 154 deacons, and 94 monks and nuns were killed. By the beginning of 1923, the total number of victims among the Russian clergy had reached 8,000.

The scope of the repressions that befell the church can also be judged by the following information, collected and generalized by O.Yu. Vasilyeva. The number of Orthodox believers in Russia before the revolution was 117 million, or about 72 percent of the total population. The Russian Orthodox Church had 67 dioceses and 48,000 parishes, in which there were 89,792 churches, 1,025 monasteries and nunneries (94,829 monks and nuns), 35,000 elementary schools, 185 diocesan academies, 57 seminaries, 4 theological academies and 34,497 libraries. The number of priests exceeded 50,000. Of them, 180 bishops belonged to the top church hierarchy. By 1921, 600 monasteries, which were of both historical and cultural value, had already been closed. Both modest peasant chapels, cut by axe, and the best creations of the masters of classical architecture were being destroyed. Bells, which had always been known in Rus as the "tsar's voices," were being torn down. As of 1928 (by the calculations of Prof P.V. Gudilyanova), the total weight of the bells that were being readied for removal came to more than 2 million poods. And how many precious church valuables had been confiscated! The vandals' revelry continued in subsequent years. From 1930 through 1934 the number of churches declined by 30 percent.

In April 1937 a "counterrevolutionary" group of believers led by the priest Garanovich was arrested in Omsk. The falsified charges stated that "they had been nurturing hope for the victory of the Bukharinites and Rykovites. But the Bukharinites and Rykovites were exposed and routed, and the priest Garanovich decided to act without waiting for Bukharin and Rykov to help."

So how many of its priests did the Russian Orthodox Church lose over the years of terror? Foreign scholars believe that from October 1917 through the beginning of 1940 about 42,000 priests were physically destroyed in the USSR.

According to the figures, as of 1939 only two metropolitans and two bishops of the top clergy remained, whereas there had been 180 of them in 1917. As of June 1940, the Russian Orthodox Church had only 4,225 operating churches left, of which 3,000 were in the western oblasts and republics that had become part of the USSR in 1939-1940, where the Bolsheviks simply had not had time to really get their operations going.

Cinematography Minister on Goals, Censorship Issues

924C1466A Moscow *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA*
in Russian No 20, 13 May 92 p 8

[Interview with Armen Medvedev, Russia's cinematography minister, by Marina Drozdovaya, *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA* correspondent; date and place not given: "Our Committee Is a Cinematographers' Lobby Attached to the Government"]

[Text]

[Drozdovaya] So, the State Committee for Cinematography lives after death? The new structure—the Committee for Cinematography which is attached to Russia's government and which you head—evidently is something like its legal successor?

[Medvedev] First of all, it is a prestigious governmental structure. The monopoly on all types of activity in this area was included in the Goskino [State Committee for Cinematography] abbreviation; our committee is the cinematographers' lobby attached to the government. We are required so that their voices will be heard more quickly.

The voices are different. Here is a letter for you from the permanent commission on culture, education, spiritual and moral enlightenment of society and—at the same time—charity: "A wave of low-standard films with scenes of cruelty and violence is overwhelming the screens of our movie theaters and video centers. Films with a pornographic content, for example, like 'Empire of the Senses,' have appeared. Quite a bit of credit for the spread of cynicism, triteness, cruelty, and depravity belongs to the Council of Ministers' State Committee for Cinematography, which purchases films abroad. The Commission for Culture of Irkutsk Oblast's Council of People's Deputies is demanding a halt to the immoral expenditure of the people's assets on the seduction of those same people." A symptomatic paper. On the one hand, the comrade, who signed it, thinks that national assets were spent on "Empire of the Senses" if one has taxpayer deductions in mind under them. More than 200 organizations, which have sufficient economic freedom to buy what they want, are operating on Russia's territory. On the other hand, a serious problem is being established here but the old administrative method of combat—by the mouths of the new ones chosen by the people: Stop—and that is all; do not spend the people's money—and that is all!—is being suggested at the same time.

Previously, such a rebuke addressed to Goskino was a lawful and competent one. Now, however, our work is to develop civilized rules of the game, legislative acts, and government

documents which would regulate cinematographic life. I do not believe that one can now somehow put out a covering force against the penetration of bad taste into the movies or, conversely, attract something bright to them using administrative measures. It is necessary to point out that the cinematography model in the production area, which the Fifth Congress of the Cinematographers' Union suggested, has worked—independent studios, and so forth, have appeared. In the rental field, however, there are pirate market elements. According to the estimates of specialists, shady rentals receive an income approximately threefold-fourfold more than the state network. It is no sin to attract part of this money to the state sector by means of state duties and a flexible tax system in order to support our native cinema.

[Drozdovaya] If we are to talk about strategy, do you count more on the American model—cinema as a business—or the European path of state investments?

[Medvedev] Strategy is a good thing but I would not want to be like Gogol's bride who expects to take eyes from there, a nose from there, and a forehead from there. The American system is alluring. However, it exists in a very rich and adjusted world where the entire problem of cinema's support and management is completely self-regulated. For example, the association of film industry workers is the analog in the United States to our committee. It is also a lobby but one directly hired by the film industry workers. I see an advantage in this. If a lobby exists, it should work directly for those who have hired it. Extremely competent people work in the American association. Its head is Jack Valenti, a big man close to the White House. The film industry workers hired him under very prestigious conditions of complete trust. However, the answer to the question: "To whom does he belong?" is a simple one.

[Drozdovaya] Why have our film industry workers not traveled this path?

[Medvedev] Perhaps because of poverty. In addition, you see, we are just now building a law-governed state. Today, the solution of many questions depends as before on the independence and initiative of government agencies. You will remember the pomp with which the association of independent film and video film rentals, the legendary ASKIN [not further identified] and others having the word—"association"—in their signature stamp were established. However, the atavism of a desire to unite in order to produce something together was contained in its use and, as a rule, these associations were transformed into local production enterprises. Such a force, which could gather collective opinions together and defend mutual interests, essentially does not now exist on the territory of our cinema. Possibly when the film business is richer and legislation is more precise, the committee can be transformed into such an association—or it will be abolished and one will arise to replace it.

I repeat, many details in the American model are attractive, in particular, the tactic of achieving a market; it is evident, however, that we should nevertheless orient ourselves

toward the European model, in particular, its French version. France, incidentally, is one of the few countries that has been able to preserve a domestic film industry. The task lay in a wise tax system. For example, the director of a movie theater should select what it is more profitable for him to show: a domestic film that fills 25 percent of the hall but the tax on the gathering is 10 percent or a Western film during which 65 percent of the seats will be filled but the tax increases to 50 percent.

Or, for example, a movie theater is a subject of business and a cultural object. Now, it deals with the cause of pure business and, according to municipal payments, is on the same footing as hothouses and exchanges for some reason: Its municipal expenditures are threefold more than those for any other cultural department institution.

[Drozdovaya] Will a system of state investments in the film industry be established?

[Medvedev] After the fifth congress, we were carried away by the words "cost accounting," "self-financing," etc. It is now understood that cinematography, despite all its commercial ambitions, cannot live without state benefits, privileges and direct support, especially under the conditions of our market. Otherwise, it will be a cinema that will knock down money by any available means. Our investments will depend on how much the government budget allocates to it.

Experiments in establishing state agencies for managing the cinema have been underway since the Thirties. At one time, the cinema was even subordinate to the People's Commissariat for Light Industry. In the Twenties during NEP [New Economic Policy], the Sovkino joint-stock company existed. The most important government organizations: People's Commissariat for Finances and Gosplan [State Planning Committee], joined it with powerful capital. Over the course of five years, Pudovkin's films appeared from Mezhrabpom-Rus, and Eisenstein's and Dovzhenko's pictures—from state enterprises. There was real competition between the state and private sectors and there were results. Now, we have a continuation of the experiments in state management—however, at a different stage in the development of a state system.

[Drozdovaya] In my opinion, the cinema has existed during recent years at the expense of so-called free or laundered money.

[Medvedev] I would not interpret this simply. A cynical computation of the laundering of money could be present here—and the romance of participating in the establishment of an artistic production—or the illusion that the cinema is the easiest way to multiply one's money. Before long, perhaps, such a stream will not exist—the more so since it was stimulated by the fact that a film was relatively cheaper even three-four years ago. However, the investment of money in projects, which deserve it, will be stricter, more rational and, therefore, more abundant. Many small cinema structures, will suffocate and choke.

[Drozdovaya] Can you comment on the circle of scandals which surrounds our cinema, for example, the "division"

between the Union of Cinematographers and the Cinematographic Center which intends to become an open-type joint-stock company?

[Medvedev] Yes, one must now clarify one's position regarding ownership. For example, they tell me that some studio wants to issue stock. Good. However, it has received its funds from the state and they allowed it to make arrangements for state property. Issue stock but, for God's sake, return to the state that which you took from it and that which you gained. Let us investigate the question strictly. The union—the Cinematographic Center? I started work in the Bureau of Cinematographic Art Propaganda—the Cinematographic Center got its start from it. It was a creative organization but until recently relations were built on absolutely voluntaristic principles on the part of the Union and at some time they became unprofitable for the Cinematographic Center. I think the fact that the union wants to maintain its influence on the Cinematographic Center, its child from the beginning, is at the basis of the scandal. The Cinematographic Center wants to become a joint-stock company of the open type. The one whose ambitions are more accurate regarding today's jurisdiction will be correct. A decision may come only from arbitration.

[Drozdovaya] What determines your absolute authority?

[Medvedev] Legislation. When they turn to me regarding conflict situations in the cinema environment, I say: Let us look at the law, lads. Administrative authority was developed in the era of the state-party system. They now forget this and ask me: Why can't you issue instructions apropos some movie theater? Yes, according to the law, movie theaters have always been subordinate to local councils but since a unified party structure was in effect, one could reach any enterprise, including cinema studios and movie halls through a central committee, gorkom [city party committee] and raykom [rayon party committee].

[Drozdovaya] Are you guided in your work by your personal movie tastes?

[Medvedev] Perhaps the fact that I have very many likings and personal attachments for the cinema—37 years have passed since I entered the cinematographic institute—hampers me. However, I want to install Committee for Cinematography work principles that would exclude the possibility of influence from these predilections. A competition system should be included in everything that concerns state support.

[Drozdovaya] This will be legislatively confirmed?

[Medvedev] A presidential ukase on corruption, which will define that a state employer—regardless of whether he works in the movies or in ferrous metallurgy—will not be able to use his influence for subjectively mercenary purposes, is sufficient for this.

[Drozdovaya] Are you among those people who survived during all the last Soviet regimes at approximately the same level?

[Medvedev] Well, I first became a cinema bureaucrat in the fall of 1984 on the eve of perestroika. Before that, I was not

summoned by the system. Therefore, my career has taken shape during the last seven years. However, I can say that I have never been a radical in a political situation; I perform my work regardless of swings in administrative regimes. Possibly that is why there is nothing to discredit me in the the new leadership's eyes. I have always thought that I became a government worker to help my work.

[Drozdovaya] They have called you a liberal boss.

[Medvedev] My relatively small connection with the system guarded me against incorrect steps and evil deeds. I have seen the fall and rebirth of people who began to advance under the flag of the system: we are for it or we will die—or, most likely, we will kill someone. Fortunately, I have never had this feeling.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Former Obkom Secretaries Predominate in Positions of Power

924C1465A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 13 May 92 p 4

[Article by political scientist Boris Kudashkin under the "Starting Point" rubric: "'Foxes in Chicken Coops' and the Russian Tontons Macoutes"]

[Text] It has become clear by now: During the feverish post-putsch acceleration, President Boris Yeltsin banned the CPSU by a decree, but it did not "ban itself"; instead, it instantaneously sublimated to newer forms of reformative power and economic domination. The only damage that it suffered was its loss of the party aura as the bearer of all that is best and brightest for all time. The CPSU big wigs and troubadours used to denounce the mercantilistic spirit and to label any healthy interest in money as greediness or the stifling power of cash as they lauded unpaid labor for the benefit of the public; at the time of the August defeat, however, the party leaders were the fastest to flit into the recesses of business. The partocrats of yesterday changed overnight into the presidents of associations, companies, and concerns, or into joint venture managers.

For instance, Aleksey Ponomarev, first secretary of the Belgorod CPSU Obkom [oblast committee], is known today as the organizer of the sugar exchange. But this is criminal from an ethical point of view. Such major figures as top obkom officials or Central Committee members should be the first to go on the cross for the sake of their holy cause. This is what the propagandists of Marxism and Leninism always called upon the rank and file members to do.

Having been fooled, they now see their apostles in a new light, as people who can trade and administrate and who have again set themselves up nicely. The corps of the oblast, city, and rayon top administrators is especially interesting in this respect. The press has already published these amazing figures: From 70 to 90 percent of the top administrators are former chairmen of oblast, city, and rayon ispolkoms [executive committees] and soviets; previous to that they were secretaries and department heads of oblast, city, and rayon CPSU committees. Who are they? Turncoats! as PRAVDA

liked to say in its hour of glory. Now, together with "Yeltsin's team" or rather, within it, they are "building capitalism," the capitalism that they have been tirelessly cursing for decades.

Why have former communist leaders chosen the "dismantling of socialism" area as their "main job"? What is behind this? Is it too big an effort for them to part with the boss's chair? If that is the case, then the plain Russian language has a good expression for it: "He sold his friendship for junk." In reality, the "magnetism" of being at the political helm has proven stronger in many cases. But it is not for personal considerations alone. "We need to go to them. We need to take our place at the helm and subtly brake to slow down any 'sliding' into capitalism," reason former obkom officials. "And then 'our people' will show up..."

They mean that the lumpens "will mature" to the point of instinctive rebellion caused by the strenuousness of their entry into the market economy. This is not a fantasy. Recently I went to Belgorod Oblast as a commission member from the Control Department of the administration of the president of the Russian Federation. In some incomprehensible way, V. Berestovoy, the former second secretary of the CPSU obkom, has remained the top executive there.

The insistence he displayed in his struggle to become "governor" and his readiness to change his colors instantaneously for the sake of "a place by the helm" are typical of many people who are in power now. On 24 August, the day when the CPSU legally ceased to exist, V. Berestovoy declared to the party meeting in this home village of Alekseyevka that he was leaving the CPSU. He showed some foresight by adding that he might return to the party after it was "purified." The maneuver did not deceive any true supporters of renewal, however. In September, over 500 telegrams and a petition signed by 20,000 people were sent to President Boris Yeltsin. All of them were directed against the top four leaders who had failed to disassociate themselves clearly and distinctly from the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency] at the decisive moment. V. Berestovoy was one the four. But all of this remained a voice crying in the wilderness. In December of 1991 he became the top executive.

What then? Without wasting time, with a steady obkom hand, he placed in the chairs of rayon and city administration heads 74 percent of his former communist colleagues—first secretaries, secretaries, and CPSU department heads. The same percentage of former obkom employees were assembled by him into his immediate staff.

The results were not long in coming. Reforms in the oblast are weakening. Peasants go through torments to become farmers as they fight the resistance of "previous people" from the nomenklatura who occupy top positions in agriculture. Having grabbed onto a proviso from Moscow, Berestovoy raised to almost 80 percent the number of kolkhozes and sovkhoses that are "not to be reformed." A. Ponomarev, the former CPSU obkom first secretary, is prorector for science and research at the Agricultural Institute, and he uses the institute premises to conduct seminars

where the supporters of the past are learning how to slow down the reform while presenting their actions as reformers' deeds.

Inspired by such "spiritual" support from the oblast center, kolkhoz chairmen and sovkhoz managers have set up a true "front for the salvation of kolkhoz and cooperative structures." Many tricks are being used there. They seem to be giving away plots to villagers, but nobody documents it legally. Later, in a "voluntary-mandatory" manner, they leave these conditional plots as the only field left to that same ailing kolkhoz.

Sometimes they may legalize the plots according to the rules, but then they make villagers unite, by hook or crook, into "associations of peasant farms," which are "designed" by those same chairmen and managers. The experience of the Rassvet kolkhoz of Korochanskiy Rayon is quite typical in this respect. Nikolay Alshayev, kolkhoz chairman and quite a worshiper of Bacchus, brought his kolkhoz to ruin and then decided to try his luck in an association. Fortunately for him, he had a mighty patron there, a relative of Korochanskiy Rayon's top executive, Ivan Tkachev. The love of his compatriots for Alshayev has evaporated, and very few people wanted to join him in the association. Then the new entrepreneur gathered his loyal minions Uvarov, Gridchin, and Gladonyuk into a team of "Tontons Macoutes" and started literally "knocking" the villagers into entering his association. To keep the people from being too obstinate, the chairman once dragged a member of a resisting family into his car and bashed his head in.

The case had unexpectedly taken a disturbingly criminal turn. So an alibi, a legend, was born. Allegedly, there had been a car standing in a nearby field, and Alshayev had had a sudden idea: He decided to mete a severe punishment to the car thief himself.

It was not particularly difficult to set up an unjust trial in a rayon whose top executive was a relation. So it was done. To prevent the victim's wife from protesting too much, Alshayev's "Tontons Macoutes" intimidated her so well that the pregnant 19-year old woman had an unfortunate accident.

As a member of the control department commission, I want to say that so much untruth of that nature reaches the top executive from the Belgorod provinces that he should have turned into a righteous sympathizer. But as you look deeper into his actions, you start to understand that Berestovoy is the kind of a person about whom our people say: "It's a waste of time talking to the guy." What is it—his character, his working style, or an intentional discrediting of the government in its post-putsch Russian reforms?

I would like to mention one more facet of my musings: How could President Yeltsin, who knows "his brethren" from the obkoms or raykoms well enough, allow them to join him, as a large and solid corps, and help him build a market society? It is clear as day that to do this means to put foxes in charge of chicken coops. He was unable to resist them? But then, was the August revolution really the winner?

This is worth pondering: Has the CPSU made its exit from the stage? The situation at the Sixth Congress of Russian People's Deputies as well as the details of life in the Belgorod provinces present a disturbing picture to our imagination: The seemingly immobile coils of the gigantic CPSU python suddenly start to twist in an "embrace"...

But let us shake off this vision and turn to the problems of today: Is it not time for the progressive forces to unite in every concrete rayon (city, oblast) and to replace the partocrats in top executive positions?

Situation of 'Northern Regions' Outlined

Government Views New Approach, Strategies

924C1437A Moscow FEDERATSIYA in Russian
No 19, 28 Apr 92 p 8

[Article by Viktor Kuramin, minister and chairman of the Russian Federation State Committee on Socioeconomic Development of the North: "According to the New Strategy"]

[Text] "The permafrost will melt quicker than our northern problems will be solved," writes Nikolay Yurkov, a bulldozer operator from the city of Nadym, to the editorial office. "I worked many seasons on the Yamal Peninsula, and with each year problems are being added: problems with ecology and with social protection.

"We pump the raw materials out of this very rich kray, while dooming its people to a semistarved life, we send this raw material to the West for kopeks, and we ourselves live like beggars. When will the curtain be dropped in this theater of paradoxes?"

The anxiety of the Northerners over the fate of their kray permeates many letters to the editorial office, but it could be felt most strongly by those who were present at the Sixth Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation, when the question was discussed "Concerning the Socioeconomic Situation of the Rayons of the North and Localities That Are on the Same Footing."

In offering the readers excerpts of the congressional discussion, we, nevertheless, retain a small hope that the ruin of the North will stop, and that the North will start on a path to revival. There is no place to retreat to. We are standing with our backs to the wall.

The North is an enormous region with an area of 11 million square kilometers, encompassing almost two-thirds of the territory of Russia. It has a leading role in supplying the country with energy fuel resources and with many types of products of the mining, lumber, and fish industries.

Possessing nine percent of the labor resources and 15 percent of the basic funds, the North produces almost a fifth of the national income of Russia. It is practically our last reserve of raw nature, an extremely important regulator of the life of the biosphere.

The narrow bureaucratic approaches to the development of the North that were employed in the past transformed it into a raw material appendage to the Union economy and gave

rise to a number of serious problems. Among these are: a lower level of development of the social sphere, the degradation of the ecological system, and a worsening of the life-support environment of nations with small populations.

The first steps in the formation of a market have aggravated the situation in the North...

The main reason, in our opinion, is that during the elaboration of legislative acts, resolutions, and instructions on the transition to a market, the specific conditions of the North were not taken into account. Practice showed that this transition should be more flexible and cautious here.

...The government thinks it necessary to resolve three tasks.

First of all, to prepare proposals applicable to the North for introducing changes in existing legislative acts on questions of privatization, price formation, and taxation that would make it possible to ease and simultaneously to accelerate the formation of market relations.

First and foremost, it is necessary to preserve national ownership of the strategic resources of the North, which are a factor in the stable functioning of the national economy of the Russian Federation. This is also confirmed in foreign experience. Thus, the lands and mineral wealth of Alaska and the Far North of Canada are entirely under the jurisdiction of the central governments.

The second task is to ensure the delivery of food products, consumer goods, and material-technical resources to the North. For this purpose 6 billion rubles [R] have been allotted to trade organizations for the formation of working capital and R3 billion to offset 10 of the 20 percent for credits for seasonal delivery.

And the third urgent task. To lower the social tensions in the rayons of the North, we believe it necessary to create a system of guarantees and compensation that will make it possible to reduce the costs of making a transition to a market, to keep unemployment down, and to ensure the protection of the disabled and elements of the population of scanty means.

Also, new problems have arisen that go beyond the bounds of the Russian Federation. These are: questions of retaining citizenship while working in the North, payments of pensions in connection with the return of Northerners to their former residences, and others. They can be resolved on the basis of bilateral interstate agreements with countries of the CIS and with those that are not part of the Commonwealth.

...The enumerated measures are of a priority and urgent nature. Together with them, it is necessary now to begin the preparation of proposals for the longer outlook. We are talking about the development of a new state strategy—it can be said, a new philosophy with respect to the North. The scientific basis for this could be the concept and main directions of the socioeconomic development of the North for 15-20 years, which were developed on the instructions of the president and the government by the Goskomsever [State Committee for the North] jointly with a large collective of scientists under the leadership of Academician

Granberg. In our opinion, it deserves unconditional support; **first**, the main idea of this document is to switch from the model of industrial development of the North, which is based on bureaucratic interests, to a model of its firm development on the basis of a multisector economy, the center of which are the interests of the individual and improvement of the environment of his habitation.

Second, its principal basis, which constitutes a comprehensive approach to the development of the North, is the combination of national and regional interests, state regulation of the transition to a market economy, and a strengthening of territorial principles in the management of these processes.

Third, the pivotal policy for official support of the nations of the North with small populations—its key principle—is to grant these nations an opportunity to choose the style of life that they themselves prefer and to preserve national distinctiveness.

Fourth, variation in the socioeconomic development of the rayons of the North, depending on the pace and depth of conducting economic reforms.

Fifth, direction in the future elimination of disproportions between the material and nonmaterial spheres. A halt to the degradation of the ecological system, and an increase in the level of social protection of the population.

First of all, there is a need to introduce substantial corrections in social policy. For example, in the sphere of health services, it is envisioned creating a system of selection of personnel for work in the North, taking into account their adaptability to severe natural climatic conditions and introducing new forms of medical service.

In the field of culture, the development of special programs is proposed, including the preservation of the cultural legacy of small nations. (The northern people have created unique cultural monuments, whose age is 4,000-5,000 years.)

The government thinks that one of the most important directions in official policy for the North is the restoration and preservation of its natural environment. We see its principle in the development of special and more stringent ecological norms, and in the creation of special zones with a conservation regime in the use of nature (forest preserves, game reserves, and national parks), and restrictions on economic activity up to scales that ensure the extraction and processing only of those natural resources whose need cannot be satisfied at the expense of other regions.

In order to attain a level of ecological and economic balance, the environmental protection program requires (according to calculations of Western scientists) not less than three to four percent of the gross national product instead of the appropriated 1.2-1.3 percent.

While ensuring its social direction, we view an acceleration in scientific-technical progress as a decisive factor in the development of the region. Scientific-technical policy should be based, in our opinion, mainly on the elaboration of four major scientific programs. These are the ecology and

the health of the individual of the North, social and demographic problems of the people of the North, structural policy in the North, and ecologically safe and resource-saving techniques and technology of the North.

In conclusion, I would like to say that the concept and basic directions envision the creation of regional programs—the basis for a Russian program of development of rayons of the North. Its implementation will be phased, and this depends on our economic capabilities, and also on the degree of scientific study of these and other problems.

Not everything can work out the way it is planned. Nevertheless, we are convinced that in the final analysis the implementation of this program will multiply the role of the North as a potentially powerful factor in the revival of our state. And, loosely paraphrasing Mikhail Vasilyevich Lomonosov, it can be asserted: The power of Russia will grow with the North.

Report on Specific Aid Measures To Be Undertaken

*Moscow FEDERATSIYA in Russian
No 19, 28 Apr 92 p 9*

[Article by Yuriy Voronin, deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Russia: "To Help and To Support"]

[Text] Today, in its priority and severity, the question of providing food products for the population occupies first place in all rayons of the North. The delivery of foodstuffs failed in 1991 in practically all categories. There was a sharp reduction—by 30-35 percent—in the norms of per capita consumption of food products. In a majority of the products, this was a drop by a factor of one and a half to two more than the average in Russia. I have 1991 in mind.

In order not to allow this in 1992, the presidium of the Supreme Soviet...adopted a resolution on measures for guaranteeing the delivery of products to rayons of the Far North and localities that are in the same status...

At the same time, I would like to say that the Northerners also have to use their own reserves. We must not allow the collapse of the agrarian complex that has been developed in the North itself. The switch to farmer forms of managing farms in the North, calculating on a quick output, as is supposed in the ukase of the president and a decree of the government, in my opinion, is illusory—and we are discussing this question with the Northerners. On the contrary, this will lead to a sharp reduction in the natural volumes of production of foodstuffs, especially milk and eggs, which it will hardly be possible to replenish with foreign deliveries.

It is necessary for us to maintain a rational scale of subsidies from the federal budget for the support of agriculture and the assurance of centralized foodstuff supplies for rayons of the North. Simultaneously, it is necessary to accelerate the implementation of the system of state strategic measures that are proposed in the concept for the development of the North and the maintenance, owing to this, of high incomes for people who are working in the North temporarily, and who therefore reconcile themselves to the social inconveniences of life here.

...We deem it necessary that both the Supreme Soviet and the government develop a block of normative acts that resolve the outlook for food supplies for the Northerners... Already today, for the purposes of stabilizing the deliveries of foodstuffs to the North (and they constitute more than 70 percent of the total balance of food products), it would be possible to examine, in addition to the measures that have already been taken, full and partial exemption of suppliers of food commodities to the North from taxes for added value...

In the sphere of social protection of the population, the formation of labor resources, and the management of the labor market in the North, the Supreme Soviet would consider the following to be necessary. First. To put in order and raise remuneration for labor, and to develop a mechanism for its financial regulation, taking into account the specific features of the North; to accelerate the adoption of laws on guarantees and compensation for workers and those who live in the North. Second. To develop and consistently implement measures for the support of the optimal number of the population in places of reduced production. Third. To establish a reliable economic and organizational mechanism for attracting labor resources to the North on principles of minimal adequacy and specific hire. Fourth. Limit construction in the North of cities and large settlements, and create organizational-technical conditions for special work detail development of mineral deposits.

In the development of the concept and main directions and resolutions of our congress, the government has to develop and submit a mechanism for the financial support of the program for examination by the Supreme Soviet. It is a question of the need to conduct a policy of state protectionism with respect to the North, as it is done in other countries.

Without purposeful budgetary appropriations, and without the establishment of a most favored regime for the North, it will be impossible to implement interregional programs for the development of transport, communications, and power. Even under conditions of Russia's difficult financial position, it is especially important to strengthen state control over the special purpose use of financial resources. Unfortunately, we have a lot of shortcomings...on this question. An example of this is the practice of financing programs for the development of the economy and cultures of the sparsely populated nations of the North.

Analysis of the state of affairs in the construction of housing and everyday social and cultural facilities over the last 10 years, and we conducted this kind of analysis together with Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics], showed that the resources allocated for these purposes, as a rule, ended up in oblast and rayon centers, and in workers' settlements. Their use for their direct purpose was only 40 percent in 1980-1990. That is the way we are using...resources that are allocated.

Unfortunately, the situation has not changed much for the better today as well.

We think...that the investment of government programs for the North at the present time needs a concentration of

monetary resources. It will be more correct henceforth to allocate these resources under specific programs, and this has to be done as a line item in the budget... And, in general, the government should look into various so-called Northern funds established on the basis of budget resources, and submit appropriate proposals to the Supreme Soviet.

And, finally...the absence of a proper normative legal basis is a bottleneck in the resolution of problems of the socioeconomic development of the North.

First of all, it is necessary to speed up and adopt an act that defines state guarantees and compensation for persons who work and live in rayons of the North. This package must include laws that establish guarantees for the development of small nations of the North, the protection and rational use of land and other natural resources in places where nations with small numbers of people live, and other normative-legal measures.

Commentary on Establishment of Khakass Republic

924C1444A Moscow *FEDERATSIYA* in Russian
8 May 92 p 6

[Interview with Vladimir Nikolayevich Shtygashev, chairman of the Khakass Republic Supreme Soviet and RSFSR people's deputy, by *FEDERATSIYA* correspondent Maksim Chaptikov in Abakan; date not given: "A Low Bow to the Founders"]

[Text] Throughout the years of restructuring, peace was maintained in Khakassiya—a fact that those who live in the republic can only rejoice in. Social tensions within the society please only those who possess a barricade mentality. True, a certain sense of apprehension over interethnic relations has arisen in the past six months. But the people of the multinational Khakass Republic have no intention of destroying their common home. In the following interview Vladimir Nikolayevich Shtygashev, chairman of the Republic Supreme Soviet and Russian Federation people's deputy, discusses the founding of the Khakass Republic.

[M. Chaptikov] After the secession of the Khakass Autonomous Oblast from Krasnoyarsk Kray, an article appeared in the local newspapers condemning the unseemly haste of the decision. Fuel was added to the flames with the formation of the Khakass Republic. Now there are quite a few who express doubts about the legality of this action. In their opinion, it is unlawful to raise the legal status of an autonomous oblast without a referendum.

[V. N. Shtygashev] The founding of the Khakass Republic was strictly in compliance with existing legislation of the Russian Federation. This became a critical issue as early as five years ago. We may take pride in the rapid development of productive forces brought about by the construction of major agricultural projects in Khakassiya. This surge in development, however, resulted in a sharp decline in the size of the indigenous peoples in relation to the population as a whole, which posed a problem of preserving the language and traditions.

The first congress of the Khakass people was held in 1990, and the resolution adopted by it specifically addressed the urgent need to raise the national and legal status of the autonomous oblast. In August 1990 a session of the oblast soviet passed by a majority of votes a resolution to transform the autonomous oblast into an autonomous republic. A year later, the Russian parliament passed the law transforming the Khakass Autonomous Oblast into the Khakass Soviet Socialist Republic of the RSFSR. In accordance with the Russian Constitution, elections were held for our Republic Supreme Soviet, which at its very first session passed a resolution changing its name; so the Khakass SSR became the Khakass Republic. As you can see, everything took place in accordance with the provisions of the law.

Now with respect to a referendum. In my judgment, problems pertaining to national statehood cannot be decided by referendum. Today practically all indigenous peoples living in their historical homelands constitute a national minority. Were a referendum to be held, the principle of majority rule would come into effect, and the voice of the underpopulated ethnic population would never be heard. Questions of statehood must be decided on the basis of the laws of the Russian Federation and in accordance with the will of the people who have given their name to the autonomous region.

[M. Chaptikov] In early March, the Khakass Republic Supreme Soviet passed a Declaration of Fundamental Rights, Powers, and Duties of the Kazakh Republic in the Russian Federation. The action followed discussions about the sovereignty of the Khakass Republic during the first session when the proposal was made to pass a declaration defining the legal status of the republic. What prompted this proposal?

[V. N. Shtygashev] Khakassiya acquired the status of a republic within the Russian Federation in 1991. Why was any other declaration needed with respect to its national and legal status? When we brought up the matter for discussion by the Supreme Soviet, we had a single concern—to determine the rights and powers of the Khakass Republic within the framework of the Russian Federation. Within these limits, we defined a degree of independence in such a way as not to encroach upon the integrity and unity of Russia. The issue of absolute independence—about which there has been so much talk—was never raised by anyone. The Khakass Republic was, is, and will continue to be an integral part of Russia, while retaining the rights and powers necessary to deal with economic and cultural problems in the interest of all people who live in the republic regardless of their nationality. Let me repeat that the Khakass Republic does not regard itself as being outside of Russia. Respect and a sense of forbearance for other peoples is manifestly ingrained in the character of the Khakass people.

At the second session of the Supreme Soviet, the Declaration of Fundamental Rights, Powers, and Duties of the Khakass Republic in the Russian Federation was passed only after a clash of disparate views had been expressed. This declaration was a logical extension of the law governing the transformation of the autonomous oblast into a

republic. The necessity of what today has become the basic legal document stems from the adoption of the Constitution of the Khakass Republic.

[M. Chaptikov] Two forces have made their appearance on the Khakass political scene: the Association of the Khakass People, otherwise known as TUN, and the Khakass Slavic Union (KhSU). A roundtable discussion that took place not long ago with the participation of these organizations and the Democratic Russia Movement prompts the hope that this republic will be able to avoid inter-ethnic strife. How do you feel about the activities of TUN and the KhSU?

[V. N. Shtygashev] Just as any person has a right to freedom of thought and speech, so any public organization has a right to exist. I believe in limiting the activities of public organizations only if they infringe on the constitutional rights of other people or if they interfere with the interests of the republic or the Russian Federation. I can only be pleased if TUN and the KhSU direct their efforts to building up a public consensus. Then we will be able to make progress in creating normal conditions of existence for all the peoples of the Khakass Republic.

[M. Chaptikov] Vladimir Nikolayevich, the founding of the Khakass Republic has stirred up separatist sentiments among some representatives of Sayanogorsk and Chernoogorsk. There is a proposal being made alleging the desirability of separating these cities from the republic and joining them to Krasnoyarsk Krai. What do you think of this idea?

[V. N. Shtygashev] Any territorial claims or efforts to dismember autonomous areas are destructive; for they encourage irreconcilable conflicts. It is a mystery to me that there are people among those with these ideas who consider themselves democrats.

[M. Chaptikov] The Declaration of Fundamental Rights, Powers, and Duties of the Khakass Republic in the Russian Federation contains an explicit proviso which states that our republic has no territorial claims against anyone. Moreover, any question of creating on its territory new autonomous areas is utterly absurd. People who harbor such notions deliberately misconstrue the facts of converting the autonomous oblast into a republic. Their views can be explained only as ignorance of Khakass history and a failure to understand the hopes and aspirations of the Khakass people.

Political Activity in Tatarstan

Milli-Majles Decides To Realize Its Program

924C1475A Kazan SOVETSKAYA TATARIYA
in Russian 16 Apr 92 p 1

[Unsigned article: "We Shall Fight in Every Way We Can"]

[Text] A press conference of the Milli-Majles (the national parliament of the republic) took place on April 14th in the administration building of the Union of Writers of the Republic of Tatarstan. Members of the Milli-Majlis expressed their opinions about the sovereignty of the Republic of Tatarstan, and about ways to develop the

economy, culture, and interstate relations, about ownership in the republic, the procedure for fulfilling military obligations, and about the place and role of the national parliament in resolving these issues. The Milli-Majlis, in particular, is fighting for the immediate withdrawal of Tatarstan from Russia, for the privatization of the majority of trade enterprises, service and other sectors, for establishment of a national guard, and for having all draftees from the republic refuse to report to the Russian army or the armies of other CIS countries for the spring draft call.

As T. Abdullin, chairman of the Milli-Majlis noted, "we shall fight in every way we can to implement all our plans."

Parties Submit Petitions to Supreme Soviet, President

924C1475B Kazan SOVETSKAYA TATARIYA
in Russian 16 Apr 92 p 1

[Unsigned article: "Another Appeal"]

[Text] Received by the editorial office on April 15th were appeals to the Supreme Soviet and the President of the Republic of Tatarstan, adopted at the general meeting of the committee to "Protect the President," representatives of the "Sovereignty," "Tatarstan," "Ittifik," and TOTs (Kazan Section) movements and parties, and the Said-Galeyev Club. As indicated by these documents, the meeting took place on April 9th and was attended by about 100 persons.

The appeals propose that the ratification of the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan be accelerated; that ministries of foreign affairs, defense, and economy be established as quickly as possible; that all law protection organs (Prosecutor, Ministry of Justice, MVD, KGB, and the courts) be transferred to Tatarstan jurisdiction; that, based on the results of the referendum, an appeal be made to all the countries of the world to recognize the Republic of Tatarstan as an independent state; that the standard documents about the army be approved and that the Republic of Tatarstan be declared a neutral state; and that Tatarstan not participate in any inter-regional conflicts. The question has again been raised about the resignation of O.M. Antonov, prosecutor of the republic, and lack of confidence has been expressed toward V.Sh.Fakhrutdinov and S.S. Peruanskiy, people's deputies of the Russian Federation, "for their position with regard to Tatarstan sovereignty."

Supreme Soviet Session Agenda Adopted

924C1475C Kazan SOVETSKAYA TATARIYA
in Russian 21 Apr 92 p 1

[Agenda From the Press Center of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan: "In the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan"]

[Text] The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet continued its work on April 20th.

The agenda was approved for the forthcoming 10th session of the Supreme Soviet, which will begin in Kazan on May 18th.

The agenda for the session included the following issues:

1. Results of the Republic of Tatarstan referendum of March 21, 1992.

2. More precise prognosis about the functioning of the economy and the development of the public sphere in the Republic of Tatarstan in 1992.

3. The budgetary system of the Republic of Tatarstan for 1992, and on completion of the Republic's budget for 1991.

4. On the draft of the new Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan.

5. On the draft of the Law of the Republic of Tatarstan "On Languages of the Peoples of Tatarstan."

6. On the draft of the Law of the Republic of Tatarstan "On the State Youth Policy in the Republic of Tatarstan."

7. On the draft of the Law of the Republic of Tatarstan "On Implementing Changes and Additions to the Law of the Republic of Tatarstan On Nominal Privatization Accounts (investments) in the Republic of Tatarstan."

8. On the draft of the Law of the Republic of Tatarstan "On Implementing Changes and Additions to the Law of the Republic of Tatarstan on Transforming State and Communal Property in the Republic of Tatarstan (on deaccessioning state property and privatization)."

9. On the draft of the Law of the Republic of Tatarstan "On Implementing Changes and Additions to the Law of the Republic of Tatarstan On Holidays and Memorable Days in the Republic of Tatarstan."

10. On the draft of the Law of the Republic of Tatarstan "On Implementing Changes and Additions to the Law of the Republic of Tatarstan "On Permanent Commissions of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan."

11. Report on the work of the permanent Commission of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan on public education, science, and training.

12. Miscellaneous.

The Presidium meeting was conducted by Z.R. Valeyeva, first deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet.

V.N. Likhachev, vice-president of the Republic of Tatarstan, took part in the meeting.

Commission Tracks Agrarian Reform in Krasnodar Kray

924A1177A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 13 May 92 p 3

[Article by Yevgeniya Pishchikova: "In Krasnodar Kray, 'Private Farmer' Is a Verdict, and 'Leaseholder' Is a Diagnosis"]

[Text] In Krasnodar Kray there is a government commission whose purpose is to monitor the existing situation in the kray with respect to agrarian reform and the creation of private farms. A ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA correspondent took part in the commission's work. This article is the continuation of a discussion begun in yesterday's issue ("Fetters for Free Farmers").

And in the city of Sochi a real story occurred. A song of songs, which awaits its own Kol Velda. First of all, on 15 January 1992, a decree was issued titled "On the Establishment of Peasant (Private) Farms Within the Borders of the Kray's Territorial Health Resort Complex" and signed by V. Dyakonov, the head of the Krasnodar Kray administration. The decree included the following statement (please note the pathetic style): "An unfavorable situation has developed in the kray's resorts, caused by numerous anthropogenic factors, including the washing off of pesticides and mineral fertilizers into bodies of water, their accumulation in the soil, the buildup of unrecycled livestock effluent, soil erosion, and so forth. This is resulting in the physical degradation of the health resorts and of natural curative factors. In order to normalize the environmental situation in the kray's resort regions, it is decreed:

—that the allocation of land for private peasant farms be made only on a "based basis;

—that previously adopted decisions regarding the granting of land for peasant (private) farms be revised in accordance with this decree."

That is, one might think that it was precisely the private farmers who for a half-century had been defiling the all-union health resort with pesticides, and that Dyakonov seriously believes that by repealing, in passing, a couple or three of key Russian laws he will rescue the health resorts entrusted to him from anthropogenic factors. That is if you also consider that in the vicinity of greater Sochi there are 19 sovkhozes covering 20,181 hectares, while private farmers with an average land allotment of a half-hectare have managed to get all of 93 hectares from the Sochi authorities, 53 of which they actually own. And even those will be taken away. A leaseholder, on the other hand, is not a real private farmer, and his fate in Russia, as we know, has been a sad one, when it has not been comical, and terrible when not fantastic, and fantastic when not terrible. I do not know a single agricultural leaseholder who has received money for the products he has produced without judicial proceedings, threats and dramatic fainting spells, or who has not had to deal with unpleasantness over land. Throughout all of Russia's territory, unfortunate leaseholders are still at law with their lessors, and one must believe that Krasnodar Kray is no exception. The commission was besieged with petitions concerning the illegal dissolution of lease contracts. The kolkhozes and sovkhozes find it advantageous (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA has already written about this) to change leaseholders approximately once a year, regardless of the original length of the lease. They have the opportunity to collect rent several times and then raise it "taking inflation into account."

Incidentally in Sochi the reason there can be no private farmers is not only that a leaseholder is not a real private farmer, but also that all the rayon's sovkhozes are not subject to any sort of reorganization. This is according to the well-known letter from Khlystun and Chubays, which relieved hothouse, seed-growing, livestock-breeding and other similar farms from all the burdens of a purely decorative transition into joint-stock companies. Moreover, back in 1989 in Sochi a certain managerial body known as

the Sochi Agroindustrial Association was established, and naturally, all the rights and duties of an ordinary agroindustrial association were delegated to it. After the decree on the abolition of agroindustrial association, the Sochi Agroindustrial Association decided not to abolish itself but to become the Sochmagro joint-stock agroindustrial company. This joint-stock company, with the same executive, S. Stolyarov, will have a great deal of state property, since its founders (who are the stockholders) include all the sovkhos directors and the directors of Sochiagropromsnab [Sochi Agroindustrial Supply Association] and Sochiagropromtrans [Sochi Agroindustrial Transport Association]—in short, it will now have the entire staff of the agroindustrial association to itself. Comrade Stolyarov is still confused about the type of his company's ownership—it is both state and private, and has the right to engage in commercial operations—and still finds it absolutely impossible to sort out his own imperious powers.

On the one hand, he claims that he is the executive of a purely service organization, and on the other hand he permits himself such statements as the following: "We had recommended that the sovkhoses change their form of ownership, but after the letter from the ministry—" And he could have actually ordered it—since all state budget monies pass through the Sochmagro closed-type joint-stock company, as they formerly did through the Sochi Agroindustrial Association, and the allocation of those monies, like the allocation of machinery etc., is controlled by that same Stolyarov. Stolyarov believes that his method of operation is absolutely correct, and that the sovkhoses and kolkhoses will join together into such closed organizations in order to protect themselves against a state and government gripped by the idea of unrestrained reform. He also recognizes that such protection preserves methods and forms of management that are far from progressive from an economic standpoint. For example, Stolyarov habitually sighs: In order to feed the city we need to produce 80,000 metric tons of vegetables, yet we produce 15,000. "We" means a certain number of sovkhoses with hothouses, which by virtue of being hothouse farms are not subject to reform. In this connection, Stolyarov regards private farmers with implicit boredom, believing that they are to the sovkhoses what a carpenter is to a cabinetmaker. This is a strange illogicality, if one considers that nearly 20 sovkhoses controlling all the agricultural territory are unable to feed the city, while the private sector, which has yards and rooftops at its disposal, supplies the entire market for the whole summer.

And so, the situation as a whole is developing as follows. Comrade Stolyarov, considering his traditionally broad commercial appetites, and, likewise, the ordinary sovkhos chairman of, say, the Protochnoye Joint-Stock Company, who ordered that the private farmers not be given a single bolt, deem themselves to be good strong conservatives.

However, there is a difference between the former state agrarian conservative, whose product was meager but sterile, and these strange forms of home-grown self-conservation that are so popular among the agricultural leaders of Krasnodar Kray and that smell of economic botulism a kilometer away.

The peasant in these places would like to act the same way his native sovkhos is acting.

The sovkhos wants to have privileged financing and physical facilities and equipment that it has not had to use its own money to amass, that is, wants to produce a product without putting in the full amount of its own real outlays. That is the only mode of agricultural labor that is the least bit profitable at the present time. The peasant wants the same thing—to have strong support facilities and sovkhos storehouses behind him, and to produce on his own small plot a cheap product that he can sell profitably. The sovkhos settles with the state through the half-hearted production of grain, while all its other products—vegetables, oil, sugar, melons and other fruit—serve as an inexhaustible source of income in barter deals, the distribution of which depends on the executive's level of bribery. The peasant would like to do the same thing, although on a small scale, but he will in no way agree to acquire the status of a half-impoorished agricultural entrepreneur, even if the sovkhos starts officially providing him with services—the charge for the use of the equipment will have an extremely bad effect on his profitability.

Given this state of affairs, the private farmer will want nothing to do with the situation. As a matter of fact, in Krasnodar Kray, which is rich and free, and where economic interests have always been tied in so many knots and had so many smoky depths that not every ordinary investigator would sort things out in this criminal macrame, it is especially clear that the private farmer in our country is more a man of the idea than a practitioner. And that is understandable—he was conceived in the form in which he exists by people accustomed to looking at the earth from the height of a bird's flight, from a plane window, people who simultaneously wanted to have agrarian reform and were not afraid of rebellions by starving people.

It is hardly likely that a place will be found for the private farmer if we do not stop telling each other fairy tales to the effect that the farmer and the sovkhos can develop and be modernized together, supporting and raising up one another. It is perfectly clear that the idea of private farming presupposed the artificial creation of a stratum of shakers of the foundations. They were the wedges that, it was supposed, would stratify the rural world that was firmly joined together by the vulgar Freudianism of agrarian executives and a certain indifference on the part of the bulk of collective workers. So far, the government cannot make up its mind to adopt a clear-cut, well-considered and absolutely irreversible concept of agrarian reform, and in this connection the private farmers increasingly resemble the soldiers in a punitive battalion. It is no accident whatsoever that the first land reform under Nicholas was based on the peasant's mandatory separation from the peasant commune, and on the creation of conditions for his complete independence from the commune. Peasants who know how to work and want to work must not be used like insurgents or, precisely, revolutionaries. That is the job of the declassé, hired laborers, and rural drunks. Especially since the experience of our former most advanced party suggests that professional revolutionary work leaves too little time for one's principal occupation.

Chelyabinsk Factories Unable to Meet Payroll

924A1177B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 13 May 92 p 3

[Article by Anatoliy Usoltsev: "'Give Back Our Money'"]

[Text] Chelyabinsk—I had not seen Petr Sumin, chairman of the Chelyabinsk Oblast Soviet, so worried for a long time. Even the hospital sick list did not keep him home. Brushing aside his own illness, Petr Ivanovich went to the meeting with representatives of the oblast's trade unions.

And the problem is that an emergency situation has developed in Chelyabinsk Oblast: a shortage of cash. Tens of plants cannot pay their employees' wages. People have nothing with which to buy bread and milk.

"We did everything possible to work out the circulation of money," says Petr Sumin. "But the solution of the problem lies outside the region. As of today the arrears in the payment of pensions, allowances and stipends comes to 3.5 billion rubles. By the end of the second quarter this figure will rise to 5 billion."

In terms of its industrial potential, Chelyabinsk Oblast is among Russia's major regions. It is the Urals inhabitants' misfortune, rather than their fault, that ferrous-metallurgy, heavy-machinery, and military-industrial enterprises are concentrated here.

However, the center remains deaf to the region's requests. There has been no answer to letters to the Russian president, Supreme Soviet and government. Therefore, the oblast soviet warned that, starting 15 May, Chelyabinsk Oblast would cease all deductions to the federal budget.

Yesterday more than 3,000 of the oblast's working people gathered on Revolution Square to demand of the Russian government that wages be paid on time. Members of the government were invited to the rally from the capital, but they did not show up. Representatives of the oblast and city administrations, oblast soviet, and Council of the Federation of Trade Unions, on whom very little related to solving the problem depends in the present situation, came to talk with the people.

Moscow's Northeastern District Prefect Interviewed

924C1440A Moscow VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA
in Russian 1 Apr 92 p 2

[Interview with Vladimir Grigoryevich Sister, Prefect of Moscow's Northeastern District, by R. Zaretskin; place and date not given: "And on April 1st, I Am Trying To Abide by the Law." First three paragraphs, introductory, are in bold font in the original.]

[Text] It is time, I think, to establish the position of historiographer in the Northeastern prefecture, so that he could chronicle the struggle for power between the deputies of the Dzerzhinskiy district and the prefecture. The district is actually a former district, but the deputies do not want to transfer to the newly established municipal Councils that are closer to their constituents. After all, work has to be done and help given to the constituents, which of course is not so

simple. It is far better to be some kind of "chief" and engage in business and other pleasant tasks, for example, to work on getting housing with all the modern amenities. Deputy L. Yegorova, chairman of the Housing Commission, just barely obtained her position and became the owner of a four-room apartment in the center of Moscow. And 9 of the 13 members of the commission, not being on the waiting list, also received very nice housing.

But we are not speaking today about the deputies' machinations. That is an important subject for a special report, even though newspapers and journals, for example STOLITSA, have already conducted impartial research on it.

Today we are remembering the Dzerzhinskiy District Council as an opponent of the new organization—the Northeastern Prefecture. And we are conducting our conversation with Vladimir Grigoryevich Sister, the most important person of the okrug.

[VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA] Vladimir Grigoryevich, it is said that during the blessed Christian holiday [Tr: Easter] you personally kissed Chairman of the District Council Semenov and said "Khristos Voskrese" to him, as if to hint that it is time to cut out the war between the deputies and officials of the prefecture. Or is this a local anecdote?

[Sister] That is what happened. I kissed him and asked for peace. But I was too late. The deputies just took another building by force, the office of the Chief of the Meshchanskiy Department of the prefecture, who died suddenly and could not defend his building. A criminal court case has been started.

[VERCHERNYAYA MOSKVA] So you are fighting with the district council over offices?

[Sister] Not only that. There is nearly a military campaign going on in the building of the former district committee of the CPSU and the district executive council, which is characterized by its long and continuous duration and its acuteness. The leadership of the Dzerzhinskiy District Council, in contrast to the three others in our okrug—the Kirovskiy, Babushkinskiy, and Timiryazevskiy—does not want to occupy itself with matters having to do with their constituents' housing. So the deputies are trying to block our initiatives. And that is how we are living with those elected by the people.

[VERCHERNYAYA MOSKVA] It is said that employees of the prefecture spend a great deal of time at work. As a rule, you arrive at your office at 7:00 AM and leave between 10:00 and 11:00 PM. Why do you have to work so hard? Do matters in the okrug go better due to your long hours?

[Sister] Time spent at work is not a goal in itself. We were waiting for a hard winter and I told my staff, "Let's work a little harder until April—from 8:00 AM to 10:00 PM." It was difficult for some, but basically they kept to the schedule. For me this was a natural thing. I want to achieve results in the okrug. I have to be the first to arrive and the last to leave. The prefecture team is trained in such a way that anyone can protest to me if I do something wrong: "You are admonishing us, and what about yourself?" In my

own eyes I have to be honest. Of course, our employees are not heroes, but movers, that's for sure. We want to move things off dead center.

[VERCHERNYAYA MOSKVA] Similar words can be heard from nearly every municipal chief: "We want to," "We are planning," "We intend to achieve." But you have been working nearly eight months now in your new capacity as prefect. So perhaps, from dreams about a beautiful future may we come over to the present time? Have you achieved anything positive yet in the life of this gigantic okrug that unites four districts? Yes or no?

[Sister] Everything that we have achieved today has a foundation built back in the districts. Emergency telephone complaints to us, for example, have decreased by ten times. Why? It is due to new principles of leadership. Results come when the teams are concerned with economic interests. "You give to us and we'll give to you," is the ideology of our interrelationships with okrug services.

Here is a simple example. Collectives of our industrial enterprises participated in last year's harvesting work. For their good work we gave passenger automobiles to five plants, paying for them from the prefecture organization. We promised them and we gave them. And today we have no problems with getting Muscovites to participate in helping the villages. We implement similar agreements, based on economic principles, for practically all our projects. We are trying to do away with the chief-subordinate relationship, especially in using threats to influence action: "If you don't do it, I'll fire you." The new method really leads to a new quality of work. Two years ago the amount of asphalt we laid on roads in the former Kirovskiy District was several times greater than before. Last year it was even more. Next year we are planning to lay 2.2 million square meters of asphalt. Compare that with Moscow's area, which is 12 million square meters, that is, it is an increase by 17 times. But... and there is one "but." Asphalt quality is rather poor and I told our repair crews: "You will do the same quality surfacing as before. We shall drastically cut down on the amount of asphalt to be done." But for the workers, whose wages depend directly on the volume of work completed, this will naturally affect their wages. Now they will be thinking of how to reconcile the two concepts: Quantity and quality. In other words, this is the marketplace at work. And so four of our small enterprises which we had created one and a half to two years ago out of the state repair organization, and which now did the asphalt work, made money on this project. In the competitive bidding they were the ones who set up the best work schedule. And we established two more similar enterprises.

[VERCHERNYAYA MOSKVA] I see you have photographs on your desk showing piles of garbage on the sports field, in the square, and next to a housing area. What are they, photographic evidence with complaints to the prefect from places where garbage is not collected regularly?

[Sister] It is a reminder of what we had just a few months ago. With regard to garbage collection, it is one of Moscow's most complex problems. We continued along the tried and

true path of establishing entrepreneurial enterprises to collect garbage. Employees of state organizations did not want to collect it, and perhaps they could not because the equipment was gone. Garbage collectors' wages now depend on actual work done. The work is scheduled daily by the REU [Rayon Operations Administration?]. Without a technician's approval, they cannot get paid. This is an elementary matter, but important. Naturally, the city helped us with equipment.

But one cannot take this multi-faceted and difficult job and consider only the collection part of it. Where should the garbage be taken? The areas around Moscow are overfilled and there are few garbage processing plants. And just imagine if they do not give us any petroleum products tomorrow. The day after tomorrow you can expect epidemics to begin. We have no transportation to go 40-50 kilometers out of the city, but you can reach a garbage processing plant in the okrug within 4-5 kms without too much gasoline. We want to purchase this kind of plant abroad, but the population is protesting, saying that they will be stifled by the smoke. In Brussels, there is a garbage processing plant half a kilometer from the king's palace. There are similar plants around the perimeter of central Paris. In other words, the world understands that one cannot force his garbage on others and it has to be processed in place. Naturally, this plant has to be ecologically clean.

Here is what I hope. We have money for one plant. But...meanwhile we have to explain to the Muscovites that we have to take care of our own garbage. We cannot fight with various municipal organizations, such as the Northern Heat and Power Plant and other plants. The city will die without them and will cease being a city. It is only in our okrug that the sale of hundreds of properties, greatly needed by the city residents, has been frozen due to lack of heat. The village of Severnyy cannot build a single house because there is no heat. Public culture enterprises cannot be constructed in Bibiryev because they have no heat either.

Such is the price for living in a city. And if you do not like the inconveniences that exist alongside with the comforts, you can move to a village. They have clean air, but...in order to have heat you have to light up a stove, split and saw wood, and have a supply of coal. There will be worries there, too, but different than those in the city.

[VERCHERNYAYA MOSKVA] These are interesting views, but the residents of Moscow still do not enjoy equal rights. They will continue breathing the smoke of the Northern Heat and Power Plant, while others living, say, in the city center, use the heat generated by the same electrical generating plant. Do they understand each other's problems?

[Sister] The heat is designated for the northern part of the city. But your question is very valid. Not only was there and still is inequality, but it seems to be stuck in the politics of the municipal leadership. Explain this to me: Why was the Sverdlovskiy District given three times more money than the Kirov District? What is it? Does a different kind of Muscovite live there?

[VERCHERNYAYA MOSKVA] Isn't it because the Sverdlovskiy is a central district?

[Sister] So what? A Muscovite is the same whether he lives in the city center or at the edge of the city. I shall tell you more. Why do the outlying districts—basically they are "bedroom" districts—have to carry a greater load than the central districts? People working in the Sverdlovskiy or Krasnopresnenskiy districts go for a rest to the "bedroom" districts in order to restore their energy level. There should be stores there and restaurants and laundries, and so on. But there are not very many of them here, so the Muscovites have to take food with them when they leave the center of the city.

I believe that now, in connection with the new organizational structure and power in the city, this bad practice is being broken. All of us together establish a unified municipal budget and receive equal and fair portions for financing our programs. If there is an opportunity for a possible enterprise, then you have to establish a non-budget fund.

[VERCHERNYAYA MOSKVA] Insofar as I know, in your okrug there are alternately strikes by teachers, then militiamen, then the building superintendents.... They have in mind that in other okrugs their colleagues have had their pay doubled and tripled. But now, with the establishment of a non-budget fund, will their situation improve?

[Sister] It is not a simple problem. Compare: Some small districts have 10 schools, but our Kirovskiy District has 80. The additional money required is naturally different. It is more difficult for us.

[VERCHERNYAYA MOSKVA] But you have such wonderful opportunities for replenishing your fund. Just the Exhibition of the USSR National Economic Achievements [VDNKh] alone is worth a great deal; it can bring millions and millions into the okrug.

[Sister] The situation with replenishing the fund has deteriorated now. Sponsors, in contrast to former years, have begun giving a lot less, for example, as additional money for schoolchildrens' meals. Taxes also escape us and go to the municipal budget. We receive money from various organizations, and it is we who established these organizations....

[VERCHERNYAYA MOSKVA] That's pretty bad. Other okrugs are bolder in creating conditions for business. Why are you so careful?

[Sister] I personally have specific experience in such matters. But I represent the state organization and have to work within the legal framework. We cannot enter into deals, for example, with banks. If a bank paid the prefecture a certain sum, it means that it shorted someone by that same amount. All this is what leads to corruption.

[VERCHERNYAYA MOSKVA] Of course we are not speaking about that kind of business. The prefecture in general is not supposed to make money. But it is allowed to create conditions for tax increases. What are you doing to have state enterprises produce more goods and consequently pay more taxes?

[Sister] We are not going to do the work of enterprise directors. All we can do is give them land and commercial buildings, but there is no way we can teach them the why

and wherefores. If a matter concerns problems of the okrug, we turn to industrial plants for assistance. That is how we arranged one of the plants to manufacture our own containers for taking out garbage. The director asked us for only half a hectare of land for the new manufacturing facility.

My primary job is to create an operational opportunity for those enterprises which help the okrug service the population.

[VERCHERNYAYA MOSKVA] But judging from the facts published by **VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA** in an article by Ye. Kostylev, deputy of the Moscow Council and chairman of the "Sviblovo" self-governing committee—and this is in your okrug—the prefecture does not always have a burning desire to support the beginnings or initiatives of those who are ready to help the okrug service its population.

[Sister] We are familiar with this newspaper article. Its author at one time competed for the position of sub-prefect of the "Sviblovo" territorial okrug. His candidacy was not supported by "Demokraticheskaya Rossiya." There was also another story. Maybe it's not for the press. On the other hand, it may be exactly right for the press.

One time a group of people came to see me and among them was Kostylev from Sviblov. They were requesting a store to be opened there. We talked for a while, and later a woman from this group returned and gave me a basket full of products.... Here it is. It was allegedly sent to me from Krasnodar.... Well, I reacted, perhaps a bit sharply, but I am thinking about what she did. But that is not the point. The crux of the matter is the criticism. Kostylev writes: "We were not given a store." But my deputy, Yusopov, a most experienced trade employee told Kostylev at the time: "Here is a section in the store for you. Start selling. If it goes well we shall give you more counter space." But alas, Kostylev could not realistically answer anything. The article was approved by a number of people with titles such as "democrat" and "communist." What is this for? We are talking about business and not political gossip. Specifically, we were speaking about the duplication of government organizations.

[VERCHERNYAYA MOSKVA] The point of the article was not about the staffs of self-governing committees, but about initiatives of citizens who have decided to help themselves. That is wonderful! After all, they say that self-government will one day replace the official government.

[Sister] We never resisted the creation of self-governing committees. We had several in the okrug. At one time they were created in order to provide a balance to official committees, as a way to assist those departments. Those who tried to serve in the professional organization were forced to rid themselves of various functions due to a lack of, let us say, the necessary knowledge. For example, a self-governing committee in REU-7 accepted a construction job on its account books. It tried to work as if it were the service for a single client and tried to control the repair. But experience proved that this could not be done professionally.

Other committees came to the assistance of the REU. Still others took upon themselves more functions in working with the population. And we see the role these committees played, specifically in this third sphere.

[VERCHERNYAYA MOSKVA] Yesterday, perhaps I would have agreed with you. Today I do not. Self-governing committees fulfill different functions, depending upon the needs of the population of a micro-district. To force them to accept rules for their own game, you have to agree, is far from the idea of self-government.

[Sister] I could argue with you here, but I shall say that I personally see them as our most important assistants. In many cases I was, if it can be expressed this way, their father in the former Kirovskiy District. It was probably precisely there that the first self-governing councils in Russia were created.

[VERCHERNYAYA MOSKVA] I have not heard much about them. Perhaps their affairs were not as prominent as those, for example, in Brateva.

[Sister] We were working, not busying ourselves with advertising. The Biberovo, Medvedkovo, and Otradnoye Councils represented a 150,000 population. This is why they grew into municipal councils. And this happened instantly.

[VERCHERNYAYA MOSKVA] In conclusion, the traditional question of this rubric: What three matters in the okrug are you especially proud of?

[Sister] Municipal organizations were not given the chance to tear down what we had done. We have created a communal system which is aiming at the market economy. First of all, this concerns, of course, garbage collection, and so on. Financing was taken away from us, but we saved the people. We are also proud of the work on transferring trade enterprises to a lease basis. They are now the first to be privatized, and we were ahead of all of Moscow in this area. And our third success was that we were able to preserve and create an efficient prefect team in the okrug. It went through the complexities of August with honor.

In general, we are trying to abide by the law even on April 1st. That is our creed.

St Petersburg 1st Quarter Privatization Program *924C1431A St Petersburg NEVSKOYE VREMYA* *in Russian 12 Mar 92 p 2*

[List of enterprises to be privatized: "Program of Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises of St. Petersburg for 1992—Plan for the 1st Quarter"]

[Text]

Light Industry Enterprises

1. Leningrad House of Knitted Fashions (10-12 Moskovskiy prospekt [Prospect]); 2. Leningrad Knitted Fashion Service Shop (12 Nevskiy prospekt); 3. The Trud Quilted Cotton Association (8 ulitsa [Street] Yakornaya).

Total: 3 (the program for the year includes 25, so the 1st quarter is 12 percent of the plan).

Local Industry Enterprises

1. The Metalloposuda [Metal Utensils] Production Association (16 ulitsa Sadovaya); 2. The Luch Production Association (9 prospekt Metallistov); 3. The Local Industry TPO [Technical Production Association] SPDO [Special Planning and Design Office] (6 ulitsa Baltiyskaya); 4. The Igrushka [Toy] LPO [Leningrad Production Association] (12 Moskovskiy prospekt); 5. The Experimental Furniture Factory (14 ulitsa Zastavskaya).

Total: 5 (the program includes 11, so the 1st quarter is 46 percent of the plan).

Food Industry Enterprises

1. The Leningrad Carbon Dioxide Plant; 2. The Candy Factory imeni Krupskaya; 3. The Champagne and Dessert Wine Combine; 4. The Polyustrovo Mineral Water Plant; 5. The Vena Beer Plant; 6. The Flour Mill imeni Lenin; 7. The Pishchevik Fish Combine; 8. Bookbinding Section No 9 of Shop No 11 of the Obyektiv Combine.

Total: 8 (the program includes 34, so the 1st quarter is 24 percent of the plan).

Organizations and Enterprises of the Construction Complex

The Leningrad Construction Corporation: 1. Trust No 4; 2. Trust No 28; 3. Trust No 104; 4. Trust No 38; 5. The Housing TPO.

Total: 5 (the program includes 86, so the 1st quarter is 6 percent of the plan).

Industry

1. The Pobeda Association for Producing Construction Materials and Elements (Kolpino, 9 ulitsa Zagorodnaya); 2. The Barrikada Production Association (50 ulitsa Magnitogorskaya).

Total: 2 (the program includes 23, so the 1st quarter is 8 percent of the plan).

Motor Transport

1. The Motor Pool AP [not further identified] 1107; 2. The Motor Pool AP 1101; 3. The Matralen AP LAOMP [not further identified]; 4. The AP GATP [City Auto Transport Enterprise]-4; 5. The AP GATP-40; 6. The LPOTT [not further identified]-3; 7. The LPOTT-5; 8. The LPTT [not further identified]-6.

Total: 8 (the program includes 62, so the 1st quarter is 13 percent of the plan).

Wholesale Trade Enterprises Subject to Mandatory Privatization

1. The Petrodvorets ORO [not further identified] (89 prospekt 1 Maya); 2. The Sestroretsk ORO (5 ulitsa Tseymyanochnaya); 3. Kronshtadt ORO (17 ulitsa Proletarskaya); 4. Neva ORO (60 ulitsa Sofiyskaya); 5. City Fruit Bureau (78 ulitsa Arsenalnaya).

Total: 5 (the program includes 32, so the 1st quarter is 16 percent of the plan).

Public Catering Enterprises Subject to Mandatory Privatization**Dzerzhinskiy Rayon**

1. Cafeteria No 6—AP (26 ulitsa Vostaniya); 2. Cafe No 2, Kameya (32 ulitsa Furmanova); 3. Cafeteria No 14, Sonety (1/38 ulitsa Nekrasova).

Kuybyshevskiy Rayon

4. Cafeteria No 3, 1 branch (25 ulitsa Sadovaya); 5. Chas pik Cafe, 1 branch (29 ulitsa Zhelyabova); 6. Cafeteria No 9, 4 branches (47 Ligovskiy prospekt); 7. Zastolye Restaurant, 2 branches (74 Nevskiy prospekt); 8. Cafeteria No 11, 3 branches (16 ulitsa Marata); 9. Cafeteria No 14, 2 branches (2 Zagorodny prospekt); 10. Charodeyka Cafe, 3 branches (88 Nevskiy prospekt); 11. Cafeteria No 19 (20 Apraksin pereulok [Lane]); 12. Cafeteria No 22 (26 Nevskiy prospekt); 13. Cafeteria No 24 (3 ulitsa Lomonosova); 14. Cafeteria No 23 (9 Zagorodny prospekt); 15. Cafeteria No 16, 2 branches (23 ulitsa Razyezzhaya); 16. Cafeteria No 28, 1 branch (64 Liteyny prospekt); 17. Cafeteria No 29, 2 branches (26 ulitsa Borovaya); 18. Cafeteria No 40, 2 branches (5 ulitsa Belinskogo); 19. Cafeteria No 42, 1 branch (14 ulitsa Sadovaya); 20. Cafeteria No 48, 1 branch (108 Nevskiy prospekt); 21. Druzhba Cafe, 4 branches (15 Nevskiy prospekt); 22. Sausage Shop No 2 (15 Nevskiy prospekt); 23. Chinara Shashlik [Kebab] Shop, 4 branches (15 ulitsa Vostaniya); 24. Shashlik Shop No 3, 3 branches (1/20 ulitsa Razyezzhaya); 25. Zhiguli Beer Parlor, 3 branches (8 Vladimirskiy prospekt); 26. Avtomat Cafe, 1 branch (45 Nevskiy prospekt); 27. Ice Cream Cafe No 49 (54 Nevskiy prospekt); 28. Ice Cream Cafe No 50 (100 Nevskiy prospekt); 29. Ice Cream Cafe No 51 (24 Nevskiy prospekt); 30. Ice Cream Cafe No 52 (8 Zagorodny prospekt); 31. Baku Restaurant (16 ulitsa Sadovaya).

Oktyabrskiy Rayon

32. Yunga Cafe, 5 branches (32 prospekt Mayorova); 33. Avtograf Cafe, 4 branches (72 ulitsa Sadovaya); 34. Cafeteria No 22.

Petrodvortsovy Rayon

35. Bushe MP [small enterprise] (4/1 bulvar [Avenue] Razvodchikov).

Pushkinskiy Rayon

36. TOO [not further identified] Cafeteria No 1, 7 branches (Pushkin, 20 ulitsa Kominterna).

Frunzenskiy Rayon

37. Cafeteria No 37 AP, 2 branches (11 ulitsa Budapeshtskaya).

Moskovskiy Rayon

38. Cafeteria No 99 (14 prospekt Gagarina); 39. Cafeteria No 131.

Smolninskiy Rayon

40. Cafeteria No 12 (9 Suvorovskiy prospekt).

Total: 114 (the program includes 614, so the 1st quarter is 18.5 percent of the plan).

Stores Subject to Mandatory Privatization

1. Lenkomissionorg [Leningrad Second Hand Trade] Store No 19 (5 prospekt Smirnova); 2. Lenkomissionorg Store No 46 (82 prospekt Stachek).

Vyborgskiy Rayon

3. Store No 9 (96 prospekt Karla Marksa); 4. Store No 3.

Nevskiy Rayon

5. Store No 54 (287/2 prospekt Obukhovskoy Oborony); 6. Store No 32; 7. Store No 1.

Kalininskiy Rayon

8. Store No 47 (10 Piskarevskiy prospekt); 9. Store No 52 (80 ulitsa Lunacharskogo); 10. Store No 7 (9 Lesnoy prospekt); 11. Store No 32 (47 ulitsa Komsomola); 12. Store No 42 (26 ulitsa Timurovskaya); 13. Store No 24 (9 Grazhdanskiy prospekt); 14. Store No 89 (11 ulitsa Lebedeva); 15. Store No 109 (8/8 ploshchad [Square] Lenina).

Dzerzhinskiy Rayon

16. Store No 1 (18 ulitsa Nekrasova); 17. Store No 31 (23 Liteyny prospekt); 18. Store No 34 (32 Liteyny prospekt); 19. Store No 35 (34 ulitsa Vosstaniya).

Petrogradskiy Rayon

20. Store No 46 (38/96 Kirovskiy prospekt).

Trading Firms

21. The Lentorg [Leningrad Trade] Firm, including 50 structural units; 22. The Trikotazh [Knitted Goods] Firm, including 41 structural units; 23. Lenobuvorg [Leningrad Shoe Trade], including 43 structural units; 24. Lenkomissionorg, including 4 structural units; 25. Store No 10; 26. Store No 14; 27. Store No 1; 28. Store No 7; 29. AO DLT [Joint Stock Company Leningrad House of Trade], including 24 structural units.

Leninskiy Rayon

30. Leninskiy Raypishchetorg [Rayon Food Trade], including 8 structural units (stores); 31. Store No 5; 32. Store No 72; 33. Store No 63; 34. Store No 3 [figure unclear]; 35. Store No 50; 36. Store No 27; 37. Store No 37; 38. Store No 58.

Various Other Enterprises

39. The Kontakt Association, including 3 leased enterprises (stores); 40. Store No 80 (49 Novo-Izmaylovskiy prospekt); 41. Store No 34 (6 Moskovskoye shosse [Highway]); 42. Store No 92 (128 Moskovskiy prospekt); 43. Yubiley TF [possibly Trade Firm], including 8 structural units; 44. Univermag [Department Store] (60 Sverdlovskaya naberezhnaya [Embankment]); 45. Store No 3 (26 ulitsa Kosygina); 46. Store No 1 (54 Nevskiy prospekt); 47. Store No 5 (66 Nevskiy prospekt); 48. Store No 4 (114 Nevskiy prospekt); 49. Store No 6 (147 Nevskiy prospekt); 50. Store No 2 (P. S. [not further identified], 51 Bolshoy prospekt);

51. Store No 8 (1 Finlyandskiy prospekt); 52. Narva Department Store AP; 53. Kirov Department Store AP, including 5 structural units; 54. Kupchinskiy Department Store AP, including 4 structural units; 55. Lenkholtorg [Leningrad Household Goods Trade], including 61 structural units (stores); 56. Store No 14 (35 ulitsa Sedova); 57. Store No 70 (161 prospekt Veteranov); 58. Store No 20 (29 ulitsa Tipanova); 59. Svet AP—Store No 9 (2/40 prospekt Morisa Toreza).

Tsvettorg [Florist Trade] Stores

60. Store No 45 (111 ulitsa Babushkina); 61. Store No 3 (56 Kondratyevskiy prospekt); 62. Store No 47 (38 Liteyny prospekt); 63. Store No 18 (37 shosse Revolyutsii); 64. Store No 19 (15 Morskaya naberezhnaya); 65. Store No 5 (136 Moskovskiy prospekt); 66. Store No 20 (65 prospekt Smirnova); 67. Store No 8 (28 Sredniy prospekt).

Self Service Markets

68. Self Service Market No 53 (28 prospekt Sizova); 69. Self Service Market No 9 (81 prospekt Prosveshcheniya); 70. Self Service Market No 41 (74 prospekt Prosveshcheniya); 71. Self Service Market No 16 (1 prospekt Kazakova); 72. Self Service Market No 37 (89 prospekt Veteranov); 73. Self Service Market No 36, 2 branches (62 Sverdlovskaya naberezhnaya); 74. Self Service Market No 14, 1 branch (42 ulitsa Nalichnaya); 75. Self Service Market No 17, 1 branch (13 prospekt Ispytateley); 76. Self Service Market No 55 (4 ulitsa Utochkina); 77. Self Service Market No 51 (11 Industrialnyy prospekt); 78. Self Service Market No 26 (4 ulitsa Tambasova); 79. Self Service Market No 32, 1 branch (140 prospekt Veteranov); 80. Self Service Market No 10 (6 prospekt Bolshhevikov); 81. Self Service Market No 15, 1 branch (12 Iskrovskiy prospekt); 82. Self Service Market No 54 (30/1 ulitsa Kollontay); 83. Self Service Market No 60 (24 ulitsa Trety Pyatiletki); 84. Self Service Market No 4, 1 branch (9 Bukharestskaya ulitsa); 85. Self Service Market No 25 (32 ulitsa Kupchinskaya); 86. Self Service Market No 39; 87. Store No 43 t/f [not further identified] Gastronom; 88. Dunayskiy AP (Self Service Market No 14); 89. Shuvalovskiy Self Service Market No 18; 90. Self Service Market No 1; 91. Lenmebeltorg [Leningrad Furniture Trade] Store No 32; 92. Lenkomissintorg Store No 74 (ulitsa Sedova); 93. Prezent AP—Store No 44 (38 prospekt Nauki); 94. Store No 162 (146 Nevskiy prospekt); 95. Progress AP (49 Kondratyevskiy prospekt); 96. Ekspres AP (8/8 Lesnoy prospekt).

Total: 341 (the program includes 1,594, so the 1st quarter is 21.5 percent of the plan).

Domestic Services Enterprises Subject to Mandatory Privatization

1. Magnoliya Hairdressing Salon 341; 2. Service Shop 1; 3. Service Shop 20; 4. Lenremchas [Leningrad Clock Repair], Shop (5 Vladimirovskiy prospekt, 59 Liteyny prospekt); 5. Obyektiv Photo Shop 16; 6. Clock Repair Shop, 6/12 Lenremchas Plant; 7. Shops 10, 12, and 53 of the Lenremchas Plant; 8. Section 29 of the Obyektiv Combine Book-binding Shop 11; 9. Service Shop 18; 10. Service Shop 3; 11. Shop 18 of the Lenremchas Plant; 12. Lyuks Hairdressing Salon 22; 13. Service Shop 13; 14. Kassios MGP [not further

identified] of Hairdressing Services; 15. Dzerzhinskiy Rayon Service Shop 17; 16. Zima Service Shop 26; 17. Petrogradskiy Rayon Leningradodezhda [Leningrad Clothing] Association Service Shop 10; 18. Clothing Repair Service Shop 14; 19. Clothing Tailoring and Repair Service Shop 5; 20. Rental Shop 53; 21. Leningrad United Pawnshop; 22. Clothing Tailoring and Repair Service Shop 23; 23. Clothing Tailor Service Shop 9; 24. Clothing Tailor Service Shop 9-A; 25. Obyektiv Combine Photography Shop 4; 26. Krasota Salon, hairdressing shop; 27. Nevskiy zori [Neva Dawns]; 28. Hairdressing Salon 110 MRT-1 PPU [not further identified]; 29. Repair and Operations Section of Nevskiy zori AO; 30. Clothing Tailoring and Repair Service Shop 18; 31. The Uyt-1 Leased Enterprise for the Repair and Manufacture of Furniture; 32. Service Shop 7; 33. Service Shop 8; 34. Kuybyshevskiy Rayon Tailoring Service Shop; 35. Kuybyshevskiy Rayon Clothing Tailoring AP Service Shop 19; 36. Zima AP Service Shop 9; 37. Hairdressing Salon 153; 38. Service Shop 19 in Krasnoye Selo; 39. Nevskiy Rayon Rental Shop 5; 40. Vyborgskiy Rayon Tailoring Service Shop 4; 41. Dzerzhinskiy Rayon Clothing Tailoring and Repair Service Shop; 42. Obyektiv AP Photo Service Shop 39; 43. Photo Service Shop 68; 44. Effekt Hair Cutting Salon 412; 45. Vasileostrovskiy Rayon Leningradodezhda AP; 46. Leningradodezhda AP Medeya Enterprise; 47. Hairdressing Salon 1 of MRT [not further identified] 1; 48. Service Shop No 79; 49. Hairdressing Salon 223 MRT 1; 50. Troyka Service Shop; 51. Zima AP Service Shop 4; 52. Uyt-3 Furniture Repair Enterprise; 53. Shop 98 of Neva Branch No 2; 54. Krasnogvardeyskiy Rayon Clothing Tailoring and Repair Service Shop; 55. Viktoriya AP Hairdressing Salon 222; 56. Men's Outerwear Tailoring and Repair Service Shop; 57. Hairdressing Salon 312; 58. Private Photography Shop 88; 59. Petrogradskiy Rayon Service Shop 21; 60. Krasnogvardeyskiy Rayon Tailoring Service Shop 2; 61. Rovesnik [Peer] Service Shop 4; 62. Zima AP Service Shop 10; 63. Zima AP Service Shop 19; 64. Rental Shop 78; 65. Effekt AP Service Shop 102; 66. Hairdressing Salon 106; 67. Effekt AP Hairdressing Salon 182; 68. Effekt AP Hairdressing Salon 49; 69. Effekt AP Hair Cutting Salon 107; 70. Effekt AP Hairdressing Salon 50; 71. Effekt AP Hairdressing Salon 104; 72. Obyektiv Association Amateur Photographers Station; 73. Aelita AP Service Shop 2; 74. Obyektiv Association Photo Service Shop 74; 75. Leningradodezhda AP Service Shop 3; 76. Experimental Shop Service Shop 30; 77. Authors' Service Shop; 78. Branch 26 of the Kuybyshevskiy Rayon Clothing Tailoring and Repair AP; 79. Alpinist Cooperative under the Leningrad Proletarskaya pobeda Shoe Factory; 80. Leningradodezhda AP Service Shop 17; 81. Leningradodezhda AP Stil Enterprise; 82. Rental Shop 41; 83. Leningradodezhda AP Service Shop 10; 84. Service Shop 3; 85. Effekt AP Hairdressing Salon 103; 86. Effekt AP Hairdressing Salon 145; 87. Effekt AP Hairdressing Salon 105; 88. Lotos Shop 2; 89. Artists' Shop; 90. Obyektiv Photo Service Shop 15; 91. Labor Collective of Hairdressing Salon 337; 92. Legal Entity Lekko MP; 93. Legal Entity Feya MP; 94. Labor Collective of Service Shop 21; 95. Labor Collective of Service Shop 10; 96. Labor Collective of Zima AP Service Shop 20; 97. Labor Collective of Zima AP Service Shop 17; 98. Labor Collective of Zima AP Service Shop 24; 99. Labor

Collective of Zima AP Service Shop 12; 100. Branch 2 of the Neva Shoe Repair and Sewing LPO; 101. Labor Collective of Lenremchas Shop 11; 102. Labor Collective of Zima Service Shop 25; 103. Labor Collective of Zima AP Service Shop 21; 104. Labor Collective of Petro AP Hairdressing Salon 64; 105. Labor Collective of Obyektiv Association Station 2 Shop 6; 106. Labor Collective of Shop 13 Workshops 14, 37, and 43; 107. Labor Collective of Photography Shop 28; 108. Legal Entity Kanon MGP; 109. Labor Collective of Severyanka MGP; 110. Legal Entity Petro AP; 111. Legal Entity Hairdressing Salon 176 MGP; 112. Labor Collective of Hairdressing Salon 199; 113. Labor Collective of Hairdressing Salon 410; 114. Labor Collective of Zima AP Service Shop 8; 115. Labor Collective of Rental Shop 28; 116. Labor Collective of Rental Shop 42; 117. Labor Collective of Photo Service Shop 13; 118. Labor Collective of Neva AP Branch 4 Workshop 33; 119. Labor Collective of Workshops 19 and 17; 120. Labor Collective of Workshop 14; 121. Zarya Private Enterprise; 122. Labor Collective of Neva AP Workshop 30; 123. Labor Collective of Neva AP Branch 4 Workshop 15; 124. Labor Collective of Shop of Service Shop 10; 125. Labor Collective of Wedding Celebrations Shop; 126. Labor Collective of Zima AP Service Shop 18; 127. Labor Collective of Obyektiv Association Receiving Station 19; 128. Labor Collective of Neva LPOR and PO Branch 2 Workshop 31; 129. Labor Collective of Neva LPOR and PO Branch 2 Workshop 18; 130. Labor Collective of Neva LPOR and PO Branch 2 Workshop 35; 131. Labor Collective of Sokol LPO Workshop 67; 132. Labor Collective of MRT 2 Hairdressing Salon 371; 133.

Labor Collective of Vyborgskiy Rayon Service Shop 3; 134. Labor Collective of MRT 2 Hairdressing Salon 380; 135. Labor Collective of Rus MRT Hairdressing Salon 414; 136. Labor Collective of MRT 2 Hairdressing Salon 413; 137. Labor Collective of MRT 2 Hairdressing Salon 415; 138. Labor Collective of Kirovskiy Rayon Trust 1 Hairdressing Salon 398; 139. Labor Collective of Frunzenskiy Rayon Clothing Tailoring Service Shop 9; 140. Trinit i AV Closed-Type AO; 141. Labor Collective of the Neva LPOR and PO Branch 4 Workshop 3; 142. Labor Collective of Rovesnik AP Workshop 24; 143. Labor Collective of Lenprokat [Leningrad Rental] AP Rental Shop 77; 144. Labor Collective of Obyektiv Association Photography Shop 60; 145. Labor Collective of Neva LPOR and PO Branch 2 Workshop 33; 146. Labor Collective of Reved MGP; 147. Labor Collective of Kvert State Enterprise; 148. Labor Collective of Sokol PO Shop 4 (Workshops 50, 61, and 64 and section 24); 149. Labor Collective of Zima AP branch and auxiliary production facilities; 150. Labor Collective of the small enterprise Fort; 151. Labor Collective of Obyektiv Combine Section 9 Shop 9; 152. Labor Collective of Effect AP Hairdressing Salon 16; 153. Labor Collective of Sokol Association Receiving Station 22 and Workshops 2 and 40; 154. Alisa AP Hairdressing Salon 331; 155. Labor Collective of Rental Shop 63.

TOTAL: 155 (the program includes 939, so the 1st quarter is 17 percent of the plan).

During privatization the plan may be slightly changed and other enterprises may be added to it.

POLITICAL AFFAIRS

URP 'Confidential' Letter Deplores Khmara Leadership

92UNI347D Kiev VECHERNIY KIYEV in Russian
28 Apr 92 p 2

[Letter to the editors from the Leadership of the Ukrainian Republic Party (URP): "To the Oblast URP Organizations"]

[Text] The editors received this letter a long time ago. We felt that it dealt with the problems of the party itself and for this reason we did not publish it. But evidently we were in error. Everything concealed under the classification "Not For Publication" ultimately became clear. This is the case now. Information has appeared in the press on the confidential letter to the URP. But this has not been completely accurate and in such a form has shaped public opinion in a distorted form.

For this reason, we are publishing the letter in its entirety. In this instance, let us remember that a free press exists so that nothing is concealed in society. In this it differs from the party press which performs the opposite task.

In considering that this letter was read in the party organizations without discussion, we shall also not initiate any polemics over it. We would merely note the contradiction: if S. Khmara is not liked then why such distress over the fact that he did not support the party's candidates for president and people's deputies? Certainly this is playing into his hands. We also feel that the best policy is an open policy.

Our Esteemed Party Confreres!

We want to describe to you frankly and honestly the situation which has come into being now in the party on the eve of the 3rd URP Congress. Each of us is concerned over what place our party will assume in society. This depends primarily upon what policy the party carries out and also to what degree it itself is a healthy, viable organism.

Undoubtedly the authority of the URP has risen and it, as before, sets the tone in Ukrainian political life. But let us look the truth in the face: at the same time we are forced to state that in quantitative terms it is growing feebly. The influx of intellectual forces has been insignificant and this tells negatively on its opportunities to take a real part in resolving the question of the state structure of Ukraine. In our opinion, there are at least two major factors here: the adventurism and far-out extremism of our individual members (this was partially justified during the imperial [Soviet] state, but at present it merely repels people) and secondly, this is the actions and deeds of individual leaders which run contrary to the By-Laws, it is their inability to subordinate their own ego to the interests of the party and Ukraine.

But we must remember that if things go this way in the future, it will be hard for us to count on success in the elections to the Ukrainian Supreme Council; these elections will be held in the spring of this year or the spring of next. This is why we must discuss the actions of our individual well-known party members who have made major contributions in the past but at present are objectively acting not to

the benefit of our common cause. It is a question of the Party's Deputy Chairman, Stepan Khmara. Let us merely give certain facts. Unfortunately significantly more of them could be given.

1. At the 2d URP Congress, S. Khmara agreed to assume the post of deputy party chairman and thus took on the obligations stemming from the URP By-Laws and Program. However, in his speeches and letters directed at the party organizations, he took an extremely negative view of the activities of the party which, as the party's deputy chairman, he also led. But this was not constructive criticism. This was harsh, tactless attacks against persons who had languished for long years in the prisons and camps. At a session of the party leadership and council, his impatience with the opinions of others turned the normal course of work into a stormy sea of passions, and everyone there, if one were to believe him, was either KGB provocateurs or Leninists and Marxists. The last example was the scandal organized by him at a session of the leadership and in the presence of English members of Parliament.

2. The constant setting of himself in opposition to the party has led to extremely negative consequences and to the disorienting of the URP supporters in society. Then, in spite of the decision of the Party Council to have the URP participate in the elections, Mr. S. Khmara first announced that the presidential elections were premature and then, in a television speech, supported not Mr. Lukyanenko but Mr. Taburyanskiy who was very far from the national idea, calling Taburyanskiy the worthiest of the candidates. Again, contrary to the decision of the URP leadership, in the supplementary election to the Supreme Council, he strongly supported not the URP member Ye. Pronyuk, but the Police Lt Col Omelchenko (the very one who at one time was campaigning for the pro-Moscow Gen Dukhov and now his supporters are campaigning in the following manner: "If you want a Banderov slaughter, then vote for Pronyuk").

3. In being devoid of elementary common sense, the activities of S. Khmara following the principles of "only be against," has led him to associate with the reactionary forces even where this directly threatens the independence of Ukraine. Thus, in the Supreme Council by his speech he stopped the promotion of the democrat and member of the People's Council A. Yemets to the post of State Security chairman.

4. Without the approval of the party leadership, S. Khmara headed a junket to the Crimea organized by the Ukrainian National Assembly and during which he resorted to actions which clearly confirmed the image bandied about by communist propaganda of an "enemy nationalist" who supposedly threatened Crimea. This elementary inability to assess a situation, the incapacity to find his way in the conditions, and to predict events provoked the stronger collecting of signatures in favor of a referendum on the separation of Crimea. They significantly retarded the process of the taking of the oath of loyalty to Ukraine by the sailors (in his letter to the leadership, the URP member, Capt 3d Rank I. Teshok wrote about this particularly).

5. Even in December 1991, at a session of the People's Council, S. Khmara stated that "the URP is an uninfluential party which is pushing for power." If S. Khmara, having adopted this formula from the communists and also the bad opinion of the URP, if he so tenaciously used any opportunity to act against the URP—and at the same time he does not want to quit its ranks and leading structures—then the question would arise of what goal is he pursuing consciously or unconsciously?

Esteemed Members of the Council of Oblast Organizations! You and the regular URP members at meetings in the party organizations often ask why S. Khmara is acting contrary to the By-Laws, and why are disciplinary measures not applied to him? Certainly among us there should not be any privileges for any party leaders and we are all equal before Ukraine. Consequently, probably the congress must draw the appropriate conclusions if we are a party and not an amateur club.

On the eve of the 3rd URP Congress it is becoming obvious that the sooner the image and personality of Khmara cease to be linked with the URP, the sooner the engineers, scientists, physicians, journalists and teachers will come to us, the sooner the party will acquire the intellectual forces which at present are so essential for carrying out the program goals of the URP.

We are convinced that in the not distant future the URP should become one of the most influential and authoritative parties of the Ukrainian people. So let us trust in principledness, in the exactingness of the Republicans and in their solidarity and unity. It is precisely with this that we should come to the 3rd URP Congress.

Glory to Ukraine!

[Signed] Petr Borsuk, Levko Gorokhivskiy, Nikolay Gorbal, Bogdan Goryn, Oleg Danilevko, Igor Kravtsiv, Levko Lukyanenko, Oleksa Mikolishin, Vasiliy Ovsienko, Mariya Oliynyk (abstained), Rostislav Onishchak, Oleg Pavlishin, Yevgeniy Pronyuk, Petr Rozumnyy, Oles Shevchenko, Press Secretary of the URP Leadership Viktor Teren, Leadership reviewer Vitaliy Oksenenko and Editor-in-Chief of SAMOSTIYNOYI UKRAYINY Igor Kravchuk

Political Association 'Novaya Ukraina' Registered

92UN1347C Kiev *VECHERNIY KIYEV* in Russian
28 Apr 92 p 1

[Unattributed Article: "A New Birth: 'Novaya Ukraina'"]

[Text] Last Friday, the sociopolitical association "Novaya Ukraina" obtained its official recognition being registered by the Ministry of Justice.

Objectives of Ukrainian Peasant Party Viewed

92UN1358A Kiev *SILSKI VISTI* in Ukrainian
30 Apr 92 p 2

[Article by Vasyl Hruzin, preceded by a letter to the editor: "What the Peasant Party of Ukraine Wants"]

[Text] We have heard that a new Peasant Party has been formed in Ukraine. It would be a good thing if SILSKI

VISTI provided information about this party. [Signed] M. MARTYNOVYCH, V. BUTRYMETS, V. ZHOVNIR-CHUK, O. RAKHOVSKYY, V. SYROTYUK, V. HAY, employees of the Lutskey State Farm.
Village of Mayaky
Lutskey rayon
Volyn oblast

There is indeed such a party in Ukraine. It held its founding conference in January of this year. This took place in Kherson. Two hundred seventeen delegates, representing 11 oblasts, took part in the conference. S.V. Dovhan, director of the Kosmos State Farm in Beryslavskyy rayon of Kherson oblast, was elected head of the party council.

In March the party was registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine.

The Statute of the Peasant Party [SelPU] states that it is "a democratic political organization dedicated to the parliamentary system, which has as its goal the unification of rural workers, all those who increase the wealth and add to the spiritual culture of the people of Ukraine with their labor."

Membership in the Peasant Party is open to anyone 16 years of age or older, who is not a member of another party, is active in one of the party's primary organizations, and supports the party financially. Members are admitted into the party at a meeting of a primary cell at the personal request of the applicant, and there is no provision for candidate status.

The Peasant Party of Ukraine is made up of primary cells, and village, rayon, and oblast organizations. A primary cell may be formed when there is a minimum of three members. The cell elects its own leader. Party organizations elect councils whose composition is determined by the appropriate assembly. The party council is elected by the party congress.

The budget of the SelPU is made up of membership dues, voluntary contributions, and income from economic activity. Membership dues amount to: for those employed—one percent of their monthly earnings, for pensioners and party members with low incomes—one-half of one percent of their monthly income.

What caused this new party to emerge in the political arena? It was noted at the founding conference that the democratic gains and political freedoms in Ukraine as an independent state have not yet become real economic and social gains for the general public. The situation is further exacerbated by the fact that the economy is continuing to decline and inflation is gaining momentum, resulting in an ever increasing deterioration of the people's living standard and the continued growth of the poverty-stricken ranks of the population. The peasants have been especially hard hit; they see no prospects in the present conditions and are even losing confidence in the usefulness of their work. There is growing tension among the people, a fact that carries the threat of a social explosion.

The SelPU believes that the peasants, more than any other group, should function as a stabilizing force in society, irrespective of the forms of production in which they are

occupied and whether they work in collective or state farms or are engaged in private farming. By taking into account the real state of affairs and on this basis reflecting the fundamental interests of the peasants, and by exercising a positive influence on the development of the economy, the Peasant Party will serve the interests of all the working people of Ukraine.

The SelPU supports the sovereignty of Ukraine, which it views as an independent state in the framework of the global economic space.

The Program states that SelPU supports a multiparty system, the plurality of opinions, and democracy and rejects the use of force and persecution with respect to those holding different views. As a party that endorses the parliamentary system, the SelPU is in favor of political compromise and agreement, of developing ties with those parties whose policies serve the interests of the working masses.

The SelPU has established ties and actively cooperates with the Peasant Union and the Council of Collective Farms of Ukraine.

In socioeconomic terms, the SelPU holds that the transition to a market economy should occur in stages; this is the road to building a socially just society. Privatization is recognized as an essential mechanism of economic activity at this stage, but only in those sectors where existing options have been exhausted. Thus, while it supports the development of leased and privately owned farms, the Peasant Party at the same time rejects the complete privatization of the collective and state farm forms of ownership. Fundamental changes in the agroindustrial complex are viewed by the Peasant Party as impossible without a constructive government policy that provides for the mandatory protection of peasant farms in a civilized manner in the event of natural catastrophes, poor harvests, and the like.

The program of the SelPU includes sections elaborating upon the party's principal tasks in the ecological sphere and in the spheres of education and culture.

The First Congress of the Peasant Party of Ukraine is expected to convene in June of this year. It will certainly feature a debate on the party's economic program. A preliminary review of this program was conducted at the meeting of the party council on 15 April of this year in Kiev. After all additions and proposals have been included, this document will be submitted for discussion in the primary cells, village, rayon, and oblast organizations.

At this time, the SelPU is devoting a great deal of attention to forming party organizations in all oblasts and rayons in the belief that this is one of the prerequisites of ensuring effective social protection for the peasants.

The party council provided me with the following information. Currently the SelPU has organizations in 11 oblasts and a membership of close to ten thousand people.

At my request, I was also provided with addresses: 252001, Kiev-1, Khreshchatyk, 24, Room 304; 325000, Kherson, Mayakovskyy St., 6, Room 417.

Statistical Data on Supreme Council, Deputies *92UN1347A Kiev VECHErNIY KIYEV in Russian* *29 Apr 92 p 1*

[Unattributed statistical report: "In the Corridors of Power: Deputies in the Mirror of Statistics"]

[Text] Seemingly the voters know everything about the Supreme Council and their representatives, as the sessions are transmitted virtually fully on radio and television. However, these fragmentary impressions do not provide a full, generalizing picture; only this can come from statistics which, as the people say, knows everything. What does it know about the Supreme Council and its deputies? Let us glance at the statistical data prepared for the second anniversary of the 12th Sitting of the Supreme Council.

Prepared, Reviewed and Adopted

First, some general characteristics. Some 24 permanent commissions have been organized in the Supreme Council. The deputies are united by different principles in 14 deputy groups. Some 193 people's deputies are employed permanently in the Supreme Council.

During the 2 years, some 355 plenary sessions have been held, over 1,000 various questions have been reviewed and 118 laws and codes adopted.

Presently the Fifth Session is meeting. Its agenda includes 93 questions. By 1 April, 23 of these questions should be fully settled, 10 will be examined in a first reading, 7 are to be given further work after discussion and the remaining questions are to be worked out and prepared.

Out of the entire diversity of problems, priority is given to economic questions: of the 28 drafts, 19 have been discussed and 11 adopted. In second place is the question of military organizational development: of the 10 planned drafts, 6 have been discussed.

Unfortunately, of the 9 questions relating to social problems, not one has been brought up for discussion. Only one draft has been reviewed on the questions of ecology.

Who Speaks Most Often

The TV viewers would scarcely be concerned with such figures. But the Rada electronic system has produced such data for all the deputies as of 2 April, that is, who spoke several times during the Fifth Session (from the rostrum). We give the data on the deputies from Kiev in the order they appeared in the Rada system.

Larisa Skorik (electoral district 1) spoke 5 times; Les Tanyuk (3)—2, Oles Shevchenko (5)—2, Valeriy Ivasyuk (9)—2, Nikolay Dzyuba (11)—5, Ivan Saliy (13)—2, Pavel Kislyy (15)—4, Ivan Zayets (17)—11, Anatoliy Mokrousov (19)—0, Aleksandr Yemets (21)—5, Pavel Movchan (2)—7, Yuriy Zbitnev (4)—2, Vitold Fokin (6)—2, Yuriy Gnatkevich (8)—5, Vladimir Kryzhanivskiy (10)—0, Yaroslav Kondratyev (12)—4, Vitaliy Karpenko (14)—3, Aleksandr Kotsyuba (16)—1, Sergey Golovatyy (18)—4, Vladimir Shovkoshitnyy (20)—0 and Yuriy Kostenko (22)—2.

In comparison with the other deputies, the Kievan ones were rather active during the session. Ivan Zayets has a sort

of record among the Kievans and is in third place among the other deputies. In the course of the Fifth Session, only Petr Osadchuk and Nikolay Porovskiy took the floor more often than Zayets—each 12 times.

Who Traveled Abroad

This question is of interest to many voters and on this matter there has been no lack of rumors and conjecture. In the Supreme Council information has been distributed giving data which are available to the Sector for International Ties Under the Supreme Council Secretariat concerning overseas trips by the people's deputies. If these data are full and accurate, then of the 21 deputies from Kiev (one withdrew), 13 have made overseas trips. Most often this was Sergey Golovatyy who visited West Germany, Canada, Turkey, three times to Great Britain, France, the U.S. as well as Malta and Jamaica. The aim of the trips was predominantly to participate in scientific conferences as well as by private invitation.

Aleksandr Yemets visited Switzerland, he was twice in Great Britain and the U.S., where he participated in various political measures. Ivan Zayets traveled to the U.S., to France upon the invitation of the National Assembly and to West Germany. Yuriy Zbitnev, upon the invitation of the social democratic parties, visited Sweden and Great Britain twice. Valeriy Ivasyuk participated in a scientific conference in Canada. Vitaliy Karpenko, upon an invitation from the West German Government, visited that country. Yuriy Kostenko traveled to a conference on ecological questions in the U.S. Yaroslav Kondratyev and Aleksandr Kotsyuba each visited West Germany and France. Larisa Skorik was in Canada and twice in the U.S. Les Tanyuk traveled to West Germany, Oles Shevchenko to Poland, Belgium and Norway, while Vladimir Shovkoshitnyy was in France and three times in West Germany on Chernobyl matters.

Virtually all expenses were paid for by the welcoming side and only Ya. Kondratyev was sent on an official trip at the expense of the Supreme Council.

We are not going to comment on all these statistical data as the reader can figure them out himself. However, we are convinced that they explain a great deal and will put an end to the various conjectures and rumors.

State Investigates Firearms Violations, Thefts

92UN1347B Kiev GOLOS UKRAINY in Russian
6 May 92 p 4

[Information provided by the Commission of the Ukrainian Supreme Council on the Questions of Law and Order and the Combating of Crime: "Operation 'Weapons' Is Over"]

[Text] The Ukrainian internal affairs bodies have completed a days-long, comprehensive operation under the code name "Weapons" and during which they checked 11,409 objects in the license system registered with the internal affairs bodies. Over 4,000 violations were detected involving the keeping of weapons and ammunition. In line with this, the operation of 897 installations was halted, and here temporarily, until the eliminating of the shortcomings, they confiscated 3,618 units of weapons and a significant

quantity of ammunition. Some 349 officials were held liable under administrative procedures. In the aim of preventing thefts in the buildings for storing the weapons, 3,057 special chemical traps were set out.

Together with the prevention groups of the city and rayon councils of the Ukrainian Hunter and Fishermen Society, some 206,000 owners of hunting weapons were checked. More than 2,500 persons were discovered who had withdrawn from the hunting societies. Some 652 guns were confiscated from them. Over 740 weapon owners were established who systematically violate public order and abuse alcohol and over 800 weapon units were confiscated from them. All in all, over 3,700 persons were held administratively liable for violations of the rules for the storage and keeping of weapons and the dates for their reregistration. As a result of the explanatory work, some 519 units of firearms were voluntarily turned in by the public. During the verification of alerts concerning illegal possession, some 970 units were confiscated. Information on instances of violations was sent to the leaders of 676 enterprises and organizations. Considering that a significant number of thefts is carried out in institutions of learning, the Ukrainian Ministry of Education has been sent a letter requesting a study of the question and ensuring the safe guarding and storing of the weapons in the institutions of learning.

ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

Parliament Rejects 1992 Draft Budget

92UN1349A Kiev VECHERNIY KIYEV in Russian
28 Apr 92 p 1

[Article by Lyudmila Vasilyeva: "The Parliamentary Week: When Social Protection Is a Luxury"]

[Text] The discussion of the state budget for the current year, in going on with varying success since December of last year, is very similar, as the experience of the Parliamentary debates has already shown, to the skinning of a still alive bear. Is it not true that there is a strange ring to the debates over where more of the billions are to be allocated: for social needs, the army or the countryside, in knowing full well that the receipts by the budget are declining, the producer-taxpayer has been dealt a knockout blow and at present he has no incentives to stop the decline in production.

In recognizing this, the legislators all the same feel awkward as an independent state which has proclaimed a policy of economic reform cannot even approve its own budget. In the experience of other countries, they say, it has never happened that a state sat 6 months without a budget. It is somehow comic.

Hence the Parliamentary debates last week over the next draft of the state budget ended, as usual, with having the draft sent back for further work. It is only known that the revised budget will be "socially oriented" (only for now no one knows at the expense of what, that is, if this is at the expense of the army expenditures which in the draft exceeded the subsidies for the social protection of the public, or let alone for the needs of the countryside, then this

might be a good thing) and the previous tax rate on income of 18 percent is to be maintained. Moreover, the principle of rigid savings and minimum state crediting is to be established in the budget.

Just how difficult it will be to orient the budget to social problems can be seen from the discussion of two other decrees: on increasing the guarantees for the public (in which it is planned that the minimum wage will be raised to 650 rubles and pensions to 550) and on the mechanism for the state regulation of the wage funds. In either case the dilemma is whether we, as before, will repeat the measures being undertaken in Russia and be drawn into the growing inflation of the ruble zone or will follow our own path, divorcing ourselves from the inflationary problems of the ruble partners.

The legislators are more and more inclined to move more quickly out of the ruble zone. If only because in order to equal the wage level in Russia of 900 rubles, it would take double the amount of cash coupons than currently exists. In the opinion of Ivan Zayets and other deputies, the mechanism for regulating the wage fund, in making an increase in wages dependent upon a rise in production, would work only in the instance that Ukraine converted fully to coupon circulation. But the deputies decided not to establish this condition in the decree without preliminary figures and put off its resolution until the following Parliamentary week.

Finance, Economics Officials Removed from Office

92UN1348C Kiev DEMOKRATYCHNA UKRAYINA
in Ukrainian 21 Apr 92 p 1

[Unsigned, untitled news item]

[Text] In accordance with a decision of the Cabinet of Ministers, First Deputy Minister of Finance V.P. Tentyuk, Deputy Minister of Economic Affairs V.H. Kotko, and First Deputy Minister of Labor I.V. Frandyuk were dismissed from office for exhibiting an irresponsible attitude to the performance of their duties and to implementing the decisions of the President and the Cabinet of Ministers. First Deputy Minister of Economic Affairs L.Ya. Korniyenko was issued a reprimand for unsatisfactory work in organizing the implementation of the President's decrees.

Statistics Ministry Reports Consumer Price Index for March

92UN1349B Kiev VECHERNIY KIYEV in Russian
28 Apr 92 p 1

[Unattributed statistical report: "In Ukraine: The Statistics Ministry Announces"]

[Text] The Ukrainian Statistics Ministry has announced that the consumer price index for the fixed range of goods and services comprising the minimum consumer budget, for March 1992, was 129.2 percent in relation to the price level in January 1992.

New Trade Minister Discusses Foreign Investment, Exports

92UN1349C Kiev VECHERNIY KIYEV in Russian
30 Apr 92 p 1

[Unattributed interview with the Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Economic Ties and Trade Anatoliy Nikolayevich Voronkov: "Trade Should Be Denationalized"]

[Text] Probably there is no sector which attracts more attention or has caused the constant dissatisfaction of the public than has the sphere of trade. Presently, trade, both domestic and foreign, is living through difficult times.

Today we given the floor to the head of the newly-formed Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Economic Ties and Trade, Anatoliy Nikolayevich Voronkov.

[Correspondent] Anatoliy Nikolayevich! Although you are not new to the managerial structures of trade, however not all the readers of our newspaper know you. A few words about yourself, please.

[Voronkov] I am 40 years old. I was born in the Poltava Region. There I completed a cooperative institute. At the same time I gained practical wisdom in trade work, rising from junior salesman to the head of an administration in the Ukrainian Ministry of Trade.

My wife works in trade and my son is finishing a technical school. In March of the current year, from a position as the deputy chairman of the Poltava Oblispolkom, I was appointed minister.

[Correspondent] How do you like your title combining the ministry of foreign economic ties and...trade? Does this not mean extra troubles for you?

[Voronkov] What is life without troubles? Particularly in setting up new structures. The problem is that trade as such should not be divided into domestic and foreign. Trade is trade; it makes no difference to it whether you are selling consumer goods or, for instance, resources and equipment. On the contrary, a skillful combination of the foreign channels which would work to supply the domestic market with consumer goods has always produced tangible results. It is another matter to force them to work in the necessary direction...

[Correspondent] In what manner do you intend to reorganize trade so that the stores have food and consumer goods at acceptable prices? Are the first steps in this direction linked to the commercialization of trade?

[Voronkov] The commercialization of the stores, dining rooms and other trade structural subdivisions is precisely that reorganization of the sector's management in the course of which the administrative-command structures should be eliminated and in their place market structures formed in the form of various business companies and individual, independent enterprises.

The main thing which commercialization will provide is assisting in the development of free trade and creating competition. And if there is competition, then there will be the commodities, the prices will be lower and the salesman

will be interested in the buyer. At present we have prepared the corresponding proposals the adoption of which will eliminate the obstacles on the path of commercialization. Above all this means overcoming the operating at a loss in trade.

But it must be realized that commercialization is still only the first stage in the reorganization of trade. Really free trade structures will arise only in the process of privatization and the ministry will encourage this in every possible way. That is, for a fundamental change in the situation existing in the supply of consumer goods for the public, trade should be denationalized.

[Correspondent] Anatoliy Nikolayevich! Recently the U.S. Secretary of Commerce Barbara Franklin stated that American businessmen would try to find ways for making efficient investments in the new states and for increasing exports to the new markets. However, as Franklin stressed, they are quite concerned by the fact that with the existing business climate, the possible risk becomes significantly more than the possible gain... How would you reply to your colleague's statement?

[Voronkov] By setting out our understanding of the mechanism for regulating foreign economic activities. Here are its basic theses.

We must immediately activate all mechanisms, both legislative and executive, to make exports advantageous. For this purpose the exporters are to be left with a significant part of the earned foreign exchange.

We must simplify the system for granting permission to participate in foreign political [sic.] activity.

For the encouragement and development of trade, we must improve the procedures for exports and barter operations, for now according to the corresponding list and the corresponding benefits.

Subsequently we must give up the quotas and licenses and introduce export tariffs in their place. That is, we must regulate foreign trade not through a system of prohibitions, but rather in being guided solely by economic methods.

We must restore the confidence of the enterprises in what is now our own banking system. For this we must establish a normal foreign exchange market with the participation of Western banks. It must be made disadvantageous for our firms and business people to keep the foreign exchange earned by them overseas.

The Law on Foreign Investments has already gone into force and according to it, the investors are guaranteed protection for the invested funds and benefits are provided in taxation and in the exporting of products produced by enterprises with foreign investments.

Incidentally, I am confident that the foreigners are coming to us not for the benefits (primarily the partners on our side need the benefits) but for the potential market. For this reason they can be encouraged in collaboration without any particular difficulty, have established clear and stable conditions for this.

Czecho-Slovak Businessmen Sign 'Many Agreements' in Ukraine

924A1188A Kiev GOLOS UKRAINY in Russian
6 May 92 p 11

[Article by Artem Prokhorenko: "Nothing Ventured, Nothing Gained: SLOVEX"]

[Text] It was probably with precisely such an attitude that representatives of 52 firms from Czecho-Slovakia arrived here in Kiev. And they were not mistaken. Because over a three-day period this first mission of Czecho-Slovak businessmen garnered quite a few proposals and concluded a large number of contracts and agreements with their Ukrainian colleagues. This attests to the painstaking preparatory work done by the organizers of such actions: the Ukrainian Institute of Economics, Administration, and Business Law, the Krok firm, and the Czecho-Slovak Association of Entrepreneurs known as "SLOVEX."

We asked the president of SLOVEX, Engineer Otto Burian, to comment on this event.

"The goal of our first serious mission during the two years of our association's existence is a simple one—to clarify the situation, both political and economic, in Ukraine and to establish contacts in various spheres of production with your enterprises. This was caused primarily by the great interest on the part of Czecho-Slovak businessmen in the Ukrainian market.

"In summing up the results of this meeting, I can state with confidence that almost all our entrepreneurs are satisfied with the contacts which were established. Because, after all, they had—on an average—as many as ten meetings with Ukrainian firms of interest to them. According to preliminary calculations, contracts were signed and agreements concluded involving almost 100 million dollars. Consequently, our mission has accomplished its task. And—in this connection—we have decided to hold another analogous meeting in the Ukrainian capital after a month and a half."

But then wherein lies the risk, if everything went so well? According to the president of SLOVEX, it lies in the instability of the economic situation in Ukraine. In particular, it is to be explained by the great difficulties experienced by our entrepreneurs with regard to exporting goods. And we cannot help but agree with this. Because, of course, taxes on exports in Ukraine have reached 50-70 percent of the profit. But in Czecho-Slovakia such taxes are being lowered in order to facilitate the export of goods.

Mr. Burian sees another obstacle caused by crazy or senseless taxes is the fact that the shadow, i.e., underground, economy is still "running the show" in our country even now. According to him, he received offers from dubious businessmen whereby he could have obtained everything from a tank to the Order of Lenin.

"Your market is extremely abundant," the president of SLOVEX said in conclusion, "and the entire world is interested in it because it has the best prospects among all the CIS countries. But its principal shortcoming consists of abnormal operating conditions, both for foreign investors.

as well as for Ukrainian businessmen themselves. There are many fine laws, but most of them either will not work, or they suffer from imperfections. For that reason it is the legislators who will have the deciding word in creating a market economy in Ukraine.

Prospects for Gold Mining Viewed

92UN1359A Kiev *SILSKI VISTI* in Ukrainian
30 Apr 92 p 1

[Interview with Vadym Koval, director of the metallogenetic division of the Institute of Geochemistry and Physics of Materials, doctor of geologic and mineralogical sciences, by D. Kyyanskyy, Ukrinform [Ukrainian Information Agency] correspondent; place and date not given: "Where To Look for the Ukrainian Klondike"]

[Text] There have been quite a few reports in our newspapers recently about the discovery of new sites of gold-bearing ores in Ukraine. What kind of prospects do they offer for the establishment of a national gold mining industry? The director of the metallogenetic division of the Institute of Geochemistry and Physics of Materials, doctor of geologic and mineralogical sciences Vadym Koval talked about this with the correspondent of Ukrinform [Ukrainian Information Agency].

[Kyyanskyy] The Muzhiyev deposit near Berehove in Transcarpathia was discovered two years ago, but so far we have heard nothing about the mining of the precious metal...

[Koval] The Muzhiyev goldfield is average-sized in terms of the quantity of gold it contains. At a normal mining pace, its reserves are sufficient to last about 10 to 15 years. A program for its recovery has already been put together. It calls for retooling the Eastern Mining and Ore Dressing Combine in Zhovti Vody, which currently specializes in the extraction of uranium. Strictly speaking, the combine has adequate facilities for both jobs and more. But there are problems involving economic and ecological concerns. A decision must be made as to what to transport. The question is far from simple. Some specialists suggest transporting the ore from Transcarpathia to Zhovti Vody. Others believe that it makes more sense to bring only the concentrate to the Zhovti Vody combine. And others still assert that it is better to recover the gold on the spot. But this third variant involves major complications: it requires the use of cyanides, which are damaging to the environment. In particular, they destroy vineyards.

Whatever the reasons, the exploitation of the deposit has been held up. So far matters have not progressed beyond the discussion stage. Many fear that the costs of extracting the gold will equal the value of the gold itself. But even if that were true, the republic's economy would still gain. After all, the "wooden" rubles spent on exploration would gradually be transformed into hard currency once mining began. Thereby, their value would increase at least a hundredfold.

[Kyyanskyy] The recent report of the discovery of gold-bearing deposits in the region of Kirovohrad has aroused great interest. Has their industrial exploitation been considered?

[Koval] As a rule, the gold found in Ukraine in recent years has been located in ancient crystalline rock formations. For example, in the Dnieper region, in the region along the Buh River, and other sites. Now this precious metal has also been discovered in sedimentary formations. I think that the recent discovery of gold in the region of Kirovohrad attracted interest primarily because the gold was found lying near the surface in alluvial deposits.

As to the prospects for its industrial recovery, I feel that these are quite small. The thing is that the gold from such orefields must be extracted by means of dredging (for example, in the Transbaikal region, along the Kolyma). This involves the movement of enormous amounts of rock tailings. Great volumes of water are required for washing. This means that there needs to be a developed river system nearby, and no such system exists in Kirovohrad oblast. Moreover, this is where the valuable Dokuchayev chernozem is located, which is under the protection of UNESCO. The mining of gold here would make huge areas of fertile land unfit for cultivation.

Prospecting for gold is a rather new direction for Ukrainian geology. No serious endeavors in this field were made in our country in earlier years. As a result, we need to perform a large volume of boring operations. But the cost of this work, even compared with last year, has increased two or three times, which has automatically resulted in a decrease in exploration.

[Kyyanskyy] What do you think—will new deposits be found in our republic?

[Koval] I think so. But we must first make an industrial appraisal of the gold-bearing ores that have already been found.

Ukrainian Metallurgical Concern Formed

92UN1320B Kiev *DEMOKRATYCHNA UKRAYINA*
in Ukrainian 16 Apr 92 p 1

[Unattributed, unsigned article]

[Text] More than 100 industrial enterprises, associations, concerns, commercial banks, organizations, and institutions of various forms of ownership have founded Ukrmetal, the Ukrainian Metallurgical Company, in Dnepropetrovsk. The Charter of the new firm emphasizes that it is not part of state structures of administration and that its purpose is to protect the interests of its collective founders under conditions of the developing market economy. Oleksandr Pozhyvanov has been elected president of the company; until recently he headed the Ukrainian State Committee of the Metallurgical Industry, which has been abolished.

Rukh Resolution Deplores Course of Land Reform

92UN1348A Kiev *NARODNA HAZETA* in Ukrainian
No 16, Apr 92 p 4

[Article: "Resolution of the Great Council of Rukh on the Course of Land Reform in Ukraine"]

[Text] The session of the Great Council of Rukh asserts that land reform in Ukraine is being carried out at an unsatisfactory pace and has not progressed beyond the initial stage. The principal causes of this deplorable situation in land reform are:

- the lack of a government program of comprehensive land reform, undersupply of equipment and financial resources for farms, and the failure to enforce existing legislation by the executive branch of the government;
- opposition to the implementation of land reform by such conservative forces as the Peasant Party, Socialist Party, and Peasant Union;
- unfamiliarity on the part of the general public with the nature and direction of land reform;
- lack of control by state organs and the public over the course of land reform and the actions of civil servants.

Conservative and reactionary forces are delaying the creation of a real Reserve Land Fund and attempting to frighten people with the impending threat of "kulaks," thereby creating a negative psychological climate. Often people who request land are refused or are allotted untillable plots of land, plots that are a long distance away from the village, having low soil fertility, and comprise very small parcels.

The Great Council of Rukh believes that the existing situation can be remedied by:

- accelerating the political reform of the entire hierarchy of government and administrative structures;
- privatizing land ownership—that is, transferring ownership of land to the peasants (with the exception of the state reserve fund) as the basis for creating individual peasant and collective farm enterprises;
- reorganizing the collective and state farm system by sharing out to create a multiform farm system;
- developing in the fastest time possible a national land reform program, particularly establishing a system of private farming, and providing farms with machinery, fuel, fertilizer, etc.;
- unifying the existing associations of farmers into a single association and ensuring its independence;
- granting favorable tax and credit terms to farms, ensuring price parity for agricultural enterprises;
- strengthening the material and technical base of the processing sectors and improving production storage facilities;
- establishing priorities in agricultural development, such as, for instance, the production of seed, sugar, and oil, as well as the production of feed, preserving and processing production;
- making a transition to a market-oriented, commercial mechanism of ties between the producers of goods and goods supply and trade organizations, of direct ties with processing enterprises, commodities exchanges, fairs, and

auctions; creating, on the one hand, a market of agricultural raw materials and foodstuffs, and on the other hand, a market of material and technical resources for the agroindustrial complex;

- organizing theoretical and practical training for farmers and agricultural specialists;
- significantly increasing the amount of available information on land reform.

The Great Council of Rukh deems it useful to convene an All-Ukrainian Congress of Farmers at the end of May for the purpose of unifying farmers into a single, genuinely independent union that would effectively safeguard the interests of farmers and protect their rights. The organizational department of the Secretariat of the People's Movement of Ukraine shall be responsible for conducting the assembly.

Head of Peasants Union on Labor Unrest in Agrarian Sector

92UN1320A Kiev DEMOKRATYCHNA UKRAYINA
in Ukrainian 9 Apr 92 pp 1-2

[Interview with Ukrainian Peasants Union Chairman Ivan Mozhovyy and Ukrainian Peasants Party Chairman Sergiy Dovhan by O. Yabolnyk: "Springtime of Worries and Hopes: Strike Committees Being Formed in Countryside." Commentary on the Results of Grain Farmers' Meeting With President L. Kravchuk and Head of Ukrainian Government V. Fokin"; date and place not given]

[Text] The agrarian sector these days resembles a ship which headed out to sea and sprang a huge leak. President Leonid Kravchuk and Prime Minister Vitold Fokin tried to patch it somehow at a meeting with representatives of Ukraine's peasantry and processing sectors, which was held in February. The plan was to focus the discussion on matters of preparing for springtime field work and improving the management of the agroindustrial complex. But the farmers had built up so much resentment over social injustice and "burning issues" that the President barely succeeded in calming down the mounting conflict between the government and farm goods producers. But will it last? Lately, since the start of springtime field work, things have become even more unsettled in the countryside. People's dissatisfaction is growing, strike committees are being formed, decisions are being made about warning strikes. What has happened? We asked Ukrainian Peasants Union Chairman Ivan Mozhovyy and Ukrainian Peasants Party Chairman Serhiy Dovhan to respond.

I. MOZHOVYY: Yes, the situation is bad. Whole rayons and oblasts have declared a boycott against industrial enterprises which have set unreasonably high prices on farm machinery. Nearly 100 farms in Volynya staged a warning strike and stated they would stop deliveries of milk, meat and other products unless normal conditions were created for farmers to work. The farmers of Donetsk and Poltava formed strike committees. A delegation from Khmelnytskyi Oblast came to Kiev with a package of demands. Sumy decided to hold an extraordinary congress of the Peasants Union, and the same thing is happening in Chernovtsy, Volynya, and other oblasts.

It has been caused by a lot of objective factors, however unfortunate.

Life in the countryside got a lot worse after price liberalization, although it wasn't all that great before. Prices on industrial goods, materials, and equipment went sky-high and threatened the very existence of many agricultural enterprises. To top it off, the peasant is subjected to moral pressure, because all the blame for increased food prices has been dumped on... the peasant himself! And, sad to say, most of the urban population believes this falsehood. To put a stop to this nonsense, the Presidium of the Peasants Union and Council of Kolkhozes insisted on a meeting with Ukrainian Prime Minister Vitold Pavlovych Fokin, who reacted to almost all the agrarians' critical remarks and gave appropriate directives regarding their implementation.

However, the implementation bogged down. In February we tried to get the President to see the truth about the poverty of the countryside. Apparently, everyone heard the voice of the countryside. At the President's directive, the Cabinet of Ministers worked out measures to rectify the situation—except they were not backed up by vigorous action. Meanwhile, agricultural production was declining on the farms, farm workers' wages were actually going down, the crops were in jeopardy, more and more farms went bankrupt and even stopped paying wages.

The agrarian deputies spoke up in favor of these conditions to protect peasants' interests. The issue was submitted to the session for discussion, and the appropriate decree was passed. The Cabinet of Ministers worked out new measures, the third such this year....

How well are they being implemented? Judge for yourselves. The bank, for example, allocated 20.6 billion rubles—but for what? For the farms and other agroindustrial enterprises to pay off back payments for material-technical resources and for paying advances to farm goods producers for contracted products—although, let's be frank, the benefit to be gained from that is not as much as would appear at first glance. The reason farmers haven't bought industrial goods is that they are priced ten times too high, and now the state is lending money to the peasants so that they, in turn, will rescue all those monopolists and buy the goods the warehouses are bulging with.

Another two billion rubles was allocated from the budget to liquidate indebtedness by way of subsidies to dairy and meat industry enterprises. It was decided to exempt agricultural enterprises from paying into the fund to promote employment; it was also decided to use budget funds to compensate value-added taxes they paid for material-technical resources and services. Rates of contributions to social insurance and to the Chernobyl Fund were reduced. Finally, a decision was made in favor of the counter-sale [zustrichnyy prodazh] of sugar, oil, meat and dairy products, and other processed goods to the farms at retail prices, subsidized by the state. A decree was passed to increase the normal allotment, to sugar-beet farms, to 150 kilograms of sugar for every tonne of sugar in beets delivered, 5 percent

of the sugar to be retained by the refiners and 0.5 kilograms to be retained by the transport workers for every tonne of beets hauled.

DOVHAN: What the farms ought to get, along with sugar, is a license which would allow them to market their products on their own. The farms also need more rights in the licensing of other types of goods. Enough has been proclaimed from the government rostrum, but very little has been done. Losses due to the depreciation of assets in connection with price liberalization are not being compensated. Not long ago we examined the Ukase on the 2.2-fold indexation for goods sold to the state last year. They sure took their time signing it! And another question arises: Why are peasants being paid only 500 to 600 rubles a month—the same amount people in the cities are getting for unemployment? How about the fuel problem? At sowing time there was some to be had, by scraping the barrel, so to speak, because mainly solar oil was in use; but crop harvesting, which lasts from May to November, requires gasoline—lots of it! Meanwhile, a kilogram right now costs an average of 25 rubles—costlier than meat. At prices like that we're going to go broke. Compare: If the aforementioned Ukase on indexation goes into effect, we will get back about 60 billion rubles, but buying fuel at the new prices will require an outlay of 250 billion!

Calculations show that a farm can survive if the cost of a kilogram of gasoline doesn't exceed 2.7 rubles. They tell us. The state will subsidize it. But why subsidize farming? It would be better for the state to subsidize the producers of energy—gasoline, solar oil, electricity, gas, and coal—rather than the consumers. At the same time, a ukase ought to be prepared immediately indexing fuel. Otherwise, the prices are going to ruin farming. Recently, for example, I received a bill/notice [platizhka] that gasoline would cost 25 rubles. I hardly had time to catch my breath when I learned that the Ministry of Communications had also raised its services from 5 to 75 million, although our fixed capital in that ministry comes to about a third.

CORRESPONDENT: So what do you propose?

DOVHAN: Pass a law on price parity immediately. But when will that be? The government is too slow in preparing documents which would confirm the priority of the countryside in deeds, not just words; after all, the whole nation depends on the countryside for its wellbeing. It would be a good thing if DEMOKRATYCHNA UKRAYINA, for example, which a lot of peasants consider their own, undertook civic monitoring of the well-known Supreme Soviet decree on the countryside. For our part, we wrote to the President and the Prime Minister asking that they get moving on the documents, which have lain around too long on government desks.

MOZHOVYY: Of course, the farmer does his job under all circumstances; he does what he must to complete springtime

field work properly and on time and lay the foundation for the coming harvest. If the farmers have bread before the harvest comes in, they can work confidently to find fair solutions to the problems facing them. But if extremely necessary decisions are delayed too long, we will be forced, on behalf of the peasantry, to convene an extraordinary meeting of the presidiums of the Peasants Union, the Council of Kolkhozes, the Peasants Party, and the trade unions of the agroindustrial complex to analyze the situation, which could get out of hand, and map out a course of action. Wouldn't it be better, though, to take steps to prevent a new round of confrontations?

Ministry Lists Birth, Death Statistics

92UN1348B Kiev DEMOKRATYCHNA UKRAYINA
in Ukrainian 21 Apr 92 p 1

[Unsigned, untitled news item]

[Text] The Ministry of Statistics has obtained new demographic data. It shows that 100,898 citizens were born during the first two months of this year in independent Ukraine. Unfortunately, these figures are accompanied by less comforting numbers: during this same period, close to 130,000 persons have died.

KAZAKHSTAN

Nazarbayev on Current Political Issues

92USD481A Moscow TRUD in Russian 14 May 92 p 2

[O. Kvyatkovskiy summary of views on various issues of N. Nazarbayev, president of the Republic of Kazakhstan: "The Path of Mutual Threats Leads to Impasse"]

[Text] Finding a "window" in his traditionally over-full work schedule, N. Nazarbayev, president of the Republic of Kazakhstan, received a group of correspondents of former central newspapers. O. Kvyatkovskiy, TRUD correspondent, offers the readers the viewpoints of Nursultan Abishevich Nazarbayev on various topics equally troubling inhabitants of the CIS today.

On the Limit of Compromise

"If we analyze the qualitative composition of the executive authorities of the republic, I would not say that we have undergone a personnel revolution. There are among the apparatchiks former partocrats also, who are openly gloating in connection with the difficulties in the way of radical transformations. Others are countering the reforms secretly, sabotaging them by disguised moves. Yet others, to whom their pockets are always dearer than their convictions, are seeking a "profitable place" in commerce. Yet again others—people of advanced years—are taking to heart the fact that their life's values have collapsed. Some feel aggrieved, others, deceived.

"I find it hard to blame them. But entirely understandable compassion for people who have not been able to relinquish the postulates drummed into them for over 70 years by no means justifies an indulgent attitude toward them. Particularly if, as before, the threads of political, constitutional-legal, and economic administration are concentrated in their hands. There can be no compromise here. We gave everyone an opportunity to reconsider their convictions and waited patiently for the personnel's mental restructuring. The allotted time is up."

On Messianism and Dictatorship

"Many of the Communist Party's present defenders do not know the historical facts of the tragic realization in practice of the communist idea and cannot analyze the situation in which we have found ourselves after 74 years of the rule of Soviet power. They do not realize that the anomalous communist experiment turned a very wealthy country into a raw material appendage, that 180 billion petrodollars obtained in the past 12 years have gone down the drain, and that we have fewer apartments and goods than countries of a middle development level. But on the other hand, we manufactured more tanks than the whole world. Yet one armored vehicle is the equivalent of 36 three-room apartments! It is to this that the 'mind, honor, and conscience of our era' have led.

"But it is not only this that is appalling. What is appalling is that today the former communist leaders are once again raising their heads, despite the burden of moral responsibility. And I am sincerely amazed that neither our press nor

the democratic forces understand that this inevitably leads to messianism, violence, and class struggle."

On Interethnic Accord

"Today the Republic of Kazakhstan is being called the most stable region of the former USSR. But it would be naive to console ourselves with the thought that stability is given once and for all, that shaking it is not easy, and that there are in Kazakhstan no people wittingly or unwittingly contributing to an exacerbation of interethnic relations. I allude primarily to the supporters of the so-called monoethnic development model.

"Undoubtedly, the Kazakh nation—long-suffering and oppressed, whose representatives for years wore the label of foreigners even on their own land—has the right unflinchingly to declare its interests just the same as Russians in Russia and Ukrainians in Ukraine. It has the right to the revival and the flowering of its distinctive culture. But these processes cannot be isolated from identical processes among the other peoples populating Kazakhstan, and even less can they be realized at their expense. Only together, as a united family, can we realize our needs and aspirations. And in this sense the Kazakh nation, full of strength and undissipated energy, should set an example of an open, good-neighborly, and international attitude toward the peoples living together with and alongside it.

"We do not live in an isolated space, and in this connection the explosive situation in other regions and the not always well-considered words of politicians could exert a direct negative influence on us. I well understand the psychological state of Aleksandr Vladimirovich Rutskoy during his recent visit to the Dniester region. Of course, speaking about the protection of the Russian-speaking population, he was referring to the 'flash points' of the former USSR. But his words were heard also in Kazakhstan, where Russians could not have viewed them other than as a dubious service."

On the Fate of the CIS

"The path of mutual threats leads to impasse not only in relations between neighboring states but for the CIS as a whole. Policy cannot be made today with the unsheathed saber.

"The prospects of the Commonwealth are very nebulous, in my view. Unfortunately, in the command echelon of a number of republics, sovereignty is frequently identified with autarky. In this connection, Kazakhstan should be ready for any turn of events. But while recognizing this, we remain supporters of integration processes brought about by the objective course of history."

On Ties to Russia

"Egalitarian, good-neighbor relations with Russia are for us undoubtedly of determining significance. I refer not only to traditional historical ties but also to the concurrence of our present views on the basic directions and methods of political and economic reform. Some people might reproach us for once again copying someone else's experience. I see no harm in this. Pursuit of a common policy only accelerates the economic reforms. Nor can there be any question of a blind copying of Russian practice. The particular features of

our transformations are evident and considerable. For example, we have not sold the land and have preserved the collective farms in the countryside, affording them freedom of activity and clearly separating state and personal property. We have programs of privatization and denationalization and social protection..."

On What Is Worrisome

"Given all today's difficulties, the people of Kazakhstan have not lost their faith in the future. But the democratic movement—and not only here in Kazakhstan—has gone somewhat flat and lost enthusiasm and romanticism. 'Yesterday's people' have begun to crawl out simultaneously and to impress upon us how good things were formerly. The unification of democratic forces against those who want to take us backward is essential. The latter have a base—our present difficulties. What is worrisome also is that the democratic movements in Kazakhstan are taking shape on a national basis. But what we need is a forum of democratic forces of Kazakhstan!"

On the Introduction of a Market Economy

"For me this is a question of principled pragmatism. Working in this position or the other in the party hierarchy in the past, I never engaged in ideology, was always an economist. For this reason I wholeheartedly supported pluralism—I refer to the economy. Perhaps my words will come as a shock to some people, but I believe that today in this vitally important sphere there is no room for an orgy of democracy. What we now call democracy in the economy is too far removed from the true meaning of this word. The stabilization of the economy and the transition to the market demand a categorical ban on any party, political, or ideological interference in this process."

On the Social Protection of the Population

"An increase in wages without an increase in productivity is the death of all reforms. It is those who cannot work who need to be protected. If in a village one homestead has three cows, not counting other livestock, but its neighbor does not even have a cock that crows, how and why should the idler be protected? People's social protection should amount to government support for the needy and the socially vulnerable strata and provide for income indexation, but by no means guarantee a subsidy to everyone without exception."

"I have just signed a decree on the allocation of supplementary benefits and the creation of economic incentives for the citizens, local enterprises, and organizations for the accelerated development of individual housing construction. The amount of the loan, for example, has been raised to 200,000 rubles with the cancellation of 15 percent with the birth of each child. There are other appreciable benefits also. Last year we distributed one million plots of land for orchards and kitchen gardens, and this year the same amount, as a minimum. Considering the limited nature of the budget resources, we are endeavoring to use for social protection the possibilities of industrial enterprises and commercial structures, and will create various charitable foundations. Nonetheless, those who can are required first and foremost to care for themselves—there is both a labor market and all the incentives for this."

On Kazakhstan's Future

"For the first time in three centuries, we ourselves, without any direction, are determining how we should live. But the euphoria of freedom and independence cannot be allowed to screen a conglomerate of crucial questions. Who are we now, what is Kazakhstan about to become? A bridge between Asia and Europe? A South-North axis? The republic's geopolitical position is only just taking shape, and our geostrategy is just being formed. From here in time there will emerge both a new ideology and a system of moral values. One thing is invariable for us here: A man is equal to others from birth and should always remain so. I personally no longer have any intention of building any 'ism's.'"

"My sole dream is contributing to the best of my abilities to the creation of normal, civilized conditions for the all-around self-development of the people of Kazakhstan. Then the people will build the life that they want themselves."

Fuel Shortage, Broken Farm Equipment To Affect Food Supply

92US0487A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
29 Apr 92 p 2

[Article by State Statistical Committee specialists B Filonov and N. Mirkina: "Springtime at the Crossroads The Sowing Campaign in Figures and Facts"]

[Text] Spring this year is forecast to be pretty good. The spring sowing is in full swing in the republic's southern oblasts, while in the others final preparations are nearly done for going out into the fields, and in places pre-sowing soil cultivation is underway. The harvest will depend greatly on whether all these operations are done right and on time.

Let's start with hotbed and greenhouse farming. Vegetables are ripening a little better this year than last. By the end of March, 1,223 tonnes had been procured. But it must be pointed out that three quarters of the cucumbers and other green vegetables were produced by East Kazakhstan and Pavlodar oblasts. Meanwhile, the crop of vitamin-filled produce declined in Alma-Ata and Dzhambul oblasts, and practically nothing has come from other oblasts.

It is disturbing to note the slow pace of preparing equipment for field operations, which has resulted in failure to comply with timeframes. An average of 10 percent of the equipment has not been made operational. Total equipment still remaining unready includes 24,000 tractors of various makes, 20,000 trucks, the same number of seeders, and large numbers of cultivators and plows. Especially lagging in this regard are Kzyl-Orda, Atyrau, Karaganda, and Turgay oblasts, where about a third of the machinery and implements are not in working order.

The material supply situation remains difficult, in particular fuel and lubricants. To be more precise, deliveries of diesel fuel have increased by 4 percent over last year, while gasoline has declined by 6 percent. Attempts to make up the shortage, unfortunately, have failed. A critical situation has developed in Taldy-Kurgan and Atyrau oblasts, whose fuel stocks this year are less than half last year's.

Very serious attention needs to be paid to the fact that the concluding of contractual agreements on the procurement of farm goods and raw materials is going badly. Compared with the same period last year, for example, only half the number of such agreements is in place for the purchase of grain and milk; the respective figure for potatoes and vegetables is one third, and for the purchase of essential oil crop seeds, eggs, and wool only one quarter.

The breakdown in the contract campaign is linked directly to what is going on in the republic's agriculture. In the first quarter, for example, milk production declined by 60,000 tonnes compared with the same period in 1991—that is, by a third.

All this has had a negative impact on the workload of the processing enterprises and the production of foodstuffs. For example, the production of meat, butter, and vegetable oil has declined by more than a third—hence, the situation has worsened with respect to trade in these types of food products.

Here's another interesting detail. Purchases of milk from the population have declined by 2.5 times while the sale of it in the markets has increased by 2.2 times and the sale of butter by 3.2 times.

Area Sown to Grain Reduced

92US0487B Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
15 May 92 p 1

[Article by V. Yelufimov: "There Will Be Less Grain"]

[Text] The amount of Kazakhstan land sown to grain this year will be half a million hectares smaller. This will lead to a republic grain harvest that is 500,000 tonnes smaller than the average crop level in the 12th Five-Year Plan. This is the conclusion reached by the Kazakhstan State Statistical Administration after a selective survey of sovkhozes, kolkhozes, peasant farms and household plots. Those surveyed stated that the reduced grain hectareage was due to the need to introduce more efficient crop rotation, increased amounts of feed crops, economic considerations, and the low soil fertility of a large percentage of cultivated land.

It is expected that vegetable production will fall by 5 percent, as vegetable crops are being crowded out of the farms because they are so labor-intensive. On the other hand, sales of potatoes will increase by 8 percent.

KYRGYZSTAN

Akayev Policies, Personality Assessed

92US0491A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 21, 20 May 92 p 11

[Article by Aleksandr Ivanov, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent, Bishkek: "The President's Smile. Is Kyrgyzstan's Politics Taking Another Turn Invisible to the World?"]

[Text] President Asker Akayev, whose speeches and manners have exuded democratism until now, is starting to shift quickly to the right. And only his smile, testifying to a

healthy optimism, still lights up his face, sometimes misleading people as to his intentions. Oh, well, that's typical of politicians: principles go through changes, while their charm continues to hold us in thrall....

Is there anyone in Kyrgyzstan who doesn't remember how mercilessly harsh he was in opposing the partycrats and their methods of government? But now the appointment of the akims—heads of administration on the oblast level—is completed in the republic, and it's as if they were selected specially from the galaxy of former party officials. Moreover, they used to hold rather high positions, right up to Communist Party Central Committee secretaries. The explanation is to be found in one of the President's statements, namely that party authority could effectively hold society in its hands, govern, give orders, accomplish things.

It would appear that, having perceived the destructiveness of the lack of authority prevailing in the republic, he has found the only solution—rely on the shoulders of the party. But for how long? Might it not happen that, one fine moment, those shoulders will shrug off the presidential hand and take over the helm? At any rate, certain segments of the republic's population are already breathing unconcealed nostalgic sighs for the period of stagnation, when life was happier and easier. Not much earlier, the President, as if responding to these sighs, had appointed the members of the Cabinet of Ministers accordingly. Under the communist regime, in general, such an apportionment of nomenklatura cadres would have actually been quite possible. The question now is, will people who were accustomed to the smooth-running party mechanism even be able to govern the situation in the present sea of anarchy and anything-goes?

Zh. Amambayev, the last First Secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee, who supported the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency] during the August Putsch, has again entered the political arena. He has been elected a deputy to the republic's parliament. Also nominated for parliament is 70-year-old T. Usubaliyev, who headed the republic's party organization for a quarter century. As for his successor, A. Masaliyev, he has so far refused to run. And it's said he already regrets it.

Kyrgyzstan, which did attempt to free itself from the embraces of conservative forces and succeeded better than the other Central Asian republics in that regard, now seems to be making a turn toward them. This is due to the absence of any other forces on the political horizon which might somehow put a halt to the oncoming economic disaster. Compared to Tajikistan or Uzbekistan, Islam's influence on society here is as yet not very great. Therefore, having turned rightward and lacking any counterbalance, the President might get stuck there.

To be sure, we must not leave out of the account the numerous parties of the national-patriotic persuasion which were formed after the split in Kyrgyzstan's democratic movement. But for the time being they do not crave power. Priority to the local population in everything—that's their goal. And, lumpenized in membership as they are, they are quite aggressive. They are joined by that segment of the

Kyrgyz intelligentsia which aims for a mononational republic. Bishkek, essentially, is surrounded by communities that have sprung up in recent years to shelter Kyrgyz families who came down from the mountain kishlaks [villages] in search of jobs and a better life. Parties of the Asaba type are nourished there.

The President is always getting pressure from that quarter. Everyone knows what courage he showed when he vetoed the law the parliament passed granting land ownership only to Kyrgyz people. The press played up this gesture with great delight. What remains in the shadow is the string of concessions the President was forced to make to accomplish this. Session after session he had to postpone the law he promised, guaranteeing the rights of national minorities. A national land fund, a national culture fund, and a national entrepreneurship fund have been created which national minorities cannot join.

But the minorities have been remembered now, in the process of allocating privatization assets [sredstva]. The residency qualification [tsenz osedlosti] is strictly enforced. If you came to the republic less than 10 years ago you get nothing. Even if you were originally invited here as a specialist. There are tens of thousands who have been cheated; they got indignant for a while and then quieted down. The President hasn't heard them. Can this be another concession to those who advocated the first version of the land law?

Akayev is fond of saying that for him, the rights of the individual stand above the rights of a national group. And this really is so. The President's international reputation is quite high. Outwardly, everything is fine in the republic. But internally, where surface politics so to speak take material form, frequently the tune is called by those who push the national idea, based on a system of privileges. Sieve-like they let the authorities' widely proclaimed laws and orders slip through, while keeping for implementation only those that are consistent with their own goals and purposes. One would like to think the President is unaware of this. And, seemingly by way of exception, he is knuckling under to these forces. Consider, for example, the presidential ukase on the state's youth policy. It talks only about Kyrgyz young people, as if there were no young people at all among the other nationalities. Again, privileges, advantages. Moreover, it has been decided to allocate earmarked appropriations at the time the republic's budget has been approved. I understand: Kyrgyz young people are having a hard time getting on their feet. But how about others?

The national-radicals are stepping up their criticism of the President's orientation toward Russia. They think this will permit the Russians (and there are still about a million of them here) to feel too independent. If Kyrgyzstan changed its orientation, they would calm right down. The Baltic republics are cited as an example. To be sure, it's more of an impasse here. And it's not so much a matter of Islam, much less the language differences, as some sociologists have tried to argue. Kyrgyz and Uzbeks share the same faith, and their languages are related, but oh, how they clashed two years ago in Osh Oblast. The aftermath is still with us....

Demography is increasingly dictating the conditions of life in the republic. Kyrgyzstan is rivaled only by Tajikistan in terms of birth rates. The object of the struggle is a place in the sun. And the demand is that foreigners must not, they do not have the right to, live better than the local population. Nothing to object to there. A man lives on the land of his forefathers, he finds himself crowded; the crowding may be peaceful, gradual-accelerated, or by force and instantaneous. So far the host has not set a deadline. But, as the satirist said, Think, Fedya, think!

The most rabid advocates of a mononational Kyrgyzstan claim that Akayev is not going to last long as President. His even-handedness is not to their liking. And it's quite possible that the President's concessions will grow in quantity and quality. Also quite possible is a departure from the dominant relations with Russia—although it would be difficult for Akayev, who was molded as a major scientist in a Russian milieu, to do that.

The President can sense the close approach of changes of this sort. One proof of this, surely, was his recent meeting with representatives of the former Central newspapers. No, he could not propose a solution to the fact that the sphere of action of the Russian language, including the Russian-language press, is becoming increasingly narrowed. He wanted merely to warn of the rapidity of the process—and, it seemed to me, to say an early farewell to the hitherto familiar neighborliness of the two language cultures. The smile never left his face, but there was sadness in his eyes. Looking many steps ahead, the President can see how inevitable it all is. And, a bit craftily, he tries to assure us that the exodus of Russian speakers is a normal and natural thing, because people do go where things are better. Ah, if it were only so! If that were the only reason people were leaving Kyrgyzstan....

One time I asked Presidential Adviser for Interethnic Affairs S. Zhigitov how much longer he expected to encounter Russians in local cities and [illegible word]. "About 25 years," he said in a tone that made it clear he was overstating it by about two times. In order to smooth over the awkwardness he added: "And then you'll see me coming back to Russia myself. What's wrong with that?"

They say nationalism won't have a place in the republic as long as Asker Akayev is President. Maybe, but.... Everyone knows what results when communists who have lost power link up with national-patriots. But what lies in store when the one and the other acquire support and gain a foothold is anybody's guess. Judging by appearances, the State of Kyrgyzstan may easily become a test field for it. It seems to me, at any rate, that the President is not going to be able to stop the republic's movement toward a mononational state, with all the ensuing consequences. Let us hope to God he does manage to prevent interethnic conflicts like the one in Osh; if he does, he will deserve the deepest gratitude.

TAJIKISTAN

Russian Reaction to New Government Viewed
92US0489A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 21, 20 May 92

[Article by Rustam Shukurov: "The Opposition Is Confident: And Is Not Afraid To Preserve Some Power for President R. Nabiyev"]

[Text] The armed confrontation of the opposition and the government has been resolved in compromise: A transitional national unity government was formed over the past week in the course of long and arduous negotiations. Although there are among the 24 members of the new government only eight members of the opposition, a number of key positions has been transferred to the latter.

A strong aspect of the tactics of the opposition bloc (the Islamic Revival Party, Democratic Party, Rastokhez Movement) was the scrupulous aspiration of its leaders to keep their actions within the framework of legality. Thanks to this, the victorious opposition succeeded not only in halting the escalation of the violence (no fewer than 100 persons died in the course of the conflict) but also in creating a firm legitimate basis of the new order: Supreme executive power has been reserved to President R. Nabiyev, and half of the new legislative body—the National Majlis—will be deputies of the former Supreme Soviet. The opposition is in no hurry and is confident, as can be seen, of its strength.

Mention must be made also of another particular feature of Tajikistan politics which is not characteristic of the majority of regions of the former Union: A pronounced role has been performed by the nonparty centrist intelligentsia. Its representatives (the philosopher Akbar Tursunov, the poet Loik Sherali, the filmmaker Davlat Khudonazarov and others) acted in the settlement process as a third, mediating, force.

A leading role in the opposition bloc is performed by moderate Islamic progressives. The popularity of the proponents of Islam in all strata of the Tajik population is natural since Islam is the religion which Tajiks have confessed and preached throughout Central Asia for a thousand years now. The elimination of the last atheist barriers holding back a revival of the Islamic spirit is entailing the accelerated Islamicization of all aspects of life in the republic. But the swift appearance of Muslim radicals in the political arena is hardly to be expected. The present Islamic leaders, like, for example, Supreme Justice Turadzhonzod, constantly emphasize their devotion to a policy of tolerance (in relation to the Christian Russian population, in particular) and also their intention to strengthen secular statehood in Tajikistan.

A really serious problem for the new government will be the intra-ethnic contradictions in the republic, manipulation of which has become a principle means of the preservation of power by the communist government.

With the accession to power of members of the opposition, hope that intra-ethnic tension will finally subside has appeared. The Islamic and democratic ideology of the opposition is in itself of a consolidating nature under Tajikistan's conditions.

The events in Tajikistan combined with the victories in Afghanistan of Ahmed Shah Masood (a Samarkand Tajik by birth) evidently caused a mild shock in the Russian Foreign Ministry. It is otherwise difficult to explain A. Kozyrev's sudden trip to Bukhara, Samarkand, and Kabul (11-13 May) and also the stated intention of B. Yeltsin and I. Karimov, president of Uzbekistan, to sign a bilateral agreement not just somewhere but in Samarkand—the oblast center of

Uzbekistan. Having recognized the de facto existence of the "Tajik problem" in these two Uzbek cities, Russia demonstrated its adherence to the principle of the inviolability of borders within the CIS.

This response of Russia would seem somewhat premature inasmuch as the political forces which have formed the present government have given no reason (either now or ever previously) for them to be suspected of an aspiration to a revision of the Tajik-Uzbek or Tajik-Afghan border.

Russia's demonstrative haste against the background of the quite manifest anti-Tajik mood in the Russian press, which has already registered the opposition as regionalists and fundamentalists and has merged Tajikistan and Afghanistan in a single Islamic domain, will hardly contribute to the rapprochement of the new Tajik authorities and the countries of the CIS. For obvious reasons it will not be difficult for the Tajiks to find support in Muslim Asia, much easier than, for example, for that same Armenia, which has, for all that, found a common language with Iran.

Tajikistan's foreign policy is now at the crossroads. What orientation the republic will choose will largely depend on the readiness of the countries of the CIS, primarily Russia and Uzbekistan, for confidential and equal dialogue.

TURKMENISTAN

Aviation Company Formed

Decree Issued

92SD0405A Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA
in Russian 5 May 92 p 1

[Ukase by the president of Turkmenistan: "On Forming the 'Turkmenistan' National State Aviation Company"]

[Text] In order to create the necessary conditions for embodying Turkmenistan's existing rights and its equal participation in the international aviation system, as well as to implement state administration and control of air transport, I hereby decree the following:

The "Turkmenistan" National State Aviation Company shall be formed on the basis of the "Turkmenistan" Aviation Company.

[Signed] S. Niyazov, president of Turkmenistan
Ashkhabad
4 May 1992

Chairman Appointed

92SD0405B Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA
in Russian 5 May 92 p 1

[Ukase by the president of Turkmenistan: "On Appointing Comrade I.N. Berdyev as Chairman of the 'Turkmenistan' National State Aviation Company"]

[Text] Comrade Ilyas Nobatovich Berdyev shall be appointed as chairman of the "Turkmenistan" National State Aviation Company

[Signed] S. Nizyayev, president of Turkmenistan
Ashkhabad
4 May 1992

Resolution Published

92SD0405C Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA
in Russian 5 May 92 p 1

[Decree by the president of Turkmenistan, dated 4 May 1992, No 697, Ashkhabad: "On Top-Priority Measures Connected with the Formation of the 'Turkmenistan' National State Aviation Company"]

[Text] In connection with forming the 'Turkmenistan' National State Aviation Company, I hereby **decree** the following:

1. The "Turkmenistan" National State Aviation Company shall be assigned the task of exercising the functions of state administration and monitoring controls on air transport and the integrated system for utilizing Turkmenistan's air space.

In conjunction with Turkmenistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the "Turkmenistan" National State Aviation Company shall carry out a complex of measures connected to the participation by Turkmenistan's air transport in the international aviation system.

2. Within a month's time the "Turkmenistan" National State Aviation Company shall work out the following measures:

—in conjunction with Turkmenistan's Ministry of Justice, a draft Statute for the "Turkmenistan" National State Aviation Company and a Charter regarding the discipline of the aviation employees of Turkmenistan's civil aviation;

—in conjunction with Turkmenistan's Chamber of Commerce and Industry, it shall work out a symbol as well as a trademark for this aviation company, as depicted in the form of a falcon (lachyn) with its subsequent attachment to our aircraft in accordance with the appropriate international norms.

3. In conjunction with Turkmenistan's Ministry of Justice, the "Turkmenistan" National State Aviation Company shall—within a three-month time period—prepare a draft air-legislation act for Turkmenistan and shall submit it to the Government of Turkmenistan for examination and consideration.

[Signed] S. Niyazov, president of Turkmenistan

UZBEKISTAN**Karimov Press Conference on CIS Relations, National Borders, Other Issues**

92US0488A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 15 May 92 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Islam Karimov reported by Vitaliy Portnikov: "'To Speak of Borders Is To Tear Central Asia Apart.' Islam Karimov Gives Interview to Foreign Journalists"; date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] Mr President, what position will Uzbekistan take on matters of defense at the upcoming meeting of CIS heads of state in Tashkent?

[Answer] Uzbekistan's position has been an open one from the start. Kazakhstan and other republics agreed with the approach which we announced at the meeting in Minsk. Basically, every republic should have its own armed forces—nominal armed forces (in particular, Uzbekistan does not intend to have a force of more than 25,000 to 30,000 men), and they will form part of the OVS [Combined Armed Forces] under the command of Shaposhnikov. At the same time, we believe that the existence of strategic troops is a matter to be decided independently, and we have contributed our bit to that decision. At previous meetings I spoke in favor of the arrangement adopted in NATO. And the fact that Russia is creating its own armed forces, along with Kazakhstan and the other republics, indicates that everybody accepts this arrangement now. Obviously, we will come to it. It would also be a good idea to conclude a regional agreement on mutual security, a proposal that was made at the meeting in Bishkek. We believe that Russia, being the biggest state, could, by means of such an agreement with the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan, guarantee stability in the region. The idea is still in the working-out stage. If successful, it would guarantee the inviolability of the borders of the former Union in our region, it would guarantee stability that all the states of the region could endorse.

[Question] At the Ashkhabad meeting of the leaders of the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan with those of Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, was any general position of the region's leaders worked out in regard to the Tashkent meeting?

[Answer] When we got to Ashkhabad, they put that question to me at the airport. I said at the time, and I repeat now, that there is no reason to draw a parallel between the Ashkhabad meeting and tomorrow's meeting in Tashkent. We have absolutely not discussed any matters relating to the upcoming agenda of the Tashkent meeting; we have published, in the newspapers of Uzbekistan, all the results of the conference of heads of state in Ashkhabad. We have adopted three documents: two of them, which we signed, and the third one about the explosive situation now taking shape not only in our region but outside it.

[Question] Have recent events in the Republic of Afghanistan had any impact on the social-political situation in Uzbekistan?

[Answer] It goes without saying that the ongoing events in Afghanistan, the uncertainty there, is an object of close scrutiny on our part. And they can hardly fail to influence the social-political situation in Uzbekistan and the other republics of Central Asia. When I spoke recently about signing the mutual security document and the fact that Russia ought to be the guarantor of security, it was this problem I had in mind. When I was in Ashkhabad I made a statement whose gist was that Tajikistan is an inseparable part of Central Asia, and that to assert that Tajikistan might suddenly find itself under the sphere of influence or under

any kind of protection of Afghanistan's *mojahedeens* is absolutely groundless. We must take the proper decisions to guarantee stability and security in this region and not allow interethnic clashes. The two months of confrontation in Dushanbe, I think, opened many people's eyes and brought them to their senses. And, sober politicians need to draw the right conclusions, which should be oriented primarily toward preserving the status quo in the pattern of the correlation and political deployment of forces which has been maintained up to now.

[Question] How do you view the prospects of Uzbekistan's cooperation with Turkey and Iran?

[Answer] When Uzbekistan, as an independent sovereign state, is faced with the dilemma as to which path of development to follow, which path would meet our interests, I say unequivocally that the Turkish path of development is more acceptable to us as a secular, civilized path of society's development. What we need to do is work out our own way, drawing on Turkey's experience. The Iranian model is not right for us. We had occasion to exchange ideas about this in Bishkek and in Ashkhabad, and it seems to me it is the opinion of Central Asia.

[Question] When you were at the conference of heads of state of the CIS in Kiev, you were in solidarity with Ukrainian approaches to the question of the future of the CIS. Weren't you disappointed by Ukrainian President Kravchuk's non-attendance in Tashkent?

[Answer] Ukraine's position is well known, there's no vacillation there. As for my attitude toward it, I think that every republic, every state in the CIS, must find its own way, and we must respect these paths of development. At the same time, I do recall that when Leonid Makarovich called the CIS a myth I stated, at the same press conference, that CIS is a necessity. Uzbekistan's position on this matter is unequivocal: CIS must exist. We don't need a return to the old structures that Gorbachev talks about; he has a different understanding. He would like to go back to his Novo-Ogarev options. Uzbekistan is against it.

[Question] There has been increasing talk in the media about the desire of the residents of Tajikistan's Leninabad (Khorezm) Oblast to become an autonomous entity within Uzbekistan.

[Answer] A meeting of the Leninabad Oblast Soviet today is discussing recent events in Tajikistan. It's not the first time I've heard that Leninabad Oblast, which is populated mostly by Uzbeks, is talking about joining Uzbekistan as an autonomous entity. My opinion is unequivocal. There are Uzbeks living there. We will be concerned for them with our heart and soul, we will defend them, but the Uzbeks there are part of Tajikistan and are citizens of Tajikistan; they must obey its laws and Constitution. If we do not comply with these fundamental principles, we will have chaos. I have spoken about this repeatedly and was compelled to repeat it most recently at the press conference in Bishkek: If they want to tear Central Asia apart, they should talk about borders—the artificial borders which were unobjectively mapped out back in 1924. The borders did not in any way reflect national, natural or ethnic boundaries. But if they want to

pit one republic against the other, they should talk about borders. I am categorically against such discussions, and I think the leaders of Central Asia can come to an agreement among themselves. There are no problems here.

[Question] How do you assess the future of economic cooperation within the CIS?

[Answer] A lot of people in Uzbekistan think that the CIS should continue to develop—provided that every state remains independent and sovereign. That is the condition for further development of the CIS. Cooperation, interaction, mutual aid—these are all components of its future, as long as the states can build their own independence. But the Russian government under the leadership of Gaydar—I emphasize, under the leadership of Gaydar—has done a lot to speed the transition to market relations and develop reforms; it is by no means confiding its next steps to us. This disturbs us greatly. What will the reform come up with next? What will the Russian government revise tomorrow? And what position will that put us in, since we're functioning in a unified ruble system? If we want to retain the ruble zone we will have to resolve several issues: the banking system, at least, must not be in Russia's hands. That would be wrong; the system should be placed on the CIS level. The printing of money, and monetary circulation generally, should be the sphere of the CIS rather than any particular government, which could bring any state it pleases to its knees—could do so tomorrow. I will admit that we are getting ready to have our own currency, but when it will happen I can't say. The Baltics, which have been announcing their own currencies for two years now, have yet to make it a reality. The introduction of our own currency is not something ordinary, to be taken lightly; it is tied to all aspects of our life. Unless it is carefully prepared for, it could lead to economic collapse. We will not introduce our own currency without figuring all the consequences.

[Question] A lot of people are saying the Russian government is not paying attention to Central Asia, that Russia's influence here has been weakened.

[Answer] That depends on how you view Russian influence. If it is through the prism of Imperial thinking, then we're glad that it is becoming weak here; the principle we advocate and vote for is the full independence and sovereignty of each state, and in this regard I fully endorse Ukraine's position. As for economic, cultural, and human relations, though, I am against weakening those ties. We need to be with Russia in all the complex situations which await us on the path of independence, on the path of Uzbekistan's entry into the world community. These relations must be on the basis of equality in all respects.

[Question] Again, what do you see as the causes of what is happening in Tajikistan?

[Answer] The absolute lack of any position on President Nabyev's part, which was manifested most badly in the dynamics of the events unfolding in Dushanbe. And when serious efforts toward democratic reforms are underway in the neighboring republics, wages in Uzbekistan are twice as high as in Tajikistan. Every person today perceives the

situation in terms of how well off he is. Uzbeks have a saying: A hungry man perceives music through his stomach.

[Question] If Ukraine should quit the CIS because of the developing events in the Crimea or other events, will the CIS even exist?

[Answer] The Crimean issue is Ukraine's internal matter, which Ukraine will resolve according to the Constitution and the laws. Whether Ukraine will quit the CIS is a prediction, and I don't want to answer it.

Trade Union Chairman on State, Nationalities Relations, Other Issues

92US0486A Moscow TRUD in Russian 19 May 92 p 2

[Interview with Uzbekistan Trade Union Federation Council Chairman Buri Allamuradov by TRUD correspondent V. Biryukov: "An Oxcart Without a Driver Is No Good"; place and date not given]

[Text] [Biryukov] Buri Allamuradovich, how do Federation members view the idea that trade unions ought to serve as a constructive opposition to the government?

[Allamuradov] A really prominent person once said that trade unions are a bone in the throat of the government. These days I don't think that's true, and the word "opposition," even modified by the word "constructive," makes me cautious, because there is a great deal in our country that is perceived from the standpoint of maximalism.

[Biryukov] But recent months have been characterized by literally skyrocketing prices and mounting social tension. Haven't there been fundamental disagreements between the trade unions and the Cabinet of Ministers in this period?

[Allamuradov] Of course there have. But we have always managed to find a common position. For example, the price paid for coal was a burning issue. Uzbekistan's miners, like their colleagues in other regions of the CIS, were ready to go on a long strike. Fortunately, the issue of the price paid for coal was resolved rather soon, and I am frankly glad that the trade unions played a big role in this.

[Biryukov] What is the basis of relations today between the trade unions and governmental organs and their local representatives?

[Allamuradov] Joint efforts with the Cabinet of Ministers to reach agreement on social-economic issues have been going on for two years. This has been preceded by a campaign to sign collective contracts, the signing of agreements with ministries, concerns, and associations by sectorial committees. Only after that should the agreement with the Cabinet of Ministers be signed. It encompasses a range of issues on providing social guarantees for workers, employment, the development of the labor market, regulation of relations in the sphere of labor protection, ecological safety, and so on.

[Biryukov] What role does legislative work play in the activity of the Federation Council?

[Allamuradov] We started by regaining the right of legislative initiative, which is, incidentally, ensured by a special amendment to the republic's Constitution. Some of our

draft laws have already been passed by the republic's Supreme Soviet. Commissions, departments, and inspectorates of the Federation Council have examined more than 40 draft laws and numerous legally binding acts designed for the social protection of workers. When making decisions, Parliament has taken almost 300 of our criticisms and suggestions into account. Medical and sanatorium-resort facilities have been exempted from the value-added tax. The draft law "On the Social Protection of Invalids in the Republic of Uzbekistan" was examined twice by our specialists, and 11 of the 13 proposals we prepared were adopted. We managed to see to it that the state organs and trade unions established normatives for the reserving of jobs for invalids. Taxes have been reduced on enterprises if 3 percent of their employees are handicapped, rather than 30 percent as had been proposed. Handicapped children residing in institutions will now be given housing out of turn on the waiting list.

If the draft of some law or other doesn't suit us, we prepare an alternative. Such was the case, for example, with employment of the population.

[Biryukov] In the name of the FPU [Uzbekistan Trade Union Federation] you signed the declaration to transform the VKP [Universal Confederation of Trade Unions] into an international trade union association. What kind of future do you think the new organization will have?

[Allamuradov] We were a little late with the declaration and reorganization, I think; the VKP was left hanging for about half a year. At any rate, the Confederation is essential.

[Biryukov] Let's "get back" to Uzbekistan. What do you think are the prospects of interethnic relations in the republic?

[Allamuradov] I don't believe interethnic conflicts are the fault of the present leadership alone; their roots undoubtedly go deeper to the serious mistakes of past years. For decades, problems of interethnic relations were a forbidden theme; resentments and misunderstandings accumulated. It's no wonder unscrupulous politicians find it so easy to play this card today.

It would be wrong of me to say that everything is fine with respect to interethnic relations here. Unfortunately, the emigration of the Russian-speaking population continues. After Uzbekistan declared its independence, many were apprehensive that tomorrow, all at once, borders that had been transparent would become impermeable and people would be cut off from their historical homeland and their kin. People said, If Ukraine and Russia can't agree, what will happen here?

[Biryukov] In the vicinity of the Tashkent Tractor Plant, where most of the residents are Russian-speaking, almost all the signs, markers, and price tags in stores are in Uzbek.

[Allamuradov] I see no need for that. While on a business trip to Navoi, I witnessed the departure of a valuable specialist, the chief engineer in a vital defense plant. His wife, also a specialist having a higher education, initiated the move. She worked in statistical organs where all the documentation now is conducted in the state language.

What's she supposed to do, learn all over again at the age of 50? I don't believe an independent Uzbekistan is going to gain by losing specialists like that.

There have been excesses on both sides. Was it possible to speak to the children only in Russian in rural kindergartens? But I'm convinced it is useless now to seek out the guilty, much less to blame everything on the Russians. In ethnic relations it is essential to exercise the utmost tactfulness and not to go to extremes. Unfortunately, our society—and I mean all the countries of the former Union—resembles an oxcart without a driver, careening from side to side and no one can stop it.

We Uzbekistanis must never shut ourselves up inside our own borders, our own language. In Moscow, where thousands of our students and graduate students are going to school, instruction is never going to be in Uzbek; the same is true of London or Paris.

[Biryukov] But doesn't the return to former major figures such as Sharaf Rashidov, who has again appeared in the political arena, constitute just such an extreme?

[Allamuradov] Five or six years ago he was being much talked about—most of it bad. But with time, the charges have fallen away like a husk. The lip of that same cup also brushed me personally. At a party plenum a few years ago, in fact, a prominent official said that I was Sharaf Rashidov's adopted son and took part in many of his transgressions. An authoritative commission was set up to look into it, and, of course, it was unable to confirm a single fact.

I have been personally acquainted with Sharaf Rashidov from years back. We were working in a school student production brigade in the summer. The heat was intense—50 degrees; we were irrigating the cotton, when a passing motorcade stopped. Sharaf Rashidov called me and another boy over, asked us in detail how things were, and wished us success. Then he kept in contact with us for many years. When the brigade fulfilled the cotton plan he congratulated us personally. That was way down south in Gagarinskiy Rayon, Surkhandarya Oblast. Then, after studying at the Timiryazev Institute, I had the good fortune to work with him a while. Let me say one thing: Any republic should be glad to have a leader and political figure like him.

He deserves credit for the former Union's attainment of cotton independence and the rebuilding of Tashkent after the terrible earthquake of 1966; no one can take that away from him. He was there at the creation of the gold-mining industry in the depths of the Kyzyl-Kums. Not many people know that it was for this accomplishment that he was awarded the Lenin Prize.

[Biryukov] Well, they say time is the best judge. But I don't think everybody will agree. History is a category that is hard to plan. Still, you can't avoid making predictions. What do you think of the CIS's prospects?

[Allamuradov] I'm a skeptic on that score. I personally don't see a future for CIS. I'd like to be wrong, but unfortunately...

[Biryukov] In this connection, what do you think about rumors that have been fomented lately concerning the creation of a state of Turan within the borders of Central Asia and Kazakhstan? Is such a formation possible?

[Allamuradov] I'm not about to predict the future, but, once scalded by water, people will blow on kefir, as the saying goes. We have seen what can happen when an all-powerful Center exists. Is there any guarantee it will not be repeated? Naturally, cultural and economic ties between the republics will grow stronger and more extensive, but they can hardly be transformed into some kind of state.

Nevertheless, in conclusion I should like to emphasize that we can only overcome the crisis together, through joint, coordinated efforts—while remaining sovereign and independent, of course.

Ukase Transforming Trade Ministry Into Joint Stock Company

92SD0406A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
7 May 92 p 1

["Ukase of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan. On Transforming the Ministry of Trade of the Republic of Uzbekistan Into the State-Joint Stock Association 'Savdo' ('Uzbeksavdo')"; Tashkent, 5 May 1992]

[Text] In order to radically improve the organization of trade services to the population, provide an abundance of consumer goods to the republic's consumer market, broadly adopt market relations in the sphere of trade, and create conditions to develop the initiative and entrepreneurship of trade enterprises and organizations of all forms of ownership:

1. The Ministry of Trade of the Republic of Uzbekistan is hereby transformed into the Uzbek State-Joint Stock Association "Savdo" ("Uzbeksavdo").

It is established that Uzbeksavdo shall constitute an economic association with the rights of a juridical person, conducting its activities on the principles of full khozraschet [cost accounting] and self-administration, and uniting on a contractual basis state, leasing, collective, family, private, and other enterprises and organizations in the sphere of trade.

2. Territorial trade-production concerns shall be formed on the base of oblast administrations of trade and public catering and the main administrations of trade and public catering of the khokimiyat [governing bodies] of the City of Tashkent.

Territorial trade-production concerns shall be accountable in their activity to the khokims [mayors] of the oblasts and the City of Tashkent and shall be members of Uzbeksavdo having the rights of founders of the Association.

Within a month's time, the Uzbek State-Joint Stock Association Savdo shall formulate and submit for the approval of the Cabinet of Ministers a standard statute governing the territorial trade-production concern.

3. It is deemed advisable to transform state republic wholesale offices and wholesale-retail associations, oblast wholesale bases, trade outlets, public catering trusts, and other major trade enterprises and organizations into joint-stock companies and associations in accordance with existing legislation of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

4. The Uzbek State-Joint Stock Association Savdo shall be recognized as the legal successor to the Ministry of Trade of the Republic of Uzbekistan, with its basic objectives and directions of activity to be:

- the study and forecasting of public demand for goods, taking account of changing conditions in the consumer market; market research; active influence on the production of consumer goods and, on this basis, measures to protect the interests of the public and improve the quality of trade services;
- the development of market relations in the sphere of trade; joint efforts to create trade houses and a network of commercial-commission and foreign currency stores and to establish direct, mutually advantageous business relations with enterprises producing consumer goods; the holding of republic-level and inter-oblast fairs for the wholesale sale of goods; and interaction with commodities exchanges;
- coordination of the activities of joint-stock trading associations and companies, territorial trade-production concerns, and other trading enterprises and organizations of every form of ownership, as well as the trading activities of ministries, departments, associations, unions, and concerns which have trade networks;
- implementation of a unified technical policy in the sector; collaboration on the remodeling and technical re-equipment of the network of trade and public catering enterprises; the adoption of modern trade-technological equipment and advanced technologies for the storage and sale of goods; the study and dissemination of domestic [otechesvennyy] and foreign experience in trade organization and technology;

5. Within a ten-day period, the Cabinet of Ministers under the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan shall pass a decree on matters of the organization of the activities of the Uzbek State-Joint Stock Association Savdo.

[Signed] I. Karimov, president of the Republic of Uzbekistan
City of Tashkent
5 May 1992

Bad Weather Affects Spring Sowing in Most Regions

92US0485A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
7 May 92 p 2

[Article by R. Nazarov, chief, Cotton-Growing Administration, Republic of Uzbekistan Ministry of Agriculture: "Despite Heavy Showers and Frosts, the Sowing Must Go On"]

[Text] Sharp temperature variations during the second half of April, unusually persistent low temperatures in early

May, and hail in certain oblasts have complicated agricultural operations in virtually all regions of this republic.

Whereas last year during the entire vegetation period more than 500,000 hectares suffered from unfavorable weather conditions, and cotton plants had to be resown on 365,000 hectares, this year the sown area which has suffered is significantly greater.

Areas sown in the following crops have suffered most of all: cotton, corn, vegetables, and fodder crops, as well as gardens, orchards, vineyards, and plantings of mulberry trees for silkworms in Bukhara, Kashka-Darya, Syr-Darya, and Surkhan-Darya oblasts. Frosts on the soil have made it necessary to resow areas in Khorezm Oblast and the Republic of Karakalpakstan, whereas its high moisture content and continued low temperatures have threatened cotton plants with root mold and other diseases, especially in Samarkand Oblast.

In order to extricate ourselves with minimal losses from the situation which has evolved, we must carefully organize operations in the localities concerned, taking the advice of specialists into account. At present each field requires particular care, depending upon the condition of the plants and the soil.

In Namangan Oblast, as a result of a heavy shower which lasted for two hours, damage was inflicted on more than 121,000 hectares sown in various agricultural crops. This included 98,000 hectare in cotton, 15,000 of which simply remained under water or were washed out. These hectares must be resown.

There have also been considerable losses on the farms of Fergana Oblast.

Great damage has been inflicted to irrigational and hydraulic-engineering structures, livestock-raising farms and field junctions, as well as roads and bridges. The local staffs which were set up in order to eliminate the consequences of these natural disasters have adopted special and urgent measures for the purpose of providing the damaged farms with seeds, fertilizers, fuel, lubricants, and equipment. Other necessary assistance is also being rendered.

In Fergana Oblast alone more than 18,000 hectares have already been resown in cotton.

Cotton plants sown in ridges have suffered less from excessive moisture and scale-formation.

Now only the cotton-grower's operational efficiency can rescue him. For example, the farmers of the Uchkurgan Sovkhoz, Uchkurganskiy Rayon, Namangan Oblast within a space of only two or three days were able to clear the entire area of scale by manual methods, i.e., using rakes and other hand tools.

In the Zadarinskiy Rayon the farmers conducted high-speed hoeing operations on the light soils of most of the fields sown in cotton in order to prevent scale-formation.

On the farms of the Yazyavanskiy Rayon, as well as in several rayons of Dzhizhak and Syr-Darya oblasts, they have been fighting against scale for many years now by the method of transverse harrowing in one track.

On most of the farms of Bukhara, Namangan, Surkhan-Darya, and Fergana oblasts, after manually clearing off the scale in order to improve the heat exchange and nourishment of the cotton plants, cultivation and feeding with mineral fertilizers have already been performed on an area of 25,000 to 30,000 hectares.

But if we are to speak about the republic as a whole, then we would have to state the following: For the first time in many years the basic sowing of cotton has not yet been completed by 5 May.

They have not been able to complete the sowing on the last few thousand hectares in Bukhara, Dzhizhak, Surkhan-Darya, Syr-Darya, and Tashkent oblasts. Nor has this been helped by the additional difficulties connected with the need to resow large areas.

There is only one solution to this problem: As soon as the soil is ready, it must be sown only with quick-ripening varieties of cotton such as S-4727, Kirgizskiy-3, Tashkent-6, Chimbay-3010, Yulduz, and S-9070.

AZERBAIJAN

Mutalibov Bid to Recover Presidency Evaluated

92US04904 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 21, 20 May 92 p 2

[Article by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent E. Akhundova; place and date not given: "Ayaz Mutalibov: To Return or Disappear? The Baku Version of the GKChP"]

[Text] The lightning-fast, stunning return of A. Mutalibov, ecstatically supported by the aggressively obedient majority of parliament that, with the same rare unanimity, accepted his "voluntary" resignation two months ago. The announcement of a state of emergency that followed, along with a series of painfully familiar decrees restricting freedom of the press, prohibiting meetings and strikes, and halting the activities of public-political parties.

In general, it is Azerbaijan's version of the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency (referring to the August 1991 Soviet coup committee)].

I heard machine-gun bursts and the thundering of weapons located inside the headquarters of the National Independence Party. "This is the end of Mutalibov," Nadir Badalov told me. "And this is the tragedy of my people."

At that time we still did not know that brother would not go against brother and that everything, happily, would be resolved with little blood—three demonstrators would suffer (again a coincidence with August!). At home, I turned on the television and heard the ultimatum read out by F. Gadzhiev, who threatened to use planes to storm the presidential palace. I physically felt the huge city freeze after this announcement, having prepared itself for the worst. This terrible half-hour dragged on tortuously slowly. As it was ending the telephone rang. A friend living a few steps from the palace reported that A. Mutalibov's residence had been taken without a fight. The palace turned out to be completely empty.

What had he been hoping for? What forces had he been relying on? At whose instigation had he taken this suicidal step? People loyal to the opposition from the Ministry of National Security [MNB] reported that on the eve of the session of the republic's Supreme Council [VS], the MNB's minister met for four hours with several generals from the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]. Unquestionably, Mutalibov was promised support. But after all, he didn't know (he couldn't have known!) that the opposition would not be reconciled to his return either, or that the people would rise up against the official government structures, which had decisively discredited themselves, or that the republic, crammed with weapons like a gunpowder keg, is not the best place for such experiments. According to the leader of the NFA [Azerbaijan People's Front], the secretary of the Union of Writers, Sabir Rustamkhenla, the forces supporting the ex-president were counting on just this: "They wanted to unleash civil war in Azerbaijan. In order to distract our attention from Karabakh and our borders. In order to convince the entire world that the Azeri people are not mature enough for democracy and can once again be

subdued with tanks and the 'international' assistance of CIS troops. That is what happened in January 1990. This time, it didn't work."

No, it hasn't worked yet. Thank God, we have managed to avoid the Georgian scenario. But the danger has not yet passed. It is not for nothing that one after another the leaders of the opposition are speaking on television, appealing to the Russian-speaking population not to yield to provocation, which has already occurred. Thus, when the representatives of the city's Russian community, at the invitation of the Azerbaijan People's Front, came to meet with the leaders of the opposition, machine-gun and even cannon fire was heard at NFA headquarters. Alarming signals are coming into the NFA information center from Russians in whose mail boxes threatening letters are being dropped.

Republic Representative to UNESCO on Efforts to Improve Economy

92US0472D Baku KHALG GEZETI in Azeri
25 Apr 92 p 2

[Interview with H. M. Sadygov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, by Azerinform correspondent Kh. Imanov: "Azerbaijan Member Of UN Commission"]

[Text] Azerbaijan's delegation which took part in the session of UNESCO on Asia and the Pacific Ocean has returned from Beijing. Minister of Foreign Affairs H. H. Sadygov led our delegation. The Azerinform correspondent talked with him.

[Imanov] How does Azerbaijan participate in such a representative meeting?

[Sadygov] At the 48th session of the commission in the capital of the People's Republic of China Azerbaijan was accepted into the ranks of this international organization. Our republic is a full member of the commission. As is known, there is also a corresponding commission uniting the countries of Europe. Now we are members of both commissions. This privilege was given to Azerbaijan because from the geographical point of view we are located on two continents, in a territory joining Europe and Asia. Of the CIS countries, only Russia is in the same situation.

[Imanov] Which of the other former union republics have also become members of the UNESCO Commission on Asia and the Pacific Ocean?

[Sadygov] Other than Russia and Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan. In general, close to 60 countries are members of the commission. Butros Ghali, secretary general of the UN, also took part in the work of the session. I held a number of official meetings during the session. These meetings primarily helped to create an impression of our rich, ancient country and people for the delegation leaders of various countries and to provide information on changes which had occurred and are occurring in our young, independent state.

Returning to your question, I want to talk about what commission membership gives to us. The region which this commission encompasses plays an extremely important role

in world economic unity. Among its members are Japan, Australia, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand and other countries which are economically very strong. The rich experience of the countries called the "Five Dragons" which succeeded in making a large economic leap forward is extremely useful for Azerbaijan now that independence has been gained and at a time when its economy is changing over to market relations. It was mentioned at the session that specialists and experts from the commission will come to Azerbaijan soon and help us in the preparation of a concept of economic development. They also promised to help in the training of cadres. As a commission member, Azerbaijan will be able to attract large sums in investments, finance credits, new technology, etc.

[Imanov] In brief, the economic prospects are extremely hopeful. But, as is known, the economy can only develop in an area which is politically stable. Was there any discussion of the political situation in the CIS, specifically in Azerbaijan?

[Sadygov] While the commission is purely an economic organization, there was discussion of this. In my speech at the session, I was unable to touch on the Armenian-Azeri conflict, which is very painful for all of us. I did give information about the events occurring in the mountainous part of Karabakh to the session participants and I expressed my anxiety that if talks were not conducted on ending these conflicts soon, they could spread far beyond the borders of the region. My speech was well received, and the Russian representative also spoke on the need to eliminate the conflict. The leader of the Pakistan delegation appealed to the session participants and said that the UN should play a more active role in this issue.

[Imanov] You said that you held a number of meetings in Beijing. Could you talk about some of them?

[Sadygov] First, I want to mention a meeting with the secretary general of the UN. The talk with Butros Ghali was very useful and took place in an atmosphere of mutual understanding. I felt that he was deeply disturbed by the events in Karabakh and wants to help find a peaceful solution to the problem. He promised that he would come to Azerbaijan personally this year with the goal of familiarizing himself with the situation in the area, stopping the bloodshed, and starting talks. Other than this, there were memorable meetings with the Chinese leadership. I talked with Tszyyan Tszemin, general secretary of the CC Chinese CP, and Li Pen, Prime Minister of the State Council. I would add that Li Pen was in Mingchevir a number of years ago and, as he said himself, he remembers the hospitality and friendship of the Azeri people well. In a talk with Tszyan Chichen, China's Minister of Foreign Affairs, I agreed that a treaty on cooperation in the sectors of friendship, economics, science and culture should be prepared and signed in the near future.

I would like to make use of the opportunity and mention meetings I held in Moscow while returning to the Fatherland. I met with the ambassadors of Germany and Great Britain in Russia's capital and reached agreements on questions of cooperation in the training of cadres in a

number of specialties. Both of them promised that they would report on this to their countries' leaders and they were sure that places would be set aside in Europe's best educational institutions. We also had an unofficial meeting with Andrey Kozyrev, Russia's Minister of Foreign Affairs. We discussed questions of mutual interest in an informal manner. We also touched on the Karabakh question. He agreed that at a meeting of parties involved in the Karabakh conflict planned to be held in the future that representatives from Azerbaijan, Russia as a middleman, and representatives of the Azeri and Armenian communities of Upper Karabakh should take part. As for the CIS, and especially Armenia, they should definitely not take part in this meeting.

It is difficult to talk about all the results gained by Azerbaijan's diplomats in Beijing in such a short time. In conclusion I only want to say that our young republic is gradually gaining influence in the international world. Azerbaijan's acceptance into the UN Commission on Asia and the Pacific Region is proof of this.

United Nations Debate on Libyan Sanctions Viewed

92130472E Baku KHALIG GAZETI in Azeri
22 Apr 92 p 2

[Article by Rasim Aghayev: "Are The Sanctions Against Terrorism, Or Against Libya?"]

[Text] The sanctions passed at the request of the USA, England and France against the Jamahiriyye of Libya went into force on 15 April. Members of the Security Council made no compromises on the question of "a lesson" to Colonel Qadhafi. Russia, taking part in the rights of the former USSR, expressed its strong solidarity with the West. Gorbachev's promotion of war in the Persian Gulf, above all, Russia's actions brought an end to the many years of friendship between Tripoli and Moscow.

In general, this was a strange friendship. The colonel hurled abuse at communism. The USSR, in its turn, loudly condemned international terrorism. Terrorists of the Jamahiriyye arranged explosions, and took part in kidnappings. The Soviet Union sent Libya tanks and airplanes, and built military installations there. True, in distinction to most of Moscow's allies, Libya compensated the USSR for its service in hard currency and generously.

Now an air blockade on Libya has been established, and an embargo placed on weapons deliveries. Above all, Libya has to reduce the number of its diplomats in foreign countries significantly.

It is clear that the fate of the close to three thousand CIS military specialists who, up to now, were controlling the actions of Libya's army, will be very difficult.

The West, for example, the USA, France and England, have been long looking for an excuse to take measures against Libya. The erratic and quick-tempered Qadhafi is blocking the USA's plans and hopes on the African continent by all means. Certainly one could dispute Qadhafi's policy, one of anti-imperialism and anti-communism. But it

is also clear that the Jamahiriyye is like a bone caught in the West's throat. There is a lot of oil there and the colonel exploits this resource as he wishes. And the West certainly does not like it.

But it is not oil which is inflaming the dispute, but the fact that two terrorists have not been turned over. This is essentially an excuse to unseat the proud colonel. The USA does not conceal the fact that it hopes that discontent will rise within the Jamahiriyye and change Libya's domestic and foreign policy.

Thus, the basic reason is not terrorism. We would note that aside from Libya's special services administration, there are other terror organizations in the world.

Approximately a hundred years ago the Armenian secret terrorist organization, ASALA, was established and it has spread its network all over the world. The Armenian terrorists have been murdering Turkish diplomats in various countries one after the other. But the murders, fires and explosions they have committed have never been condemned seriously, either in the USA or the USSR. Two years ago Moscow television displayed units of this army marching grandly on the streets of Yerevan. Right after this, the explosions occurred on the Moscow-Baku trains and buses. Colonel Blakhotin was killed in Rostov. Civilian helicopters were shot down and burned in Karabakh, and journalists met their death. Essentially, the Armenian terrorists committed their atrocities in Moscow long before Baku. No one talked about them. When I worked in Tripoli local diplomats often told me that Armenian terrorist groups located in Europe and the Near East maintained a constant relationship with Libya's special service administration.

Now Armenia is the only country in the Commonwealth of Independent States that openly supports and helps every kind of terrorism. One can count on one's fingers the countries in the world engaged in this work. That is to say, the principles represented at the Security Council must not deter anyone. The solution to political issues which require punishment is not terrorism, which is rejected by all of mankind as a method, but Qadhdhafi and Libya.

We recall that, Libya has also been exposed to a merciless economic, military and transport blockade, as it was during the war in the Persian Gulf. They call this a sanction, but delaying tanker trucks loaded with fuel on the road to Yerevan is called an atrocious measure.

It is a pity that in policy Russia is following in the wake of the states of the West. By following this kind of policy, it is laughable that it claims to be a great state.

Terror has no national address. We must establish and perfect a single fighting anti-terrorist mechanism on an international basis. Above all, the countries of the CIS must describe their relationships to the international agreements and accords on the fight against terrorism from now on. We would also say that Armenia, which has talked more than anyone recently about human rights, could also make an effort in this direction. This would clearly confirm its claims about its faithfulness to civilized relations.

Head of State TV, Radio on Changes in Media

92US0473A Baku KHALG GEZETI in Azeri 24 Apr 92
pp 3,4

[Interview with Elshad Guliyev, chairman of the Azerbaijan State Teleradio Company, by N. Ismaylova: "Today Is Upon Us, What About Tomorrow?"]

[Text] After an interruption of two years, Elshad Guliyev has returned to his duty as chairman of the Azerbaijan State Teleradio Company. This appointment was met with various reactions in public circles. The occasional replacement of leaders of ministries and chief administrations, the attracting of the nation's attention to this and the violation of human destinies have turned into one of the sad symptoms of the time. But Elshad Guliyev has one advantage over his predecessors: the collective has stood by him.

Since he left his job he has thought over many things, and there was not little that he would say to the collective and they would hear from him.

We include below the discussion between the journalist N. Ismaylova and Elshad Guliyev, chairman of the Azerbaijan State Teleradio Company.

[Ismaylova] They say that "it is impossible to step in the same river twice." You have belied this thought as you have returned to your former job after two years.

[Guliyev] I did not leave television. In this period I wrote a book called "Television At The Nexus Of Two Centuries." I taught "The History Of Azeri Television" at the Fine Arts University. I opened the Ziya television studio at the Bilik Educational Society, and registered an independent film studio there. Throughout this period I always followed television programming with great attention, not only as a viewer, but as a person who had devoted thirty years of his life to television.

I would explain that I did not make the decision to return to my former job easily. I had my reasons for leaving the television company and these deeply affected me; in fact, they shook me up. Thus, I did not want to "step into the same river twice." On the other hand, television was not just a job for me, it is work I love. Thus, I was badly torn.

[Ismaylova] When was your appointment discussed? How did they explain the reasons for their selecting you for this position?

[Guliyev] They invited me to the National Council ten days before the presidential decree. They were discussing the problems of the Teleradio Broadcasting Company and ways to pull it out of a crisis situation. The members of the commission were interested in my ideas. In the presidential office they said they wanted to appoint me chairman of the company; they hoped that my experience, abilities and acquaintance with the collective would help in doing this difficult job.

[Ismaylova] Given the instability of the political situation, whose orders to you follow?

[Guliyev] I would put the question differently. To whom is teleradio responsible? Now there is a broad public discussion about where teleradio broadcasting is going: in the direction of the president, the government, the people, in a commercial or private direction? Will there be alternative television or cable?

There is state television in all developed countries. Above all, there are also commercial companies. For example, in the USA such companies include state television in their system and only agree on problems of a global nature, for example, problems connected with the American interest.

Certainly, it is good to have various companies. But they should not imitate each other: at our present level of political and economic development this is not possible. Without the help of the state, national television could not survive, it cannot sustain itself.

To bring television and radio closer to the people it cannot be run by an individual but by a collective organ: the best way would be that parliament would manage it, and that parliament would protect it with its influence. I am submitting my own conception to the Supreme Soviet. If they approve it, they will have to defend it.

[Ismaylova] Are you ready to speak about your concept in parliament?

[Guliyev] Not only in parliament, it would be best if this concept were discussed in the press so that public attention would be attracted to problems of the airwaves.

[Ismaylova] You describe this position in your dissertation "Republic Television In The Mass Media System." At the beginning of the 1980s this had a revolutionary character.

[Guliyev] This position is still actual.

[Ismaylova] Is the "white telephone" system still operational? You remember how many subjects the government banned over the telephone?

[Guliyev] From the first day I placed the condition that under any circumstances only the company itself determines such questions.

[Ismaylova] What was the response to this?

[Guliyev] Positive. I receive no directives from above. True, there are such questions that require some careful thinking. Let us take the election campaign as an example. In my opinion, in following this campaign on television and radio we have to agree that all candidates' speeches must have equal conditions in time slot and length.

[Ismaylova] What is your initial impression? Does it strike you that you are returning to a different teleradio?

[Guliyev] I cannot find the words to say it. The airwave's lifeline has been destroyed. There is no concept; thus no unity or program variety strikes the eye in program structure. Artistic shows, viewer programs, television theater, broadcasts with the participation of the actors, talk shows, comedies—all have vanished. For two years a new show has not been shown on the screen even once. The excuse is that now is not the time for light entertainment. True. But no

matter how serious the events, or how bad, they must find their artistic reflection. Now, one cannot satisfy the viewer with raw, hard facts or meet his spiritual requirement. This only agitates him. There is a need to give meaning to the facts from a philosophical and historical point of view. A show can be in a patriotic spirit, it can be a charity marathon, it can carry a political, psychological or family content. At a time when traditional criteria have been lost a family needs consolation, hope and defense. This is an incomparable resource, and the strength and the mentality of the people depend on it. I am sure that men's spiritual need is much greater than thought. Dry, long broadcasts lacking in content (unfortunately from the financial point of view programs are not evaluated according to their quality, but their size) have disappointed me for a long time. The appearance on the screen of random people with nothing to say amazes me. Vague opinions, incompetence, repetition. Our television now "presents" basically these to its viewers. Maybe it is for this reason that Azeri viewers have fallen away from the intellectuals, national ideologists, scholars, writers, playwrights and musicians.

[Ismaylova] Do you plan to put them on the screen?

[Guliyev] Not only them. Their participation in the company is necessary so that it will be possible to raise the level of ideas and the television art.

[Ismaylova] Fine, many things have to change. But when are these changes going to happen on the screen? What is stopping you?

[Guliyev] I want the public to know that television's and radio's administrative mechanism and all its structural departments were destroyed. A good half of the company's workers do not know whether they should come to work or what they should do. One cannot give them an order. On air discipline, which is the most important factor for every broadcast, has been violated. If we compare the company to a computer and we set the objective of changing its program to give it more content and a contemporary, compelling character, how would one do this if the computer itself were destroyed?

[Ismaylova] Is it possible to eliminate this disruption?

[Guliyev] If the repairmen do not lose heart, of course. The most tragic consequences of the reforms which have taken place over the last two years are the hypocrisy, opposition, claims and counterclaims. The former leadership fired close to two hundred people. Speaking frankly, not everyone was released unjustly. I swear that not a few of them in truth had to be released: some because of age, some because of lack of qualifications, or some because they were crooked, and some for all three reasons. But even so, under these conditions they were fired in a way which conformed neither to common courtesy nor the law.

I am sure that one could not excuse the departure of honorable men, people's artists, diligent managers and simple workers who had gained the love of their colleagues—Fatma Jabbarova, Gultekin Jabbarli, Zerrin Kerimova, Bunyad Memmedov, Sabir Akhundov—on the basis of an impulsive decision, an order stating that "you are

released from work on the basis of article such and such. For them there was no farewell party, no remembrance of their creative services, and no declaration of thanks.

No one can prove to those who did not respond to the demands of the job that they are worse than those who remained in the company. There are civilized ways to select a worker: a contract policy, agreement of a trade union, competition... None of these were applied. As a result, 41 who were humiliated and degraded petitioned the court, and the court ordered their return to work. The former leadership of the company, still unsatisfied with the situation, collected signatures protesting the return of those who had been fired. The list of the two hundred radio and television workers who had signed this document fell into the hands of those who had been driven from their jobs. It is clear that those who had left the company were angered and, "because their honor and worth had been impugned," took their colleagues to court. The court met their demand. They returned to their workplaces. But their jobs had been filled by new workers. I am sure you can imagine that passions were inflamed when both groups came face to face.

[Ismaylova] Now it is not difficult to inflame passions and antagonisms, achieving a harmonious work place is a difficult question. Do you have any ideas of how to eliminate this conflict?

[Guliyev] Undoubtedly. We must succeed in treating the leading worker sickness. The delicate question is when to intervene surgically and when to proceed cautiously with treatment. Calls from the television screen on being patient and calm, and succeeding in forgiving mistakes pertain not only to the viewers, but primarily to ourselves. Only in this way can the situation in the collective be changed. Certainly, the effect of the job, the creative conditions and organizing the labor on a high standard will not be small. You will see that then the situation on the air will change.

[Ismaylova] What about cadre changes? Now there are significantly more workers in the company than needed. And among the new workers there are talented youths.

[Guliyev] We will proceed very carefully so that neither the job nor the talented workers are harmed.

[Ismaylova] Will there be structural changes in the company?

[Guliyev] Certainly, there must be an exact scheme determining the optimal possibilities of every computer. We have prepared such a procedure. Every worker must have his own job, and the company as a whole must operate flexibly and without interruption.

We now have two channels. They repeat one another in the negative sense. The opening of the "Baku" channel was a symbolic event for us. But this channel, in its present state, is not productive: right now it has no concept, image, program order, technical equipment or money for day-to-day operations (this is 25 million rubles).

[Ismaylova] Had you begun with your last statement, it would have been clearer: this number is sufficient to close the channel.

[Guliyev] The channel is not being closed, it will be used in another way. Other than programs from Russia, time will be set aside for independent studios: the Azerbaijan News Service, Turkey's Zaman and News programs and other studios which want it.

Our First Program, which is our basic program, will be built on the basis of the principles of Azerbaijan national television as a whole. Other than this, we have to do serious work in the sector of scheduled programming so that broadcasts do not repeat each other, and the geography of information encompasses much more.

News programs should not air at the same time. At 8:00 p.m., Azerbaijan's Gun program conflicts with Russia's Vesti program. At 9:00 p.m., the "news" from the Ostankino studios clashes with the "news" from Turkey. In our opinion, programs from Turkey and Iran should be on separate channels.

[Ismaylova] What will become of the creative workers in Baku channel studio?

[Guliyev] They will work for the first program in the "Baku studio" which prepares broadcasts devoted to Baku. These broadcasts will be in both Russian and Azeri, as it is now.

[Ismaylova] Will new structures be created in the company?

[Guliyev] Yes. The literary-artistic broadcasting studio, which was closed and which had gained the love of the viewers, will be revived. A new parliament group has been established. Considering the growing role of the parliament in the republic's life, we are starting a new program called "Parliamentary News." In programs under this rubric we will focus on work in the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet and National Council, the progress in the implementation of decrees, and accountings from ministries, chief administrations and parliamentary commissions. Yes, it would be better if we opened a special channel for this, as in Canada. But we do not live in Canada.

[Ismaylova] Will time and space in the program be given to national opposition, various parties or social movements? If these are given, what form will they take?

[Guliyev] These are important problems. We are working on them. If you have paid attention, we have given time to representatives of all political parties recently. They spoke about their platforms. Frankly, these programs have been unsatisfactory. A form and a means of expression have not yet been found. The level of the broadcasts has been lower than we would have thought. Time has been given to banal ideas and hasty, confused thoughts. Not all the speakers are good speakers, or can act naturally in front of the camera, or correctly say what they want to say to the viewer in the time allotted. Speaking on television is a special kind of art. After such broadcasts viewers write angry letters: "Why did so and so talk that way?" His political content was unclear. It shocked us."

In my opinion we must create a special political program, and capable, effective and intelligent writers must help give a precise expression to the problem through television, we

must either bring ideas to a consensus or smoothly differentiate them from one another. The present political situation is very complicated. Television has a special role in stabilizing life; it can play the role of a stimulator, a peacemaker, or even of a mood barometer. We have to reinforce belief in our information and our position for whatever it is worth.

[Ismaylova] Let us define the question of position. Now a number of opposition representatives have attained real government. In your opinion, are they as irreconcilable and genuine as before?

[Guliyev] (smiles) —

[Ismaylova] Could you explain your smile?

[Guliyev] Let me explain. We prepared an emotional broadcast of an analytical nature connected with forty victims of Khojaly. In my opinion, it was well done. When the broadcast went on the air, a responsible person immediately called up: "How many tears can one shed? How much can we talk about our failure?" I have respect for this individual and, if he is opposed to this, he liked it as a broadcast. I do not reproach him. The feeling of responsibility of a person with a position is not the same as someone in the opposition; the relationship to state secrets and psychological strategy is different.

[Ismaylova] There are many dark labyrinths within government circles. Groups defining political position are active in many of the world's television companies. They determine what the priority political problems are which have to be given precedence, and produce a weekly political analysis.

[Guliyev] This problem also awaits us: we are looking for advisors competent in technology, economics and politics so that the company can work well at the world level. In the final analysis our sovereign state is going forth into the international world. At this point I would mention that we are establishing yet another important structure—the International Programs Center. It will organize business and creative relations with television [companies] of the CIS and other countries. Measures like program exchanges, holding joint broadcasts and television bridges, and establishing our correspondents' areas are included in our plans. We have reached agreement on this with Tehran, Tabriz and Ankara. We are discussing proposals on establishing relations with Iraq's Minister of Information and the chairman of Russia's television company. Talks are going on about the place of general information in the CIS countries.

We ourselves are also responsible for Azerbaijan's information blockade. I would present two concrete facts. At the end of last year the company's leadership received a letter from Moscow. Ostankino television wanted us to permit the transfer of a certain sum of money to our address so that we would prepare broadcasts for them. Can you imagine that? They wanted to hear the truth about Azerbaijan through our own voices and even pay for it. But our people did not answer this proposal. St. Petersburg also came to us with a similar proposal. But the editors were occupied with current

work and their daily plans; we do not even have an information service for the CIS and the rest of the world. They abolished it. Thus, we need the International Center as much as air and water.

They have also seriously criticized our film policy: why do we have so few films in the mother tongue? After the breakup of the USSR the relationship to history changed and a few Soviet and Azeri films could be shown which could be run without explanation. Thus, we had established a dubbing department. A certain amount of time is necessary for this. I wanted that film fans should be aware of our plans and reduce criticism to allow us more time.

[Ismaylova] How do you approach negative opinions about your activities?

[Guliyev] I am an excitable person. I do not meet criticism with enthusiasm. But I do approach it in a normal manner, and try not to let external factors bother me. My relationship to charitable criticism is completely different. Let us take the television summaries in AZADLYG newspaper, for example. It is useful to the work and not disturbing. My relations with the press are of a peaceful nature.

[Ismaylova] May 7th is getting closer. Are we going to mark radio and television day?

[Guliyev] No. We are a sovereign state and we have our own historical days. Azerbaijan radio went on the air for the first time on 6 November 1926. We have sent a letter to the Supreme Soviet asking that it be declared a holiday.

[Ismaylova] What is your ultimate goal in this job?

[Guliyev] Recently a Turkish correspondent asked me: "What are the positive and negative aspects of Turkish television?" I said that its advantages are excellent technical equipment, expertise, a solid and orderly presentation. Its disadvantage is that it lacks a national image. The correspondent agreed with me. They are discussing this problem in the Turkish public. I could say the same about Azerbaijan's television—it has no national image. While the broadcasts are in Azeri, Azerbaijan's spirit is not felt very strongly. We have to think about this deeply.

[Ismaylova] If possible, explain your ideas more precisely. Has television always been this way, or has this happened only over the last two years?

[Guliyev] In my opinion, the best model for our television was in the mid 1980s, more precisely, between 1984-1988. At that time, our entire program was filled with Azerbaijan's traditions, they had a national coloration, and were devoted to current topics. At the same time, they were inclined to common human values. Certainly, there were also shortcomings connected with this period.

From the technical point of view, we want to create an Azeri television which both has a national identity and is developed at the European level. We want to attract Azerbaijan's intellectual forces and form the idea of a common national revival. No matter what our losses, a national revival is necessary and only the people can meet its commitments. One has to bring the people forward and ignite the light of hope in their hearts. We want Azerbaijan's radio and

television to be a center of culture and center for the national experience, and when the people lose hope or fall on bad times they can turn to it and receive an answer to their questions. All our creative work, our plans and our hopes are connected to this wish.

GEORGIA

Official on Fighting Economic Crime

92US04824 Tbilisi SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA
in Russian 23 Apr 92 pp 1-2

[Interview with Sh. Kviraya, Georgian internal affairs deputy minister, by SG correspondent L. Mchedlidze, under the rubric "Rule-of-Law State"; place and date not given: "Business and Crime"]

[Text] We have learned that at the present time the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] of our country is drawing up a set of documents determining the fundamental lines of reorganization for our system of lawkeeping organs. What place will the economic police occupy in this system? This is the subject of our correspondent's conversation with the Georgian internal affairs deputy minister, Shota Kviraya.

Information. Born in 1952. In 1977 graduated from the Georgian Technical University; has a diploma from the Kaunas Special School of the MVD and the Tbilisi State University Law School. Worked in the Abkhazian MVD from 1984 to 1990 in the central apparatus of the Georgian MVD. Went from operational representative to deputy head of administration. From December 1990 to January 1992, was head of the subdivision for especially important matters in the central apparatus of the Chief Economic Crime Administration. Simultaneously was the MVD representative to Interpol for economic crimes. Since January of the current year, Shota Kviraya has been the republic's internal affairs deputy minister and continues his service in the fight against economic crimes. A colonel in the police, three-time boxing champion of Georgia, and an expert in the sport.

[SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA] Batono Shota, more than once recently in the republic's media we have heard the opinion of official as well as unofficial persons as to the pointlessness of the existence in the MVD system of a service to fight crime in the sphere of economics. Your opinion on this subject?

[Kviraya] Without sufficient argument or study of the problem and without consideration for international practice or the financial-economic interests of our young state, the supporters of this point of view ground their position in the allegation that the service could create a barrier to the development of private initiative and entrepreneurship.

At the same time they cannot prove concretely where these obstacles are expressed. After all, the economic crime service comes into contact with production processes only when a crime has already been committed, the interests of the state, society, and citizens have been damaged, or the production process itself has intervened in some way. Consequently, the exposure of crime cannot mean the creation of any obstacles. If entrepreneurship is implemented within

the framework of the law, then no one, including the law-keeping organs, can create any barriers to businessmen.

In the near future the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs will become a member of Interpol and so will establish business contacts and collaborate with the police apparatuses of many countries of the world. This clearly means that our structures must be formed to correspond to their police services. And in all developed countries the national police include subdivisions to fight economic crimes and protect the state's financial-economic interests.

In recent years in the United States of America, Great Britain, France, Germany, Finland, Sweden, and the Netherlands, a series of normative acts has been passed directed at strengthening the fight against economic crimes.

In the years 1990-91, Interpol twice discussed this issue as well. Within Interpol itself a special economic crimes subdivision has been created. The concern of Interpol and the countries that belong to it over issues involved in the fight against economic crimes is no accident. Frequently the damage inflicted by legal violations exceeds the budget of several states. It has been established that economic crimes frequently inflict damage on the economies of Germany, France, England, America, Finland, Sweden, Italy, and other countries in the tens of billions of dollars.

At the contemporary stage an extremely difficult problem for the police apparatus of all countries is the fight against economic crimes in the finance-credit system—in particular, the laundering of so-called dirty money and its use in legal business, the damage from which comes to as much as six percent of all banking operations. The illegal export of national currency and its movement into other countries from states that do not have their own convertible currency has become widespread. The exposure and disclosure of these types of crimes is complicated by the fact that bank employees frequently prove to have been mixed up in financial machinations.

These crimes are so difficult to solve that they require constant improvement in operational-investigative methods.

[SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA] Batono Shota, what today is international practice in the fight against economic crimes? How is this problem being dealt with in our country, where the main part of the economy is still in the state sector?

[Kviraya] We are looking at denationalization and privatization in the area of the economy. The situation is also aggravated by the fact that the complicated political situation allows no opportunity to stabilize the economy, which is in a stage of deep crisis. All this creates conditions conducive to economic crime. Suffice it to say that in the last two years alone, as a result of financial machinations, Georgia's budget has suffered to the tune of billions of rubles. Our practice shows that the large part of these crimes is accomplished by deeply masked methods, using all possible combinations, and without the appropriate operational-investigative work they are impossible to expose.

As of the beginning of this year, nonstate structures had taken out in the form of loans from banks, in many

instances illegally, as much as 4 billion rubles [R]. The loans have been repaid on time only in individual cases, and a significant portion of the loans comprise so-called insolvent payers. Along with this, more than half of the sums paid out in the form of loans is being spent not as intended or is being acquired through various machinations. We possess information that frequently serious damage is inflicted on the state's economic interests by various associations and joint ventures. The latter take scarce goods and materials and antiques out of Georgia, put them on the world market, in return bring in objects that are far from being what the republic most needs: beer, cigarettes, chewing gum, outdated equipment, machines, and installations, and make an enormous profit, acquiring large quantities of hard currency.

[SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA] Batono Shota, the question arises: whose purpose does it serve to pass such a hasty resolution on eliminating the economic crime service? What results can follow from this?

[Kviraya] Let us turn to politics. Before the upcoming elections in Georgia, this hullabaloo, which calls for the elimination of the OBKhSS [Department for Combating Theft of Socialist Property and Speculation] service, will certainly serve the populist politicians, great being the temptation to announce publicly at a well-attended meeting the victory over a previously unslayable "dragon," and so on. Naturally, after this the mafia will celebrate its great victory in the new elections as well. Certainly it will support those who brought this idea to life, for today the income they receive by criminal means is limited only by the relative activity of said service.

The elimination of this service promises them total freedom of action. An army of many thousands of middle producers is prepared psychologically to support the idea of eliminating the economic crime service, since to conclude so-called small deals they often have to resort to many violations, which is a source for constant worry and fear.

As has already been noted above, replacing the economic crime service with an auditing chamber or a tax inspectorate is not in the least all right. A fiscal service is interested in increasing budgetary income and does not disclose the legality of the sources of that income. Moreover, it is actually interested in monopoly prices. The higher the prices, the greater the budget's income. Only operative workers can expose the masked monopolistic associations who benefit from taking control of the market through prohibited methods, and, what is most important, the victims will be the people, the simple consumers, whose interests no political party or eloquent speaker can defend, however promising their election platforms.

Probably many will be forced to consider the sad fact that as of April 1992 the illegal blockade of transport highways, the breaks in communications, arson, and cargo theft had inflicted R10 billion in damage to the state. Even more to the point is the issue of the fight against the theft of

narcotics and strong-acting substances from health care sites and their incorrect use and the illegal storage and trade in them.

As was noted above, the global view on the problem of the fight against economic crime dictates that we reorganize all our structures in accordance with world practice and experience. Therefore we are seriously working on creating new structures and eliminating all our chains in the subdepartmental apparatus. The service's personnel is being cut by two thirds, and the greatest attention is being paid to attracting competent, able-bodied, and conscientious personnel.

Our service is shifting to a regional principle of servicing the economy. Departments and groups are being created on the basis of several rayon systems to be immediately subordinate to the central apparatus rather than the local rayon internal affairs departments.

Only normal, effective legislation can create fertile ground for the development of business. Today Georgia is experiencing the acutest shortage of just that kind of legislation. The lack of correspondence between the vital principles of the law and business is becoming the chief attribute of our daily life. The economic crime service must work according to the norms accepted in civilized countries, although the legislation corresponding to them for some reason is behind schedule. When will it finally appear?

Meanwhile Russia, for example, is already preparing a new draft Criminal Code and has submitted it to the parliament for discussion. In it two chapters are devoted to white collar and economic crimes.

Not so long ago the speculation statute was repealed in Russia, as it was here. The real situation that took shape in the economy and the numerous violations in the commercial and cooperative sectors there demonstrated the hastiness of repealing the article, so it was reintroduced.

An analogous situation has taken shape in our republic. As the facts attest, locally produced foodstuffs and industrial goods, as well as goods coming in as humanitarian aid, are being moved from the state sector into commercial structures and resold at prices 30-40 times more expensive. This has provoked just indignation among the population, which is demanding protection of their consumer interests. The lawkeeping organs, however, have been deprived of the rights and opportunity to battle such occurrences.

The government of the Republic of Georgia has prepared a draft resolution on freedom of trade, in accordance with points 5 and 8 of which the organs of internal affairs are categorically forbidden to check any transported freight, even if it is stolen or acquired by illegal means. They do not have the right to demand licenses or other documents for cargo either. These points of the resolution in fact undermine the state's economic stability, untie criminals' hands, and allow the unpunished theft of state property, the illegal export of goods and material assets, all sorts of machinations.

It should be pointed out that this resolution was copied from the decree of the president of the Russian Federation on freedom of trade, which, however, does not provide such advantages to criminals. Society is striving toward a life style, laws, and order characteristic of Western countries, forgetting that the cornerstone of that lifestyle is the supremacy of private property, which is the point of departure for the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man. In the near future, economic cooperation with the countries of

the West will undoubtedly expand. Therefore we are going to have to start worrying seriously about safeguarding the state's economic interests.

Taking all this into consideration, a new structure should be devised for the economic crime service and its material-technical base strengthened, especially since all civilized countries have analogous services that protect the state's economic interests.

ESTONIA

Prime Minister Demands Vote for Exiles

92UN1337A Stockholm EESTI PAEVALEHT
in Estonian 22 Apr 92 p 1

[Statement from Tiit Vähi: "Government of the Republic of Estonia: Voting Rights Should Also Be Given to Citizens Abroad!"]

[Text] The government of Estonia demands that the Supreme Council change its resolution not to give voting rights to Estonians in exile to vote for the Constitution and the State Council. A signed statement to that effect was sent to the Supreme Council by Prime Minister Tiit Vähi. We are publishing the text of this statement in full.

Statement from the Government of the Republic of Estonia to the Supreme Council of the Republic of Estonia

The continuity of the Republic of Estonia is provided by its citizenry.

The Government of the Republic of Estonia maintains that when it comes to adopting the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, and voting for the State Council, the right to have their say should be given to all those who represent the continuity of the Republic of Estonia—to all the citizens of the Republic of Estonia.

Based on the foregoing, the Government of the Republic of Estonia proposes to the Supreme Council of the Republic of Estonia that voting rights for adopting the constitution and electing the State Council be given to all citizens of the Republic of Estonia, regardless of their residence.

[Signed] T. Vähi, Chairman Government of the Republic of Estonia

April 15, 1992

Exile Council Defies Parliament

92UN1337B Stockholm EESTI PAEVALEHT
in Estonian 24 Apr 92 p 1

[Statement issued by the Estonian World Council "The Central Council Protests: The Latest Resolutions of the Estonian Supreme Council are Unacceptable"]

[Text] The Estonian World Council and the central organizations of its member countries—in Australia, England, Canada, United States, Germany, Sweden, Belgium and France—do not agree with the resolutions passed by the Estonian Supreme Council regarding election law and citizen identification papers. The joint statement voicing the protest reads as follows:

We appreciate several of the developments that have taken place in Estonia since August 20, 1991. We want to single out here the constructive spirit of cooperation between the Estonian Congress and the Supreme Council in convening the Constitutional Assembly; the nationally minded message from the new Prime Minister Tiit Vähi to mark the Anniversary of Estonia's Independence, and the public statements he made on his recent visit to Sweden.

The same goes for the resolutions of the Estonian Congress regarding the work of the Constitutional Assembly and the possibility that the adoption of the new constitution be followed promptly by elections to the Estonian State Assembly.

We cannot, however, accept the resolutions passed last week regarding the election law and citizen identification papers passed by the temporary Supreme Council of the transitional period following occupation.

Contemporary laws in the Western world allow its citizens to vote even when they are away from their home country. Curiously enough, the election law is in conflict with the provisions of the bill for the new constitution on a number of points.

Thus, for example, the Supreme Council approved a citizen living abroad as Estonia's foreign minister who, according to the law passed on the day of his approval, did not have the right to vote.

Without a citizenry that has been ascertained beforehand neither voting for the constitution nor elections to the State Assembly, which are based on the bill of that constitution, could be carried out by duly franchised citizens. The resolution of the Estonian Congress, as the representative body of citizens of the Republic of Estonia, to register its lawful citizenry with the help of identification papers, is a necessary and urgent step before democratic elections could be carried out.

There is no doubt that the resolution passed actually interferes with this objective and confirms our suspicions that there is a willingness to extend the citizenship of the Republic of Estonia to non-citizens.

We are convinced that the Republic of Estonia and Estonians cannot get out of their current difficulties without a constitution, a constitutional parliament and a constitutional government. We want to emphasize, once again, that these steps require ascertaining the lawful citizenry of the Republic of Estonia as soon as possible, either by the government or by the Estonian Congress.

We have steadfastly supported the citizens' movement of the Republic of Estonia; its resolution to convene the Estonian Congress as the legitimate representative body of the citizenry of the Republic of Estonia; the work of the Estonian Committee formed by the Congress, along with the new constitution; registration of citizens based on identification papers, and carrying out elections for the State Assembly as soon as possible.

We appeal to the Supreme Council to change their resolutions on elections and citizen identification papers so that they would be compatible with the bill of the constitution and reflect the interests of the lawful citizenry of the Republic of Estonia.

...

The joint statement is signed by Mäido Kari, chairman of the UEKN [Estonian World Council]; Ebe Kartus, chairman of the League of Estonian Associations in Australia; Helmut Heinastu, chairman of the Estonian Association in England;

Laas Leivat, chairman of the Estonian Council in Canada; Juhan Simonson, chairman of the Estonian National Committee in the United States; Johannes Kungas, chairman of the Estonian Community in the Federal Republic of Germany; Peeter Luksep, chairman of the Estonian Executive Board in Sweden; Lillie Dillie-Lindre, chairman of the Estonian Association in Belgium; and Maurice Goutt-Liiv, chairman of the Estonian Association for Mutual Assistance in France.

People's Front Bracing for Comeback

92UN1337E Stockholm EESTI PAEVALEHT
in Estonian 24 Apr 92 p 4

[Article by Kalle Muuli: "At the People's Front Congress: Playing for the Full Bank, With All Cards on the Table"]

[Text] The fourth congress of the People's Front was anything but a sleepy gathering of weary people. Blows were being dealt vigorously throughout the day. All received their share, from journalists to "insiders." It started out in the morning with speaker Edgar Savisaar, who gave a long thrashing to the Estonian Committee. There was less flap about the former Communist brass, and colonists were left alone altogether, because we have to get along well with them. Instead, Tiit Vähi's government was put in its place. From the resolution regarding economic policies one can deduce that almost everything the government has managed to do over the last two-and-a-half months has been bad and retrogressive, even if the stores be full of food and tanks full of gasoline.

By the afternoon it even reached Marju Lauristin, who came close to being called a political weathervane. To the traitors', traitor's dues—after all, Marju Lauristin had put in a good word or two about the resolutions of the Estonian Congress. It is hoped that the deputy speaker of the Supreme Council will understand that not all people have the habit, or opportunity, to lower their tensions in conventional ways (sport, tourism, sex, etc.). As long as there is a chance to curse other people, and even have an audience for it, life will seem a lot brighter. The People's Front seems indeed to be a necessary formation in Estonian politics for some time to come.

One of the more interesting passages of Edgar Savisaar's speech was his evaluation of the August 20 independence resolution or, more precisely, one part of it on the basis of which the Constitutional Assembly was later formed. Savisaar portrayed the formation of the Constitutional Assembly as an apparent compromise, even though it is supposedly not yet known with whose authority, and how this compromise was reached. It is difficult to pinpoint just what kind of shady dealings the speaker was alluding to but, just the same, an approach like this can, if need be, challenge the legality of the Constitutional Assembly, if not the entire resolution for independence. One would expect a suspenseful sequel to such a thought, even though Edgar Savisaar and his comrades-in-arms also voted for independence on August 20. It is also possible, of course, that the chairman of the People's Central Party dropped this phrase simply to irritate someone.

Taken as a whole, Edgar Savisaar's speech did not reveal any big surprises. This time, however, criticizing the Estonian Committee and praising the People's Front were not a "thing in itself" but formed a basis for a strange kind of logic: If the Estonian Committee has always been wrong, and the People's Front has always been right, then we, who want to give voting rights to those applying for citizenship, are right once again.

Despite the well-reasoned psychological approach, the most vigorous discussion at the congress was generated by the resolution on voting rights. Coming up first for the vote, at the suggestion of the task force for revisions, was the bill that recommended giving voting rights for the first elections of the State Assembly also to all applicants for citizenship who are born in Estonia and who have their permanent residence here. The congress did not like that the voting rights of the former USSR citizens be linked to being born in Estonia, and the bill failed to pass. Instead, approval was given to the resolution giving voting rights for the first elections of the State Assembly to all permanent residents of Estonia who have applied for citizenship. This passed with 189 votes for and 47 against, with nine delegates abstaining. These figures did not constitute a quorum (375), but that did not really matter, because the congress of the People's Front checks for quorum only at the beginning of the session.

Since the government resolution does not require proof of mastering the language until nine months after the application is filed, access to ballot boxes would become available to totally inarticulate "non-Estonian countrymen." Besides, the Citizenship Office could not possibly check on the qualifications of thousands who would be submitting their applications only a few days before the elections.

But, there is not much one can do, since the will of the People's Front is supposedly half the will of the people because, as Edgar Savisaar said referring to the EMOR survey, in Tallinn, for example, the People's Front is supported by almost every other Estonian.

With its resolution to extend voting rights, the People's Front congress put a few more twists on the election struggle. Now, it's a game played for the full bank, with all cards on the table. Thus, it is not at all surprising to see the recently registered Russian Democratic Movement among the alliance of centrist powers. In any case, the results of the voting will be available before the official start of the election campaign, with the decision up to the Supreme Council. Should the Supreme Council give voting rights to all those who apply for citizenship, Edgar Savisaar could hold on to his fond hopes of winning. If not, the People's Central Party will lose to the Coalition Party and possibly to some other rightist coalition parties.

When it comes to passing the implementation resolution of the election law, the votes of independent democrats and moderate social democrats could carry the election. The position of the former is especially precarious, because there is not much good that they can expect from either Lagne Parek or Edgar Savisaar, or not even the government, for

that matter. Whom are they gravitating to? It was at the initiative of independent democrat Ulo Uluots and the centrist faction that the Supreme Council cancelled the identification papers issued by the Estonian Committee, thus leaving thousands of Estonian citizens stranded without any identification. (What is one to use for getting money out of the bank, for exchanging rubles into Kroons, or for participating in the elections of the State Assembly, once the Soviet passport has been dumped in accordance with the resolution of the Supreme Council Presidium?).

This one common wish may not necessarily signify the start of continuing cooperation, but the infamous Paragraph 8 can have quite an impact, even without becoming law. A straight back may be a joy to behold, but in politics a high forehead should be preferred. The least palatable mixture would result, of course, should the Supreme Council first give its permission for the citizenship applicants to vote, and then be driven out by the people of Estonia.

Estonia Prepares for Own Currency

92UN13524 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
18 May 92 Morning Edition p 2

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent Leonid Levitskiy]

[Text] To the wail of sirens, krona printed overseas were delivered from the port to the Bank of Estonia. It became clear: The ruble has seen its last weeks in Estonia.

The Committee on Monetary Reform has published a decree on the procedure for exchanging the ruble for the krona. Special points for this have been created everywhere in the republic. There are about 160 of them in Tallinn. Each one can handle about 4,000 people living in its microrayon. They have drawn up lists of people who are allowed to exchange rubles for krona. The right to exchange them has been granted to all permanent residents; that is, those who have a residency permit or identity card for residency for no less than a year and regular residents of the republic.

But the peace was disturbed by an unexpected announcement from the Committee on Monetary Reform, which announced to "private individuals from other states who were in the republic that...there would be no exchange of nonconvertible currency into the Estonian krona." Who are these private individuals from other states? According to the most recent laws, about 600,000 of the 1.5 million residents of Estonia, practically all the Russian-speaking population, are regarded as foreigners. This did not make any difference to the Committee on Monetary Reform before, and the right to exchange was granted according to residency permit. What is this; will it now be distributed according to citizenship? This question was not made any clearer by the answer from the leader of the press center of the Bank of Estonia, K. Pollinskiy:

"I cannot say anything about the announcement. But nobody has revised the first decree and the declared procedure for exchange."

Not all economists are convinced of the correctness of such an abrupt and unilateral rejection of the ruble. Estonia will

remain in the space it unifies for a long time to come. It will have to glean raw material, fuel, and metals from this zone and offer its goods which are not suitable for the Western market. But so far Estonia is unable to coordinate with Russia and the other republics the fine points of the transition to its own currency.

There is no doubt that the young state should decide for itself when and how to introduce its national currency. True, in the words of bank president S. Kallas, the International Monetary Fund is advising Estonia to wait two or three years until the economy stabilizes. But the republic, its politicians, and its present citizens do not want to wait: For them the krona is a symbol of independence and the key to well-being.

Will the krona stand up in a time of continuing decline of production? Hyperinflation, which is eating up the ruble, will not spare the krona. The Supreme Soviet will have to consider three draft laws: on the monetary unit, on its support, and on foreign currencies. It follows from the documents that only one currency will be used in Estonia—the krona. It will be backed by gold inherited from the prewar republic and foreign convertible currency. The exchange rate of the krona is established in correspondence to the exchange rate of the German mark. Currencies of other states may be used only in international transactions.

Minister of the Economy H. Vitsur has stated that the Estonia krona will be put into circulation by St. John's Day; that is, 23 June. Cautious economists are still putting off the arrival of the krona until autumn. In any case there will not be long to wait. It is no accident that the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs warned Russia and other "ruble" states that beginning 20 May the rules for entry into the republic will be tightened. Temporary visas will be given only to those guests who have a return ticket or the freely convertible currency to acquire one. So if you intend to go to Estonia, take along a return ticket or some hard currency. More difficulties have arisen for the ruble...

ZHIZN Ethnographic Dictionary: Estonians

92UN1334A Moscow ZHIZN in Russian
No 14, Apr 92 p 9

[Ethnographic dictionary entry edited by Dr of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Dr of Historical Sciences U.B. Simchenko: Estonians]

[Text] Self-designation: **Eesti, Eesti-Rahvas, Eestlased** (plural); **Maarahvas**. ("People of Our Land") until the 18th century.

According to the 1989 census, there were 1,026,649 Estonians living in the Soviet Union.

Anthropologically, the Estonians belong to the western-Baltic and eastern-Baltic type of the Atlantic-Baltic race of the Big Europeid race.

The Estonian language belongs to the Balto-Finnic subgroup of the Finno-Ugric group of the Uralic language family and includes three dialects: **southern Estonian** (Tartu); **north-Estonian** (Tallinn), which is spread in most of Estonia, and

coastal northern (similar to Finnish), spoken by the population of a relatively narrow northeastern coastal area of the Gulf of Finland.

The Estonian literary language is based on the north-Estonian dialect.

The ethnic nucleus of the ancestors of the contemporary Estonians was formed from at least three ethnically different components: first, the local tribes which inhabited Estonian territory in the first half of the third millennium BC; second, the Baltic-Finnish tribes of hunters and fishermen which moved here from the east, possibly no later than the middle of the third millennium BC, and which partially absorbed the indigenous population; third, the ancestors of the Baltic tribes which came here from the south by the end of the third millennium BC, already familiar with the elements of farming and livestock breeding. Subsequently, along with the consolidation processes which occurred within the Estonian tribes which were developing here, were interethnic processes of interaction with the eastern Finno-Ugric, northern-Germanic, and subsequently, eastern-Slavic populations.

By the end of the first millennium AD, the features of a single Estonian ethnos began to appear more clearly and the former tribal groups were replaced by territorially demarcated entities.

The German-Scandinavian expansion, which started at the beginning of the 13th century, and the ethnopolitical changes which followed it, played an equivocal role in the ethnic history of the Estonian people and in the shaping of its ethnocultural features. Starting with the second quarter of the 13th century and until the mid-16th century, the Estonian territory was under the rule of the Crusaders and became part of Livonia. By the end of the 16th century it was divided among Sweden (the northern part), *Reich Polita* (the southern part), and Denmark (*Saaremaa* Island); from the middle of the 17th century to the beginning of the 18th century all of it was part of Sweden.

After the Northern War, on the basis of the *Neustadt Peace Treaty* (1721) the territory became part of Russia.

The material and spiritual culture of the Estonian people developed on their own indigenous basis although, at the same time, experiencing the fruitful influence of Scandinavia and western areas and the islands, on the one hand, and the eastern-Slavic influence in the eastern and southern areas, on the other. The original foundations and traces of western and eastern influence may be traced in settlements, housing, clothing, food, traditions, and customs.

Most believing Estonians are Protestant (Lutheran). A small group of Orthodox Estonians are found primarily among the subethnic *Setu* group—the original inhabitants of the areas of southeastern Estonia and in *Pechorskiy Rayon*, *Pskov Oblast*, known as *Setumaa* (previously known as *Setukesia*). The Russians referred to the group of *Setu* Estonians who had converted to Orthodoxy under the influence of Slavic population as “semi-believers.” The same name was given to the Estonianized old-rite Russian population which had

settled on the northern shore of *Chudskoye Lake* and had converted to the Lutheran faith.

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LATVIA

New 'Latvian Ruble' Faces Difficulties

92UN1351A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
18 May 92 Morning Edition p 2

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent Irina Litvinova: “The Ruble Has More Difficulties...Baltic States Will Introduce Their Own Currency”]

[Text] Latvia is following with alarm the first steps of a newborn but unwanted child—the Latvian ruble. There are almost no optimistic predictions, and the three “fathers” from the Committee on Monetary Reform, including Prime Minister *Ivars Godmanis*, have not concealed the fact that the “*Latvijas rublis*” was born of harsh necessity. The absence of cash money threatened to cause a social crisis. But will the introduction of the monetary surrogate not lead to even graver consequences?”

When assessing the situation experts break the tension among the population with jokes like the anecdote about the mole who went to look for a job. To the question, “What are you able to do?”—the mole answered: “Dig.” “And what else?” The mole thought for a long time and then said: “Not dig.”... That is the way things are in Latvian business: to accept the “*Latvijas rublis*” or not? “Not to accept it” is not permitted by legislation (it has already been reported that it will be stiffened and corrections in the administrative code specify that refusal to accept the monetary bills of the Bank of Latvia entails both fines and administrative arrest). But somehow the instinct for self-preservation keeps one from “accepting” it with the confidence that one will not lose one's shirt. Peasants, for example, must buy feed, technical equipment, and fuel either with hard currency or with rubles. They have no hard currency. What is left is the ruble, for which they should sell their products—if they want to survive. The “*rublis*”—which will have a circulation that is limited additionally by the desire or lack of desire of the entrepreneurs to accept it—will end up in a position of disadvantage on its own territory. As distinct from Ukraine, where there is a fairly large domestic market which makes it possible for the coupon to survive, Latvia does not have this advantage. Moreover, the Baltic states have been ignoring the advice of Western experts to join forces in monetary reform. The result is that there is a common Baltic political space but no common Baltic market.

Even in the first days of its circulation the Baltic ruble was compared to a multitude of things—including baseball cards and lottery tickets. Moreover, the new colored bills have come to be called “*repshiks*”—after the name of the president of the Bank of Latvia, *Einars Repshe*. A physicist by education and one of the youngest deputies of the Supreme Soviet, he displayed enviable courage a couple of months ago when he decided to reform banking in Latvia. But *A. Berg-Bergmanis* who supported him (he resigned from his post as vice president literally on the eve of the introduction

of the Latvian ruble) considers the introduction of a temporary means of payment to be a dramatic mistake and a drop in the exchange rate of the Latvian ruble—to be inevitable.

What is left for the population to do but smile while reading the anecdote about the mole? Should they believe that the president of the Bank of Latvia will keep his word and not allow the printing press to start running too fast. For with hyperinflation it will also be impossible to look to the stingy neighbor in the east where all problems originate.

So far only merchants who come in to the markets categorically refuse to accept the Latvian ruble. The new means of payment has circulation on a par with the Russian ruble and they are exchanged one for one in money changing offices.

Chairman Outlines Role Of Russian Society Of Latvia

92UN1354A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 18 May 92 Morning Edition p 3

[Russian Society in Latvia Chairman G. Romashov interviewed by Yuriy Stroganov: "Interview: Conscience Test"]

[Text] Seemingly well-disposed a few years ago, people's minds have proved fraught with various forces that had been artificially repressed for a time, including forces that can destroy peace. What are indigenous residents and the people who came from other places now to use as a guide in their mutual relations?

Confrontation. Pluses and minuses. Each side considers its position to be a plus. Indigenous residents...and occupiers, migrants, colonists, stateless persons. People who long considered the republic to be their homeland have heard any number of such words in recent years. Such is reality.

Many nonindigenous residents are getting help in finding their bearings from the Russian Society of Latvia (RSL). The chairman of its center council, G. Romashov, answered our questions.

[Romashov] The Russian Society of Latvia, as an independent, nonpolitical social and cultural organization that brings together on a voluntary basis not just Russians, but also people of other nationalities who are linked by their native Russian language and centuries of Russian culture, was created more than a year ago. Its aim is to preserve and develop national and cultural identity, traditional spirituality, and historical memory. It provides moral and material support to all RSL members regardless of nationality.

Our organizational structure is based on primary Russian communities, which can take the form of individual families, parents' committees, interest clubs, and associations of fellow countrymen. The RSL's supreme body of self-administration is the annual Russian assembly of Latvia. Between councils, self-administration is exercised by the RSL center, which consists of a president elected by the Russian assembly, a vice-president and chairman of the center council, who are confirmed by the assembly, and chairmen of the functional interest committees.

The Russian Society of Latvia operates within the framework of republic legislation and in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, cooperates with other national associations in Latvia, coordinates the society's interests with them, and also maintains contacts with government and administrative bodies of Latvia, Russia, and other states and with Russian societies outside Latvia.

Unfortunately, residents of Latvia's nonindigenous nationalities—and they account for 48 percent of the entire population—do not have public self-administered structures that could represent their interests. The existing Association of National Cultural Societies brings together more than 20 small societies that sponsor cultural and artistic events. As a nonpolitical organization with a broader range of tasks, the RSL does not belong to the association. The Russian Society has taken its first step toward the establishment of a self-administered public structure in Latvia. The RSL already operates a technological university with advanced study of the Latvian language; it also sponsors Russian national classes in schools and operates preschool childcare facilities, music clubs, and a school for aesthetic education and development for preschool-age children.

[Correspondent] Nevertheless, interethnic relations in Latvia are not simple. Latvians are afraid of losing their identity, while Russians fear that their rights will be violated—and not without grounds.

[Romashov] The problem of Latvian citizenship is the most acute. The resolution on restoring Latvian citizenship adopted by the republic Supreme Council has divided the population into those who will receive citizenship (those who lived in Latvia prior to 1940 and their descendants), and those who must obtain citizenship through naturalization, which entails passing a language test and signing an oath. There is also a third group—those who have no chance of obtaining citizenship because of restrictions listed in the resolution and a quota of 16 years of residency in Latvia. By the end of the year, plans call for registering all residents, after which a figure will be obtained for the number of stateless persons—people without citizenship. In our opinion, they could number no less than 500,000. The draft citizenship law has passed first reading, and all the requirements of the adopted resolution have been incorporated in it.

In our opinion, the citizenship law must be such that ethnic relations are in no way exacerbated. All permanent residents at the time of the laws' adoption should obtain citizenship—this is the so-called zero option. And if a quota of two to five years is established, it must apply only to people coming to Latvia. Therefore, we view A. Gorbunov's statement to the effect that only Latvian citizens should solve the citizenship problem as discriminatory. The problem of citizenship must be solved by the state in the form of its supreme body—the Supreme Council.

[Correspondent] Some Russians take the view that if the institution of dual citizenship is lacking, then they need to take Russian citizenship and to decline the republic's citizenship. What is your opinion?

[Romashov] The institution of dual citizenship exists in Latvia, but only for Latvians living abroad. Among those who will not obtain citizenship in Latvia are already some who want to obtain Russian, Ukrainian, or Byelorussian citizenship, provided there will be an appropriate mechanism for this. But taking Russian citizenship and declining Latvian citizenship is the independent choice of every person. After all, a person will be deliberately choosing the status of foreigner, with all the ensuring legal, political, and economic consequences.

[Correspondent] What role, in your view, should Russia play in the solution of these problems?

[Romashov] Russia must always remember the "new Russian community abroad" in the Baltics. In Latvia, for

example, there are more than 900,000 Russians. In concluding treaties and agreements at the intergovernmental level, it is essential to establish guarantees that human rights will not be violated and a mechanism for providing humanitarian and other assistance to Russians.

This opinion is just one viewpoint, albeit one shared by many.

The national radicals will undoubtedly respond with a mass of arguments and call on thousands of supporters as witnesses.

Only a search for paths to accord will erect barriers on the path to confrontation. But this search can hardly be undertaken when one of the sides is in a defensive position. And is there any need to reinvent the bicycle when the civilized world is oriented toward the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and toward unchanging laws of conscience?

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